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Abstract
Debates concerning international justice are now integral to the discipline of 
international relations. Among the most pressing of these ethical and legal 
dilemmas is the matter of whether the use of force can be justified for 
humanitarian purposes, or for the protection of human rights. Although a 
wealth of theorists have taken aim at this issue, it is the contention of this 
thesis that only the ‘ontology of becoming’ (an idea which is traced through all 
branches of constructivist theorising) boasts the conceptual and analytical 
force to successfully and thoroughly appraise the relationship between 
humanitarian intervention and international justice. In developing this claim, 
this thesis seeks to hybridise constructivism with a number of other theories 
which employ the arguments associated with the ontology of becoming, 
including: cosmopolitanism, communitarianism, solidarism and feminism. The 
purpose of this process is to demonstrate the ways in which this branch of 
international relations theory can both enrich, and be enriched by an account 
o f what might be thought of as a ‘constructed duty of justice’.
Ultimately, this thesis asserts that adherence to the requirement of 
institutional feasibility dictated by the ontology of becoming necessarily limits 
the agenda for the reform of international society. However, those normative 
developments which can withstand the restrictions brought to bear by the 
consensual nature of international politics do provide the means for 
international society to advance, albeit incrementally and inconsistently, 
toward an increasingly prominent role for considerations of justice.
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Introduction
If there is to be a sense of reality, then there must also be a sense of possibility.1
Robert Musil The Man Without Qualities
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse and appraise the nature and limits of a 
duty of justice in international society, through the conduit of humanitarian 
intervention (HI) and the theoretical lens of social constructivism. As David 
Boucher has persuasively argued, a comparable agenda unites almost all 
political theorists concerned with the parameters of international justice.
[t]he same substantive end is desired by many political theorists of 
international relations, an extension of the moral community which posits a 
certain degree of universalism, while at the same time seeking to preserve 
difference and respect for diverse identities.2
It is this attempt to balance: human rights (HR) with cultural diversity; 
individual well-being with the territorial integrity of states; and a realistic 
appreciation of the status quo with the pursuit of tenable and durable moral 
reform to the international system which informs efforts to define, and if 
necessary restrict, our conceptions of an international duty of justice. One of 
the principal contentions of this thesis is that, of the myriad theoretical 
approaches which govern the study of international relations (IR), social 
constructivism is the most effectively equipped to provide the conceptual tools 
for these complex debates. This is due to the fact that all subsets of
1 (Cited) Andrew Hurrell, On Global Order, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 18
2 David Boucher, Political Theories o f International Relations, (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1998), p.395
1
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constructivism share a commitment to an “ontology of becoming”;3 a notion 
which is drawn from feminist IR theorising and which encourages an 
engagement not only with what is but also with what might be. In other words, 
the analytical scope of constructivism is such that it incorporates both ‘being’ 
and ‘becoming’ and facilitates investigation into “how society has changed, 
what the principal difficulties and challenges are, and what the way forward 
might look like” .4 The ontology of becoming, as defined in this thesis, rejects 
realist claims that inter-state relations are characterised by an unchanging 
pattern of self-help and mutual insecurity, in which moral progress is both 
meaningless and inconceivable. Neither are its advocates persuaded by the 
liberal assertion that certain a priori first principles regarding the universal 
nature of a broad raft of HR have already served fundamentally to alter the 
nature of national sovereignty (NS) and the scope of public international law 
(PIL).
Instead, the ontology of becoming suggests that through a focus on 
incremental normative developments and the subtle linguistic modifications 
which so often accompany or precipitate them, it is possible to analyse 
change where it has already taken place and to identify the potential for the 
future development o f international society. In so doing, it is imperative to take 
account of the reality: that states remain the principal subjects of a 
consensual framework of PIL; that power and national self-interest, (albeit 
defined much more broadly than reductivist realist terms would allow) remain
3 Birgit Locher and Elisabeth Prugl, ‘Feminism and Constructivism: Worlds Apart or Sharing 
the Middle Ground?’, International Studies Quarterly, 45(1), 2001, pp. 111 -129
4 Hurrell, Global Order, p.8
2
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foundational elements of IR; and that the relationship between morality and 
law is key to executing and consolidating lasting moral progress. So it is that 
the constructivist ontology of becoming both encourages and places 
necessary limits upon moral theorising. Those commentators who are 
constrained by its confines are necessarily inclined toward a certain degree of 
conservatism in their conception of the international duty of justice owed by 
citizens to strangers. However, those who fail to respect the requirement of 
feasibility dictated by this ontological framework tend ultimately to 
misunderstand the relationship between law, politics, and ethics and to arrive 
at moral prescriptions which are fundamentally unrealistic.
In order to explore the hypothesis that constructivism provides the most 
compelling and engaging insights into the discourse of international justice, it 
is necessary to refine both these otherwise immeasurably broad concepts. In 
this context, constructivism will be viewed as “a group of related approaches, 
rather than one completely coherent approach”.5 It will be subdivided and 
hybridised in accordance with the suggestion that the “sources of 
constructivist theorising are many and varied”6 and that “a number of different 
broad orientations”7 can be identified “in constructivist scholarship” . Exploring 
and analysing the overlap between constructivism and four alternative 
theoretical appraisals of international politics -  feminism, cosmopolitanism, 
solidarism and communitarianism - will establish both the breadth and depth 
of constructivist analysis. It will demonstrate the ability of constructivism to
5 Nicholas J. Rengger, International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem o f Order: 
Beyond International Relations Theory, (London, Routledge, 2000), p.81
6 Ibid
7 Ibid
3
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assimilate elements of both the positivist and post-positivist projects and to 
assess the current constraints imposed upon interaction between global 
political actors, as well as the potential for the crystallisation of the normative 
developments which might ultimately come to erode them.
In the context of this project, HI will serve as a microcosm of international 
justice more generally. There are several reasons for this, the most self- 
evident being that brevity does not allow for a thorough engagement with all 
aspects of an issue as vast as international justice. However, since it draws 
upon matters as diverse and controversial as: the use of force, gender and 
racial inequality, regime change, and economic deprivation, HI can certainly 
be said to represent, to varying extents, the majority of the most pressing 
debates in IR theory.
This chapter will serve to introduce and investigate some of the key 
conceptual categories which will form the basis of the project. It will begin by 
sketching the traditional approach to international justice, so as to establish 
the ways in which the findings of this thesis may be situated within the wider 
canon of IR theory. This will be followed by a detailed engagement with the 
development of constructivism and a brief overview of the notion of human 
protection which has given rise to both HI and, in more recent years, the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Taken together, this analysis will seek to draw 
out the relationship between the ontology of becoming and what will be 
referred to throughout this project as the ‘constructed duty of justice’; thereby
4
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serving to assess both the demands and the limitations of our obligations to 
those beyond our borders who find themselves persecuted or destitute.
I. Traditional Conceptions of International Justice
In order to appreciate the overall purpose of a project of this nature, it is 
necessary to map the development of norms of international justice, not least 
the evolution of the concept itself from a relatively peripheral element of IR 
theorising (deemed as the exclusive preserve of political philosophers), to a 
viable category of analysis. From the time of its inception until at least the 
1970s, IR was dominated by the hegemonic discourse of realism, proponents 
of which saw international politics as akin to the natural sciences. On this 
basis, it was believed that the power-seeking behaviour of states, the only 
currency of any value to theorists of IR, could be measured, assessed, and 
even predicted using positivist tools of analysis and assumptions of rational 
choice. States were considered to be inherently self-serving, governed by a 
fixed set of exogenously given interests concerned with increasing the power 
and influence which they could exercise over their rivals. Throughout this 
period of realist dominance, the foundational principle of ‘raison d ’etat’ (the 
notion that a leader owes their allegiance exclusively to their own state and 
citizens and that this loyalty permits any range of behaviours which might 
guarantee the survival of that state) was continually challenged by liberals 
who argued that cooperation between states could serve to fulfil a ‘harmony of 
interests’ and engender the conditions for peaceful coexistence. 
Nevertheless, the ontological and epistemological similarities between the two 
theories, and in particular their shared conviction that anarchy was the
5
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inevitable consequence of NS, ensured that the substantive differences 
between them (especially in their respective guises of neo-realism and neo­
liberalism) were relatively few. In this context, responses to the concept of 
universal HR tended to be somewhat hostile and during the Cold War in 
particular considerations of justice were necessarily deferential to the 
demands of international order with which they were said to conflict. Against 
the backdrop of mutually assured destruction HR infringements abounded 
and, despite the codification of HR standards in the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights (1948), the Genocide Convention (1950); the Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (1966), and the Covenant on Social, Economic and 
Cultural Rights (1966), self-determination and non-intervention remained 
firmly in place as the peremptory norms of international society.
However, as the Cold W ar drew to a close, formerly marginal theoretical 
approaches benefited from the decline of neo-realism, advocates of which 
had failed to predict the end of the conflict. The neo-neo synthesis8 was 
exposed as suffering the consequences of its own methodological reductivism 
and over-estimating and under-investigating the concepts of power and 
interest. As a consequence, international justice emerged as a contested and 
fascinating concept which elicited a range of conflicting responses. 
Increasingly, an engagement with international order began to entail some 
consideration of justice as an analytical factor and the suggestion that
8 Ole Waever, The Rise and Fall of the Inter-paradigm Debate’ Steve Smith, Ken Booth and 
Marysia Zalewski (eds), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.163-164
6
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individuals, as well as the states which they constituted, might be an 
appropriate referent for IR and PIL, began to gain ground.
As a consequence, the contest between realists and liberals was partially 
displaced in favour of Chris Brown’s groundbreaking distinction between 
cosmopolitanism and communitarianism;9 a demarcation which runs as 
follows. Cosmopolitans tend to base their appeals to universality on a form of 
“covering law universalism”10, which suggests that a broad range of a priori 
moral principles can be said to exist across time and space. These principles 
transcend political society and are not contingent upon institutionalisation or 
formalised cross-cultural consensus. According to cosmopolitan theorising, 
we live, or should aspire to live, in a world society in which our duty of care 
does not depend upon membership of “bounded political communities” .11 
Thus, there is no marked disparity between the obligations which we accept 
toward our fellow citizens and those which we would willingly extend to global 
humanity. By way of contrast, communitarians would argue that our identities 
and interests are defined, and find expression, within our individual political 
communities. This does not entirely preclude the possibility that certain 
universal standards of morality or justice might emerge but it does ensure that 
their legitimacy can only derive from extensive agreement - explicit or tacit -  
amongst a wide range of cultures or societies. According to this line of
9 See Chris Brown, ‘Borders and Identity in International Political Theory’ Mathias Albert,
David Jacobsen and Yosef Lapid (eds) Identity, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International 
Relations Theory, (USA, Minnesota University Press, 2001), p.117-137
10 Michael Walzer, ‘Nation and Universe’ The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Brasenose 
College, Oxford University, 01/05/89 and 08/05/89, http://www.tannerlectures.utah- 
edu/lectures/documents/walzer90.pdf. pp.510-556, [01/03/06], pp.510
11 Andrew Hurrell, ‘Order and Justice in International Relations: What is at Stake?’ Rosemary 
Foot, John Lewis and Andrew Hurrell (eds), Order and Justice in International Relations 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003) p.34
7
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argument, true universality is inordinately rare and attempts to impose values 
upon those elements of international society which might, on particularist 
grounds, reasonably reject them will inevitably undermine the conditions for 
order and provoke conflict within and between states. This viewpoint is 
rebuffed by cosmopolitans who argue that respect for diverse cultures must 
depend upon the willingness and ability of such political communities to 
protect HR standards and that the failure to acknowledge this risks turning 
defenders of cultural diversity into apologists for state-sponsored repression.
The dominance of such entrenched and apparently irreconcilable convictions 
on either side of the debate has tended to reinforce a somewhat defeatist 
perception. Specifically, that
... discussions of international justice... pose an unwelcome choice. Either we 
can abstract from the reality of boundaries and think about principles of 
justice that assume an ideal, cosmopolitan world, in which justice and human 
rights do not stop at the boundaries of states; or we can acknowledge the 
reality of boundaries and construe the principles of justice as subordinate to 
those of national sovereignty.12
The assumption that debates surrounding international justice are necessarily 
constrained by this theoretical choice has impacted upon the discipline in a 
number of ways. The most compelling development from the perspective of 
this project is the emergence of a so-called ‘third’ or ‘middle way’13. This 
thesis contends that the balance implied by the middle way can be
12 Onora O ’Neill, ‘Gender and International Relations’, British Journal o f Political Science, 
20(4), October 1990, pp.439-459, pp.445
13 Chris Brown, ‘Towards a neo-Aristotelian Resolution of the Cosmopolitan-Communitarian 
Debate’, Chris Brown, Practical Judgements in International Political Theory: Selected 
Essays, (Oxford, Routledge, 2010), p.40-52
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successfully struck by means of constructivist theorising. This is because 
constructivism can be “profitably synthesised”14 with both cosmopolitanism 
and communitarianism to produce a hybridised account of international 
justice, which subscribes to neither theoretical extreme. This process of 
hybridisation can be substantially enriched through the incorporation of ideas 
espoused by solidarists and feminists, both of whom are principally 
concerned, in Boucher’s terms, with the ‘extension of the moral community’15 
and the establishment of standards of international justice. Hybridisation is a 
core element of this project since it is the ability of constructivism to augment 
and be augmented by alternative theories which ensures that it offers the 
most promising route to a nuanced understanding of international justice. 
Moreover, hybridisation will demonstrate that whilst the analytical framework 
of the ontology of becoming is utilised to varying extents by a range of IR 
theorists, only constructivists or those who incorporate constructivism into 
their theorising, can balance the requirement of feasibility with a relatively 
ambitious agenda for reform.
II. Why Social Constructivism?
Although the decision to add to the growing literature on international justice is 
relatively uncontroversial, the theoretical lens through which this project will 
be envisaged requires further explanation. Therefore, the first issue which this 
thesis must address is the matter of why social constructivism should form its 
theoretical basis. The answer lies in the fact that, for constructivists, “[A]ll
14 Tony Evans and Peter Wilson, ‘Regime Theory and the English School of International 
Relations: A Comparison’, Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, 21(3), 1992, pp.329- 
351, pp.329
15 Political Theories, 1998, p.395
9
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politics is shaped through the webs of meaning that are developed both 
intentionally and otherwise, through time and chance” .16 As such, the source 
of reform in international politics lies in the changing identities and interests of 
global political actors and it is this dynamic conception of HR which gives 
justice claims their purchase. This approach to ‘becoming’ in IR is key to an 
understanding of the development of the discourse of justice in international 
society.
Constructivism, a theoretical framework which rose to prominence in the early 
1990s, posits the notion that the choice between accepting, or rejecting, 
boundaries as barriers to justice is an unrealistic and unnecessary dichotomy. 
Instead, proponents of this emerging viewpoint argue that boundaries are 
constructed through processes of interaction between global political actors 
and, in particular, states. This is not to suggest that such limits are, in some 
sense, unreal, or lacking in significance but rather the assertion is that, as 
social constructs, they can be redrawn or re-envisaged in line with 
incremental normative developments. This middle ground seeks to illuminate 
the relationship between international order and international justice, by 
proving that these values, far from being diametrically opposed to one 
another, are inter-related. In short, “justice is part of the constitution of order, 
so that the two cannot be contrasted straightforwardly” .17
16 Nicholas Rengger, ‘On the Just War Tradition in the Twenty-First Century’, International 
Affairs, 78(2), April 2002, pp.353-363, pp.353
17 Ian Harris, ‘Order and Justice in The  Anarchical Society’, International Affairs, 69(4), 
October 1993, pp.725-741, pp.725
10
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As well as unpacking the relationship between international order and 
international justice, constructivists reject more traditional conceptions of NS, 
claiming that “sovereignty is a social construct, and like all social institutions 
its location is subject to changing interpretations”.18 These developments are 
precipitated as much by ideational shifts as by changes in the material 
environment and for this reason constructivists have always warned against 
the dangers of under-estimating “the power of ideas, in particular of so-called 
soft-hearted and soft-headed ones like human rights and humanitarian 
action” .19 In this respect, constructivism challenges the dominance of realism 
inasmuch as it indicates that any theory which sacrifices the ideational to the 
material will inevitably understate the value and influence of normative 
developments.
This focus on the changing nature of norms informs an understanding of the 
ontology of becoming. A norm is most succinctly defined as “a standard of 
appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity”20 and, according to 
constructivists, once a particular standard or set of expectations becomes 
embedded in inter-state relations, global political actors become constrained 
by its terms. The need to maintain reputation and influence restricts the 
options available to even the most powerful of states and can ultimately come 
to modify or reconceptualise the ‘rules’ which govern international society. In 
this sense, notions as fundamental to international politics as NS or anarchy
18 J. Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, T he  State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the 
Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations’, International Organisation, 48(1), Winter 
1994, pp.107-130, pp.109
19 Thomas G. Weiss, ‘Researching Humanitarian Intervention: Some Lessons’, Journal o f 
Peace Research [online], 38(4), July 2001, pp. 419-428, pp.425
20 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change’, International Organisation, 52(4), 1998, pp.887-917, pp.891
11
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are, in fact, the by-product of shared normative, linguistic, legal, political and 
social understandings. From the perspective of the ontology of becoming, it is 
this developing and overlapping consensus which sows the seeds for change 
at the international level and which can lead to the universalisation of certain 
rights claims, without relying upon metaphysical characterisations of a priori 
entitlements. In this sense, the constructivist ontology of becoming boasts the 
potential to strike the balance between the universalising instinct of the 
cosmopolitan and the commitment to cultural sensitivity which typifies the 
communitarian project. As such, constructivism offers a unique insight into 
changing conceptions of international justice and the moral obligations which 
they may imply.
III. Why Humanitarian Intervention?
This chapter has so far sought to establish that an investigation of continuity 
and change at the international level is incomplete without a thorough 
engagement with issues of international justice. Similarly, it has advanced the 
claim that social constructivism, in the hybridised forms which this project will 
outline, and with its reliance upon the ontology of becoming, offers the most 
effective tools for such an investigation. What remains at issue is the choice of 
HI as the norm of international justice most appropriate to this endeavour. HI, 
defined as “the violation of a nation state ’s sovereignty for the purpose of 
protecting human life from government repression... or civil breakdown”,21 is 
riddled with contrasting and contradictory imperatives. Whilst sustained and 
systematic HR abuses in every corner of the world prompt emotional pleas for
21 Alex de Waal and Rakiya Omaar, ‘Can Military Intervention be ‘Humanitarian’?, Middle East 
Report, 187/188, pp.3
12
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any effective response to alleviate human suffering, concerns that the 
institutionalisation of a so-called ‘right to intervene’ would invite abuse by the 
self-interested and the powerful are as established and compelling, as these 
calls to action. This seemingly intractable quandary speaks to a broader 
debate which has long echoed through IR, namely the relationship between 
the values of order and justice and the matter of the existence and extent of 
the obligations owed to persecuted or desperate strangers. It is for this 
reason that the issues surrounding HI are in such desperate need of 
exploration and resolution; a task for which constructivism is uniquely 
equipped.
However, whilst no one would contest the extent of human tragedy which the 
‘loud emergencies’ of ethnic cleansing and genocide engender, there are still 
those who might resist the conflation, for the purposes of this thesis, of HI and 
international justice. In fact, an analysis of HI has the potential to meet with 
some derision, either from realists who argue that it simply numbers among a 
series of political manoeuvres or rhetorical devices which are designed to 
promote the interests of powerful states, or from the largely post-positivist 
perspectives of those who have striven to ensure that the discipline of IR must 
move beyond the traditional focus on matters pertaining to the use of force.
This thesis contends that both objections are without foundation. HI is 
intrinsically connected to the incremental, inconsistent, yet vital development 
of HR norms which are, themselves, linked to a reconceptualised notion of the 
limitations of NS. As such, it is mistaken to assume that this discourse is
13
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simply the latest incarnation of power politics. It has its basis in an institutional 
and philosophical consensus, albeit an extremely limited one, concerning the 
basic rights of all human beings and the matter of how and when international 
society ought to respond to the systematic infringement of such rights. 
Equally, the very notion of ‘power politics’ necessitates and demands a much 
deeper analysis than realism has traditionally afforded its proponents, since 
insufficient consideration has generally been given to the factors and 
processes which shape the national interest and the normative framework 
which so profoundly influences the behaviour of global political actors.
Similarly, those concerned that a focus on HI threatens to narrow the agenda 
of IR research in favour of militarism, overlook two key issues: the enduring 
moral significance of debates surrounding the resort to force and the 
relevance of intervention to the discourse of human security. The first of these 
issues is based on the practical consideration that, as unpalatable as many 
commentators may consider political violence to be, it remains a feature of 
international society. As such, violence demands ethical reflection. Even 
those whose agenda is predominately pacifist must concede that 
understanding the conditions which can result in conflict is a necessary 
component of restricting its outbreak.
The second issue relates to the definition of security which informs an account 
of HI. Although still a relatively novel concept (first summarised in the report of 
the 2003 United Nations Commission on Human Security), the language from 
which human security derives its meaning has been employed by many
14
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philosophers and practitioners of international politics to draw attention to the 
need to address two dimensions of security, “freedom from fear”22 (physical 
security) and “freedom from want”23 (economic security). Some commentators 
have even gone so far as to suggest that because human security 
emphasises that individuals as well as states ought to be considered as 
subjects of PIL, it could be said to undermine some of the core assumptions 
on which the state system is based.
The underlying issues of human security -  a focus on the individual, the 
waning of state sovereignty and the rise of new actors, the shift in our 
understanding of security, the need and risks of ‘saving strangers’ through 
humanitarian intervention, the reform of the Security Council, the conduct of 
complex peace missions, and the adequate reaction to new threats -  pose a 
challenge to international law.24
An acknowledgement of the inter-related nature of these varying dimensions 
of security indicates that an investigation into HI allows for and arguably even 
necessitates an engagement with any number of competing issues in IR. 
These include matters o f distributive justice, since one may argue that the 
widespread violation of HR often occurs in regions of the world beset by 
extreme poverty. Similarly, it is impossible to divorce debates surrounding HI 
from a consideration of gender or racial justice, since institutionalised patterns 
of discrimination often inform genocidal acts or inclinations. So it is that an 
analysis of both the nature and the necessary limits of a constructed duty of 
justice in the arena of HI speaks to demands for justice across the board and
22 Heidi Hudson, ‘Doing Security as if Humans Matter: A Feminist Perspective on Gender and 
Human Security’, Security Dialogue, 2005, pp. 155-171, pp. 164
23 Ibid
24 Gerd Oberleitner, ‘Human Security: A Challenge to International Law?’, Global 
Governance, 11, 2005, pp.185-203, pp. 185
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provides us with an appreciation of the practical and moral constraints at work 
in the order versus justice debate.
IV. Humanitarian Intervention, the Ontology of Becoming and the 
Constructed Duty of Justice
Much debate concerning HI is based on appeals to the just war (JW) tradition, 
principally associated with “the writings of Ambrose and Augustine in late 
antiquity and those of later scholastics like Suarez and Vitoria and Protestant 
natural lawyers like Grotius”.25 Although not originally framed as a defence for 
HI, its terms have been appropriated by those who wish to encourage or to 
constrain the development of a norm of human protection. It is generally 
accepted that if a military incursion is to conform to moral exigencies it must 
fulfil the following criteria:
1. Presence of just cause,
2. Presence of competent authority to act,
3. Right intention in action,
4. Reasonable hope of success, and
5. Overall proportionality of good (in ends desired).26
Most commentators would interpret the final requirement as the expectation 
that, in as far as possible, non-combatants should be protected during conflict. 
These principles have been embraced by modern theorists of intervention and 
warfare and even formed the basis of the 2001 International Commission on
25 Rengger, The Just War’, pp.354
26 Michael J. Butler, ‘US Military Intervention in Crisis, 1945-1994: An Empirical Study of Just 
War Theory, Journal o f Conflict Resolution, 47(2), April 2003, pp.226-248, pp.232
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Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) Report, forerunner to the 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P).
However, in many respects, the ICISS Report and the R2P represented a 
response to the inability of the international community to implement these 
standards effectively or consistently. In fact, it was the succession of high 
profile failures in the face of humanitarian disaster which led then Secretary 
General Kofi Annan publically to state that the assumption in favour of NS 
must be subject to some degree of revision. As a result, in 2000, he issued an 
impassioned plea, asking in his Nobel Lecture We, the Peoples:
[i]f humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on 
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica - to gross 
and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our 
common humanity? . . . Surely no legal principle - not even sovereignty - can 
ever shield crimes against humanity.27
For many, Annan’s comments were of incalculable normative significance. 
After all, “[wjhen one recognises that the sanctity of state sovereignty is the 
foundation of the United Nations, to have its principal appointed officer plea 
for intervention is a profound shift in itse lf’.28 In an international society 
hitherto structured around notions of non-intervention and self-determination,
27 Michael Levine-Clark, Review Article: ‘We, the Peoples’ The Role of the United Nations in 
21st Century’, Journal o f Government Information, 28(5), September-October 2001, pp.571- 
574, pp.574
28 Lieutenant General John M. Sanderson (Ret’d), The Need for Military Intervention in 
Humanitarian Emergencies’, International Migration Review, 35(1), Spring 2001, pp. 117-123,
pp.122
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the suggestion that NS could no longer function as a “license to kill”29 
represented a substantial legal and ethical challenge.
Of particular significance from the perspective of the ontology of becoming is
the manner in which Annan’s bold statement laid the foundations for the
discourse of ‘conditional sovereignty’. Although it was hoped that, in shifting
the emphasis from interveners to those in need of rescue, the R2P would
divest humanitarianism of its neo-imperialist overtones, even those who doubt
whether this was achieved would nonetheless acknowledge the normative
resonance of the notion that NS implies both power and responsibility.
Conditional sovereignty or ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ renders respect for
territorial integrity contingent upon evidence of good governance and
concedes that where states fail to discharge their most basic duties to their
citizens, the international community has cause to accept a default
responsibility on their behalf. For constructivists, this points to the concept of
becoming in action. From both a linguistic and a practical point of view, the
framers of the R2P have attempted to infuse the word ‘sovereignty’ with a new
meaning; a meaning which might potentially be employed to enable or
legitimate a new range of political behaviours. As such, the same expression
which has been used to guard against HI for generations is now argued, by
some, to justify it in certain instances. A term once associated exclusively with
power, is now designed to call to mind the necessary limits which must be
placed upon the exercise of such power. The process of assigning and
reassigning meaning in this way is integral to the ‘construction’ of standards of
29 Nicholas J. Wheeler, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and World Politics’, John Baylis and Steve 
Smith (eds), The Globalisation o f World Politics, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), 
p.471
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international justice. As new normative commitments emerge and are 
reiterated among and between global political actors, they may eventually 
gain an increased sense of legitimacy until they begin to form part of the fabric 
of international society itself, displacing the norms to which they once posed a 
challenge. It is by means of this process, that the understandings and 
expectations associated with international justice and the obligations which 
derive from them might come to evolve, and the moral progress of 
international society may be secured. Such is the relationship between the 
ontology of becoming and the constructed duty of justice.
Significantly, this thesis does not claim that conditional sovereignty has 
attained the status of ‘emerging norm’, or even that it could or should. Very 
few commentators beyond the most radical elements of the liberal 
cosmopolitan tradition would argue that this changing conception of NS (or 
the norms of human protection associated with it) has attained what the 
constructivist “norm life cycle”30 would define as the impending ability to 
implement a broad “systematic shift”31 in IR and PIL, capable of overturning 
the dominance of non-intervention and self-determination. After all, the vast 
majority of the international community remains wedded to more traditional 
understandings of inter-state relations. However, for constructivists, who seek 
to “describe the world not as one that is, but as one that is in the process of 
becoming”,32 the very fact that a reconceptualised understanding of NS has
30 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics’, pp.891
31 Carsten Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric of Emerging Legal Norm?’, The 
American Journal o f International Law, 101(1), January 2007, pp.99-120, pp.100
32 Locherand Prugl, ‘Feminism and Constructivism’, pp.114
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entered, to some extent, into the diplomatic dialogue of the society of states is 
engaging in itself.
As further exposition will reveal, the development of legal and political norms 
is a painstaking and incremental process and one which is fraught with 
complications and conflicting agendas; something which is illustrated by the 
diverse responses to the establishment of the R2P. For some, the framing of 
the ICISS is indicative of the fact that “conservative interpretations of positive 
international law do not cover the full spectrum of moral reasoning on matters 
of war and peace”33 and must be supplemented through the assimilation of 
developing norms of human protection. For others, the ICISS represented the 
most coherent attempt to date to draw up criteria to govern HI which could 
strike the balance between humanitarian impulse and political reality. For 
these commentators, “the moral and the strategic are intimately connected; 
what is required is a framework of argument that embraces both”.34 Still others 
continue to cling to a pluralist account of the relationship between states’ 
rights and HR arguing that the principles of territorial integrity and non­
intervention should be protected by the apparatus of international politics. For 
these critics,
[h ]owever im perfectly observed , the  presum ption  against m ilitary intervention, 
including even hum anitarian  in te rvention , has not served badly as an ordering 
principle o f in ternational re la tions. The protection w hich it provides has been 
one basis for so m any s ta tes jo in ing , and staying w ithin, the United Nations. It
33 Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Ethics and Intervention: The ‘Humanitarian Exception’ and the Problem of 
Abuse in the Case of Iraq’, Journal o f Peace Research, 41(2), March 2004, pp.131-147,
pp.132
Mona Fixdal and Dan Smith, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Just War’, Mershon 
International Studies Review, 42(2), November 1998, pp.283-312, pp.284
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is, notoriously, a principle based more on o rder than on justice, but as such it 
does have a serious moral basis. It p rovides a c lear rule for lim iting the use of 
force and reducing the risk o f w ar betw een the arm ed forces o f d ifferent 
states. It involves respect for d iffe rent soc ie ties .35
This perception is particularly popular among developing states which have 
the most to gain from a continuing respect for territorial integrity. These states,
being very proud o f their new ly won sovere ign ty , very conscious o f the ir 
fragility, and all too conscious o f the w ay in w h ich they had been on the 
receiving end in the past o f not very benign in te rven tions from  the im perial 
and colonial powers, [are] not very keen to acknow ledge  the ir right to do so 
again, w hatever the c ircum stances.36
This accounts, in part, for the fact that much of the substantial agreement 
carved out in the formation of the ICISS report has failed to enter into force, 
even in the loosest of senses. As Emma McClean claims “[t]he central tenets 
of the responsibility to protect as articulated by the ICISS -  such as the 
guidelines for military intervention” and the matter of how to proceed in the 
face of UNSC deadlock “were lost in transition from the ICISS report to the 
[World Summit] Outcome Document” .37 This has led many commentators to 
reject the suggestion that R2P bears the hallmarks of an emerging norm.
The quick rise o f the concept o f respons ib ility  to protect from an idea into an 
a lleged em erging legal norm  ra ises som e suspic ions from  a positiv ist 
perspective. How can a concep t tha t is labelled as a ‘new approach ’ and a 
‘recharacterisa tion ’ o f sove re ign ty  in 2001 turn into an em erging legal norm
35 Adam Roberts, ‘Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights, International 
Affairs, 69(3), July 1993, pp.429-449, pp.434
36 Gareth Evans, ‘Responsibility to Protect: An Idea Whose Time Has Come... and Gone’, 
International Relations, 22(3), 2008, pp.283-298,pp.285
37 The Responsibility to Protect: The Role of International Human Rights Law’, Journal o f 
Conflict & Security Law, 13(1), 2008, pp. 123-152, pp. 151
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with in  the course of four years, and into an organ is ing principle fo r peace and 
security in the UN system one year la te r?38
However, the fact that ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ has not yet gained the 
status of emerging norm does not definitely indicate that it will not find favour 
in the future. Equally, it is possible to contend that those who are already 
prepared to dismiss the potential of conditional sovereignty to meaningfully 
impact upon relations between states have adopted an unrealistic view of the 
time it takes for new normative ideas to disseminate across an international 
system which is ultimately based on consent and compromise.
Although controversy continues to rage over the proper interpretation of 
human protection, what is clear is that throughout the development of the 
society of states, the suggestion that justice may occasionally necessitate 
some degree of HI has recurred. Never universally embraced, often 
misappropriated, and almost always deemed to be incompatible with other 
foundational normative principles, the discourse of HI numbers among the 
most contentious elements of the international justice debate. As such, it 
offers the means to demonstrate that justice is a contingent but powerful 
concept, which can be constructed and reconstructed in terms of the ontology 
of becoming and that the key to moral progress lies in the incremental 
development of legal and political norms.
38 Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’ pp. 101
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V. Outlining the Project
So far, this thesis has sought to establish: that an evaluation of international 
society necessitates an engagement with international justice; that the social 
constructivist ontology of becoming is the element of IR theory which is 
sufficient to this task, and that the historical and normative development of HI 
offers a way into this complex debate. Exposition has also revealed that the 
development of the R2P has served as evidence of the role of language and 
negotiation among global political actors in sowing the seeds for change; a 
principle which demonstrates the practical causes and consequences of 
becoming in IR.
The remainder of the project will be given over to an analysis of how various 
hybridised forms of constructivism are positioned to flesh out the relationship 
between the ontology of becoming and the necessary limits of an international 
duty of justice. Following a comprehensive survey of the literature surrounding 
international justice and HI, designed to illustrate the pervasive and 
persuasive nature of the ontology of becoming among IR theorists, each 
chapter will focus on the work of one or more prominent and influential 
thinkers, who has incorporated constructivist principles into their analysis. 
Throughout the course of this endeavour, the gender-lens of the ontology of 
becoming, as defined by the fem inist theorists who first identified its analytical 
force, will be reiterated and explored as a means to unpack and problematise 
the range of unequal power relations which tend to preclude the 
establishment of international justice. However, this thesis will also serve to 
demonstrate that those com mentators with the most sophisticated and
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instructive appreciation of the international justice debate are those who 
operate within the restrictions imposed by the ontology of becoming and that, 
the principles arrived at within this framework are, at times, substantially more 
radical than detractors of constructivism might be inclined to suggest. 
Although the scope of the project does not allow for the formation of definitive 
conclusions as to the appropriate content or applicability of norms of 
international justice, it is hoped that it may provide some indication as to the 
minimal standards of morality which currently govern the discipline and 
practice of IR, as well as the possibility that, in the future, this international 
‘code of conduct’ may evolve still further.
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Chapter One: Hybridising Constructivism  
i. introduction
This project asserts that social constructivism, with its unique appreciation of 
the ontology of becoming, is better equipped than alternative IR theories to 
define and contend with the demands of international justice. This is due to 
the ability of constructivists to balance competing claims and produce a 
hybridised account of justice which is both innovative and realistic. The task of 
this chapter is, therefore, to demonstrate the ways in which the ontology of 
becoming permeates justice theory in general but is most effectively executed 
within the confines of constructivist theorising.
The conviction at the heart o f this thesis is that any obligation, or set of 
obligations, framed in terms of justice, is ‘constructed’, at least in part, through 
interaction among state actors, non-state actors, and individuals. The 
evolution and crystallisation of norms of international justice (the processes of 
becoming) therefore depend for their efficacy and legitimacy on some degree 
of consensus and shared understanding among global political actors. This 
stands in stark contrast to the liberal cosmopolitan contention that the 
demands of justice, and the raft of HR which they inform, exist a priori and 
that their successful implementation through institutional mechanisms would 
provide the blueprint for a just and equitable international society. It is also at 
odds with the assertion common among pluralists that the sole purpose of 
international society, both from the perspective of that which is conceivable
25
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and that which is desirable, is the maintenance o f order. The associated claim 
is that when this singular purpose appears to conflict with the demands of 
justice, it is fidelity to order, and to the peaceful conditions arguably 
associated with it, which must prevail.
However, this project combines an exposition o f the development of HI among 
the society o f states, with a detailed analysis o f constructivist theorising, in an 
attempt to demonstrate the ways in which considerations o f justice have 
entered and influenced the diplomatic dialogue, challenging the assumed 
supremacy of order. It contends that, in so doing, they have effectively served 
to establish a limited framework for an international duty of justice, which is 
self-consciously less demanding than that advocated by the cosmopolitan 
tradition but notably more ambitious than pluralist, and certainly realist, 
parameters would allow. This conception o f the international duty of justice, or 
the obligations which may be said to exist between citizens and strangers, is 
best appraised using constructivist tools o f analysis since an account of 
international justice, viewed through the lens o f constructivism, may serve to 
strike the balance between the interrelated values o f being and becoming.
Since each of the key elements at work in this thesis (constructivism and HI) 
is so vast, a formative task o f the project is to establish and provide 
justification for the inclusion of those elements or individual theorists which 
have been incorporated and, conversely, for the exclusion of certain other 
perspectives. The following overview of the literature surrounding HI and 
constructivism will explore the ontological and epistemological positioning of a
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number of theorists and provide an explanation for what might otherwise be 
considered the controversial omission of certain world renowned contributors 
to the field. It will be argued that each of the thinkers whose accounts of 
international justice will ultimately infuse the constructed duty of justice at 
which this thesis takes aim, has attempted to synthesise and amalgamate 
some element of constructivist theorising with insights drawn from a 
competing theoretical perspective. Equally significantly, each engages with 
the obligations incumbent upon international society in the face of 
humanitarian crisis; thereby providing the foundations for a wider appreciation 
of international justice. Alternatively phrased, each of the featured thinkers 
has employed the framework of the ontology of becoming (albeit with varying 
degrees of success) to consider the possibility of reform in the arena of HI, or 
international justice more generally.
This chapter will begin with a brief summary of the issues underpinning 
humanitarian intervention. This will be followed by an exploration of what 
might be thought of as ‘conventional constructivism’ and the contribution of its 
advocates to the key debates within IR. The remainder of the chapter will 
seek to demonstrate the ways in which certain key theorists have attempted 
to develop, situate or reinterpret constructivist insights, or to hybridise 
constructivism with: cosmopolitanism, communitarianism, solidarism and 
feminism respectively, with a view to establishing or defending certain 
standards of international justice. A more detailed analysis of the work of each 
of these theorists will form the basis of the forthcoming substantive chapters, 
as will an appraisal o f whether constructivism can be hybridised without
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compromising its own analytical scope or integrity. Taken together, this 
analysis will attest to the unique value of the constructivist ontology of 
becoming to an understanding of the obligations which derive, or may come to 
derive, from taking seriously the terms of international justice.
II. Humanitarian Intervention: Illegal but Moral?
Chief among the many reasons that an analysis of HI provides such valuable 
insight into the issue of international justice is the fact that it “poses the 
conflict between order and justice in its starkest form for the society of 
states” .39 In incorporating any number of debates within and beyond IR, it 
presupposes and demands a multidisciplinary approach to the regulation of 
the use of force and allows for the mapping of complex and sometimes 
contradictory normative developments. This focus on cross-disciplinary 
analysis lends itself to constructivist theorising, since a constructivist 
conception of becoming entails political, legal, and ethical dimensions. The 
requirement of feasibility which this thesis interprets as a key component of 
the ontology of becoming is dictated by the confines of PIL, which are 
themselves determined by the consensual nature of the international system. 
Assessing the potential for moral development within international society, 
therefore, necessitates a pragmatic consideration of current legal constraints. 
Changing political norms can certainly lay the foundations for developments in 
PIL. However, it is equally possible for existing legalistic standards to preclude 
the institutionalisation of ethical prescriptions. As such, the intriguing legal
39 Nicholas J. Wheeler, ‘Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society’, 
Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, 21(3), 1992, pp.463-487, pp.486
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status of HI is a key element of the unique perspective which it provides into 
the machinations of the international system.
At least from the perspective of PIL, customary and conventional, the 
assumption in favour of non-intervention is well-rehearsed. It is enshrined in 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter:
All M em bers shall refrain in the ir in ternational relations from the threat or use 
o f fo rce  against the te rrito ria l in tegrity or political independence o f any state, 
or in any o ther m anner incons is ten t w ith the purposes of the United N ations.40
Acts of aggression of this nature produce a concomitant right of self-defence 
on the part of the state which has been offended against, or indeed, among 
any state which might be allied to it. This right finds expression in Article 51 of 
the Charter.41 Conversely, the lim itations placed upon the UN itself in its 
relations with its members guard against HI.
Nothing conta ined in the p resen t C harte r shall authorise the United Nations to 
intervene in m atters w h ich  are essentia lly  w ith in the dom estic ju risd ic tion  of 
any sta te .42
One further exception to this principle is: “Security Council enforcement action 
under Chapter VII, but this requires a finding that there is ‘a threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act o f aggression (that threatens) international
40 Charter of the United Nations, Article 2(4), fhttp://www.un.orq/aboutun/charter1.f02/10/061
41 The article reads: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, 
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security. (Ibid)
42 UN Charter, Article 2(7)
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peace and security”43. If the case can be made that the actions of a domestic 
government imperil global stability, the Security Council (UNSC) is 
empowered to intervene on the grounds of restoring order but no other body, 
be it an individual state, a coalition, or a regional organisation has the 
requisite legal authority to take such action without the explicit endorsement of 
the UNSC. Thus,
[It] is d ifficu lt to escape the conclusion that international law forb ids the 
un ila tera l use o f force to rescue v ictim s o f a hum anitarian catastrophe. As a 
m atter o f treaty law, the UN C harte r does not exem pt unilateral hum anitarian 
intervention from the proh ib ition  on the use o f force, and prom inent General 
Assem bly resolutions c lea rly  support th is interpretation. As a m atter o f 
custom ary international law, the International Court o f Justice in Nicaragua  
vs. United S tates  conc luded tha t custom  does not perm it unilateral 
hum anitarian in te rven tion .44
However, there is evidence to suggest that a normative shift resulting in a 
reconceptualisation of ‘sovereignty as power’ to ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ 
is generating increased support for the practice of HI, at least in its multilateral 
form. Since the 1990s in particular, humanitarian imperatives have featured 
with marked frequency in the diplomatic dialogue of international society and, 
consequently, the language of HR has been reiterated and incorporated, to a 
certain extent, into state practice. As a result, those states which routinely 
violate the HR of their citizens are said potentially to forgo their right to 
territorial integrity and the definition of ‘threats to international peace and 
security’ has been recast, to some extent, to incorporate the massive refugee
43 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 15 
Ryan Goodman, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and the Pretexts for War’, The American
Journal o f International Law, 100(1), January 2006, pp. 107-141, pp. 111
30
Being and Becoming: Humanitarian Intervention and the Constructed Duty of Justice Claire Malcolm
flows and potential spread of disease which can result from humanitarian
• ■ 45crisis.
However, the disjuncture between legal and moral perceptions of HI persists 
and has recently been revisited by the contributors to the R2P which, in 2005, 
reinvigorated debate surrounding the appropriate response to egregious 
violations of HR, or acts of state-sponsored oppression. R2P, which secured 
some degree of support from the vast majority of UN member states, 
represented an explicit attempt by the international community to reconcile its 
conflicting imperatives to respect and maintain both states’ rights and HR and 
was instrumental in the development of conditional sovereignty; the 
suggestion that the privilege of territorial integrity is contingent upon respect 
for ‘basic’ HR. Perhaps the most significant finding of the Commission, 
chaired by Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, was that, whilst the primary 
responsibility for the welfare of citizens rests with their home state, at times of 
humanitarian crisis, this is negotiable.
[WJhere a popu la tion  is su ffe ring  serious harm, as a result o f internal war, 
insurgency, repression, o r s ta te  fa ilure, and the state in question is unwilling 
or unable to halt o r ave rt it, the princip le o f non-intervention yields to the 
international respons ib ility  to p ro tec t.46
In other words, if a state fails to discharge its duties, the responsibility passes 
to the international community.
45 It was this principle which allowed representatives of the international community to take 
action to establish Kurdish ‘safe havens’ in Iraq in 1991
46 ICISS Report, Synopsis, Basic Principles,(1B) http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission- 
Report.pdf. [02/02/07]
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Notwithstanding the arguable increase in support for acts of forcible HI 
conducted under the auspices of the UN, the fact remains that no legal 
justification exists in defence of unilateral HI (defined in PIL as any 
intervention lacking UNSC authorisation). There can be little doubt that, in 
recent years, the framing of the R2P has brought the issue to increasing 
prominence. However, all references to the possibility of alternative sources of 
‘proper authority’, the element of the ICISS report deemed by many to be its 
most pioneering dimension, were ultimately excluded from the 2005 World 
Summit Outcome Document. This indicates that the international community 
and the framers of PIL are no closer to agreement over the infringement of 
national sovereignty, in the absence of UNSC endorsement. However, 
operational and logistical restrictions almost always act as barriers to 
successful multilateral HI and it is the failure to generate consensus within the 
UNSC, or the crippling dearth of political will, which often leads to the 
perception that legal and moral standards are irreconcilable.
The stalemate which results is testament to the inability of current PIL to 
honour legalistic commitments whilst maintaining a balance between the 
prohibition of force and the protection of citizens in human rights abusing 
states. It is the contention of this thesis that the constructivist ontology of 
becoming may offer potential solutions to this quandary. The urgency of 
outlining and implementing such solutions is clear to those commentators 
concerned with HI. The matter of how to proceed when the mandate for 
multilateral HI is not forthcoming but large-scale loss of life appears to 
demand it illuminates the disjuncture between the restrictions of PIL and
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moral intuition. It is the appeal to the emotive notion of ‘common humanity’ 
which informs the belief, however nascent and loosely defined, that human 
beings threatened with annihilation at the hands (or with the acquiescence) of 
their own government ought to be defended, if necessary by force. It would 
appear that normative principles concerning HR, as well as the legal and 
political debates which infuse them with their meaning, have outstripped the 
development of PIL, leading many commentators to argue that legal 
parameters may need to be redrawn, or at the very least, strongly 
reconsidered in the name of international justice. As Charles Beitz claims:
An ideal theory o f g lobal ju s tice  has im plications fo r traditional doctrines of 
in ternational law ... C onsider, as a representa tive example, the rule o f non­
intervention. It is often rem arked tha t th is rule which is prom inently d isplayed 
in a num ber o f recent au tho rita tive  docum ents of international law, seem s 
inconsistent w ith the in te rna tiona l com m un ity ’s grow ing rhetorical com m itm ent 
to the protection o f hum an rights, w h ich  is prom inently d isplayed in the same 
docum ents47.
This contradiction ensures that almost all IR theorists who concern 
themselves with justice are committed to projects which have at their basis 
some sense of becoming. The pervasive nature of injustice in international 
society and the potential for conflict between legal and moral considerations 
drives the desire to reform international politics. There remains contention, 
however, as to whether cross-cultural consensus and some limited respect for 
existing legal parameters must constrain the pursuit of this goal. If they must 
then change is necessarily piecemeal and inconsistent but if ‘universal’ values
47 ‘Justice and International Relations’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4(4), Summer 1975, 
pp.360-389, pp.386
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claim their own transcendent legitimacy then barriers to reform are far from 
insurmountable. Once again, a balanced response to this issue can be 
extrapolated from the constructivist conception of becoming. In line with this 
framework, as further exposition will reveal, it may be possible to impinge 
upon certain aspects of existing legal doctrine, provided that it can be 
demonstrated that the law itself no longer reflects the prevailing normative 
standards at work across the international system. After all, as Stephen J. 
Toope has argued:
International lawyers can a lso learn about the increm ental evolution o f norm s 
-  the behaviour o f in ternationa l actors is not ‘de te rm ined ’ by the existence or 
non-existence o f a legal rule, but by norm s w hich may harden  over tim e into 
binding ob ligations.48
In sum, there can be little doubt that at present HI, particularly that which 
lacks UNSC authorisation, is prohibited under the terms of PIL. However, 
there may be scope for constructivism, with its understanding of the 
relationship between being and becoming, to address the ethical gap which 
this commitment to law over morality threatens to engender. In exploring this 
possibility, each of the forthcoming substantive chapters will consider the 
issue of HI from a number of perspectives, taking account of each of its most 
controversial dimensions. As well as the issue of agency -  in essence the 
matter of whether intervention which lacks UNSC authorisation may ever be 
considered legitimate - each chapter will also analyse: the definition of ‘just 
cause’; the most appropriate military means for a campaign orchestrated for
48 ‘Emerging Patterns of Governance and International Politics’, Michael Byers (ed), The Role 
o f Law in International Politics, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), p.98-99
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humanitarian ends; and the most durable and reasonable post-conflict 
settlement available to interveners and target states. Only in investigating 
each of these separate debates can the contribution of constructivism to their 
resolution effectively be determined.
III. ‘Conventional Constructivism ’
In order to appreciate the ability of constructivism to underpin a hybridised 
understanding of HI and international justice, it is first imperative to establish 
both its basic tenets and its commitment to becoming. Much of the analytical 
capacity of constructivism concerns the understanding of norms which the 
theory informs.
i. The Significance of Norms
Constructivism focuses enquiry “ [o]n the ideational processes that construct 
the world rather than on given agents and material structures typical of 
conventional international re lations” .49 As such, it is predominately concerned 
with the legal and political norms upon which international society is 
structured. The nature and significance of norms has been summarised by 
Nicholas Wheeler.
Constructiv is t theo ris ing  in in ternationa l relations defines a norm as the 
existence o f shared  unders tand ings as to the perm issible lim its o f state 
action, and an accep tan ce  tha t conduct should be justified and appraised in 
term s o f tha t no rm .50
49 J Ann Tickner, ‘Gendering a Discipline: Some Feminist Methodological Contributions to 
International Relations’, Signs: Journal o f Women in Culture and Society, 30(4), June 2005,
pp.2173-2188, Chicago Press, pp.2179 
Nicholas J Wheeler, The  Humanitarian Responsibilities of Sovereignty: Explaining the 
Development of a New Norm of Military Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes in
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For constructivists, the emergence, development, and crystallisation of these 
norms provides the basis of the ‘shared understandings’ which bind together 
international society and which give meaning to the constitutive “rules of the 
game”.51 Not only do changing norms both restrict and enable the behaviour 
of states, they also serve to infuse the ubiquitous yet ill-defined currency of 
‘power’ with a more sophisticated awareness of social context than positivism 
has tended to allow. This is because constructivists acknowledge that
[j]ust as the re la tionsh ip  o f the  ind iv idua l to society is defined by a network of 
norms and va lues, the  re la tionsh ip  o f the state to other actors in the 
international system  can be though t o f as being governed by a network of 
perm issions and co n s tra in ts .52
Against such a backdrop, “norms are not material barriers” and, as such, their 
“constraining power derives from the social disapproval that breaking them 
entails”.53 A clear example of this can be drawn from PIL, an arena governed 
by compliance rather than enforcement, in which infringements of the ‘rules’ 
rarely result in direct punishm ent but persistent deviation from established 
standards can severely damage the reputation of a given political actor. Thus, 
factors such as the fear of opprobrium, or the desire for acceptance, can be 
as powerful in terms of their ability to incentivise compliant behaviour as can a 
preponderance of econom ic or military influence and, as a norm becomes 
increasingly embedded in the behaviour and expectations of global political
International Society’, Jennifer M Welsh (ed), From Right to Responsibility: Humanitarian 
Intervention and International Society, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), p.30
51 See Raymond Cohen, ‘Rules of the Game in International Politics’, International Studies 
Quarterly, 24(1), March 1980, pp. 129-150
52 Cohen, ‘Rules’, pp.129
53 Wheeler, Saving, p.5
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actors, this “compliance pull”54 increases incrementally. Therefore, as the 
shared understandings which underpin international society begin to evolve, a 
new range of behaviours are legitimated and actions deemed to be at odds 
with these normative standards are rendered socially unacceptable. Such is 
the constructivist understanding of the nature of becoming in IR.
Constructivists also argue that the sense of belonging and legitimacy which 
derives from compliance can impact directly on the nature of the national 
interest. This is because
Interests flow  from  a cons truc ted  identity  and the identities o f all actors in IR 
fluctuate e ither th rough  d iffe ren t associations w ith others (through 
participation in an in te rna tiona l o rgan isa tion) or through changing se lf­
perceptions.55
ii. Continuity and Change
One of the principal advantages o f a constructivist approach, framed in terms 
of norm dynamics, and drawing upon influences beyond the traditional 
confines of IR, is its ability to account with equal clarity for both change and 
continuity in international politics. In fact, it is the constructivist appreciation of 
the processes which govern change at the international level which is 
arguably the most compelling element of the theory. This is because
constructivists take account of the development of normative expectation,
state practice, and the interplay between the two. This ensures that they are
uniquely placed to assess and appraise the development of international
politics.
54 Beth A. Simmons, ‘Capacity, Commitment and Compliance: International Institutions and 
Territorial Disputes’, Journal o f Conflict Resolution, 46(6), December 2002, pp.829-856, 
pp. 846
Henry Steiner, Philip Alston and Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights in Context: 
Law, Politics and Morals: Third Edition, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) p.684
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By focus ing  on socia l ep istem ology, the role o f collective know ledge in 
in te rna tiona l socia l life, and the com m unities in which know ledge orig inates 
and is then d iffused, po litica lly  selected, and institutionalised, th is approach 
helps exp la in  w here  in ternational practices and institutions -  more broadly, 
g lobal gove rnance  -  com e from  and w hy certain ideas congeal into human 
practices and ins titu tions  w hereas others do not.56
As a consequence, the theory also provides the tools for a comprehensive 
critique of the lim itations of the current state system and of PIL. This is chiefly 
because constructivists derive their understanding of the nature of 
international politics from the shared meanings and expectations produced 
through negotiation and interaction between global political actors and from 
the impact of these changing expectations on perceptions of morality. A 
further appeal of a normative, constructivist, framework for research is, 
therefore, the fact that it allows for and encourages an engagement with the 
morality of international politics. Constructivists acknowledge that, in many 
respects, reifying normativity, rather than apologising for it, actually increases 
the amount of source material which can be incorporated into a given debate. 
In essence,
because norm s by de fin ition  em body a qua lity  o f ‘oughtness ’ and shared 
moral assessm ent, norm s p rom pt jus tifica tions for action and leave an 
extensive tra il o f co m m un ica tion  am ong actors that we can study.57
56 Emanuel Adler, Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of 
International Relations, (London and New York, Routledge, 2005), p.3
57 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘Norm Dynamics’, pp.892
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iii. The ‘Middle Ground’
The ability o f constructivism to assimilate political, legal, social and ethical 
considerations has led Emanuel Adler to argue that it may lay successful 
claim to the coveted theoretical space between competing traditions.58
C onstructiv ism  occup ies  the m iddle ground between rationalist approaches 
(w hether rea lis t o r libera l) and interpretative approaches (m ainly post­
m odernist, pos t-s truc tu ra lis t and critical), and creates new areas fo r 
theoretica l and em p irica l inves tiga tion59.
This view is based upon the constructivist preoccupation with “understanding 
how the material, subjective and intersubjective worlds interact in the social 
construction of reality” ,60 as opposed to the rationalist dismissal of any factor 
beyond the material, and the post-structuralist blanket mistrust of positivism. 
Furthermore, the claim at the heart of constructivism that actors and 
structures are mutually constituted also represents a theoretical midpoint 
between two extremes. In fact, Adler is as resistant to attempts to define 
constructivism as an elem ent o f the post-structuralist project as he is to those 
who might wish to locate it in the rationalist camp. He argues that the “purely 
materialist ontology”61 of realism, neo-realism and dependency theories is of 
little scholarly merit in this context and that the neo-liberal attempt to treat
58 This position can arguably also be associated with John Ruggie who subdivides 
constructivism into three categories: ‘neo-classical’ (a pluralist, largely positivist account of IR 
which promotes a commitment to a social science agenda); post-modern constructivism (a 
constitutive or post-structuralist approach which rejects social science premises); and 
‘naturalistic constructivism’, which represents a balance between the two and, as such, 
occupies the same ontological ‘middle ground’ identified by Adler. See Emanuel Adler 
‘Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics’ European Journal o f 
International Relations, 3(3), 1997 and John Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on 
International Institutionalisation, (London, Routledge, 1998), p.35
59 Emanuel Adler, ‘Middle Ground’, pp.319
60 Ibid, pp.330
61 Ibid, pp.331
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ideas and interests as separate entities undermines and devalues its 
regrettably “m inimalist and therefore weak epistemological approach”;62 
consolidating its lim itations as a theory already overly reliant on 
“methodological individualism” .63 However, Adler argues with equal veracity 
that the constitutive approaches, with which constructivism is often 
associated, are also subject to significant flaws, which do not impact upon 
constructivist theorising. The over-arching commonality between all 
constitutive or post-structuralist theories is their rejection of the search for 
objective ‘Truth’ claims, anchored in their assertion that no conception of the 
‘Truth’ can exist independently of the language in which it is framed. On this 
side of the debate, structures are entirely ideational and material 
considerations are relegated in favour of discourse analysis. It is Adler’s claim 
that
[c jonstitu tiv is ts ... concede  too  m uch to ideas; unless they are w illing to deny 
the exis tence  o f the  m ate ria l w orld , they should recognise, as constructiv ists 
do, tha t ‘a soc ia lly  construc ted  rea lity  presupposes a nonsocia lly constructed 
rea lity ’ as w ell and that, consequently , the question o f how the material world 
a ffects and is a ffec ted  by the  conceptua l world is crucial fo r social sc ience.64
In support of his assertion, Adler develops an argument first mooted by 
Alexander Wendt; namely that an ‘ontological map’ could be employed to 
identify the character and scope of various IR theories. According to Wendt’s 
version of the map, constructivism shares with a number of other theories 
(including post-modernism and the English School) a dual commitment to 
Holism and Idealism, which distinguishes it from more individualistic or
62 Ibid
63 Ibid
64 Ibid, pp.332
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materialist theories. In other words, constructivism favours the ideational over 
the material and is more concerned with the constitutive nature of community 
values and identities, than with individuals per se.
Figure 1: The Ontological Position of Constructivism according to Alexander Wendt's 
Map of International Theory65
Holism
Individualism
World Systems Theory 
Security Materialism
Gramscian Marxism 
English School 
World Society 
Postmodernism 
Constructivism
............... Neorealism....................
Classical Realism
Domestic Liberalism 
Neoliberalism 
Ideas Liberalism
Realism Idealism
[Materialism]
According to Adler, W endt’s understanding of the ontological positioning of 
constructivism understates the degree to which the theory is capable of 
balancing all four factors: Holism, Individualism, Materialism and Idealism. 
Adler’s own diagrammatic representation demonstrates his claim.
65 Ibid, p.331
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Figure 2: Emanuel Adler's Reconceptualisation of Wendt's Map of International Theory: 
Constructivism as the Middle Ground66
Structuralism
Individualism
However, it is the contention of this thesis that Adler’s characterisation is 
slightly misleading. Constructivism  is not precisely equidistant to rationalist 
and reflectivist (or constitutivist) theory. Neither does it perfectly combine 
elements of both traditions. Instead, the broad theoretical school of 
constructivism is most accurately described not as a map but as a spectrum 
which connects state-centric branches of the theory with more constitutivist 
conceptions of IR. Thus, a range of approaches to international politics can be 
considered to form part o f the constructivist project.
There can be little doubt that many commentators would associate Wendt 
himself with one end of the constructivist spectrum. After all, his now famous 
claim, that “anarchy is what states make of it” ,67 represents nothing less than 
an attempt to overturn the assumption that the interests of states are fixed,
66 Ibid
67 See Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of 
Power Politics’, International Organization, 46(1), 1992
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predictable, and concerned exclusively either with the consolidation of their 
own power, or with containing the influence of others. He is also credited with 
the suggestion that identity and interests share a symbiotic relationship, which 
can fundamentally alter the expectations and behaviours of state actors.68 
Therefore, it is fitting that an understanding of Wendt is considered by many 
to be so crucial to an understanding of constructivism and the justice-claims 
for which it might provide grounds. However, Wendt is not without his critics. 
Influential commentators from within the constructivist tradition itself have 
identified the ways in which his determination to operate within the confines of 
what he considers to be the ‘scientific ’ basis of the discipline limits the scope 
of his appreciation of becoming and has even lead to suggestions that “the 
promise of constructivism ”69 remains unfulfilled. For these detractors, Wendt 
appears to have identified an approach which is perfectly positioned to 
challenge conventional IR theory (by unpacking privileged assumptions of 
power and interest) but has fallen short of the potential implicit within it by 
demonstrating an unnecessary deference to the dominance of states and to 
‘scientific’ modes of enquiry. As Christian Reus-Smit claims,
W endt’s s ta te -cen trism , sys tem a tic  theoris ing , and scientific realism  are hotly 
contested by o the r co n s tru c tiv is ts .70
Many of W endt’s critics are more persuaded by the views of Mervyn Frost, a 
constructivist who is notably more committed to the post-structuralist element 
of the tradition. Frost’s conception of international ethics as constitutive of the
68 Ibid
69 See Ted Kopf, The  Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory’, 
International Security, 23(1), Summer 1998, pp.171-200
70 ‘Imagining Society: Constructivism and the English School’, British Journal o f Politics and 
International Relations, 4(3), October 2002, pp.487-509, pp.491
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actors which participate in it claims that states become socialised in certain 
common practices or codes of ethics, which ultimately permeate their identity 
and can lead to changes in their behaviours and expectations71. For Frost,
[a lth o u g h  the  nationa l soc ie ty  is the m ost im portant com m unity fo r realisation 
o f the ind iv idua l, the  state, w h ich  is the h ighest form  o f com m unity in which 
ind iv idua l rea lisa tion  occurs, is a lso constituted intersubjective ly w ithin a 
socie ty o f s ta tes. Thus, ju s t as dom estic  com m unities help constitute the 
norm ative unde rs tand ing  o f ind iv idua ls w ith in states, the com m unity o f states 
helps constitu te  no rm a tive  d iscuss ion  am ong s ta tes72.
Although framed in terms of differing methodologies, both Wendt and Frost’s 
arguments can be considered as elements of the normative constructivist 
tradition, in that, implicit in both approaches, is the possibility of change and 
moral progress. In each case, shifting the focus from power politics or a 
preoccupation with security, to the suggestion that global political actors are 
able to frame and reframe their own international relations based on appeals 
to oscillating interests, creates a theoretical space for normative concerns. 
Different elements of the constructivist project also lend themselves to 
hybridisation in different ways, with W endt’s focus on the practical realities of 
states as the core actors of international politics compatible with 
communitarian convictions and Frost’s approach to the constitutive nature of 
ideas, sharing theoretical ground with feminist views concerning self- 
perpetuating and unequal power relations; a response to which informs much 
of the remainder of this project.
71 Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory, (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1996)
72 Adler, Communitarian International Relations, p.8
44
Being and Becoming: Humanitarian Intervention and the Constructed Duty of Justice Claire Malcolm
Although Adler’s notion of constructivism as the perfect equilibrium of 
rationalist and reflectivist traditions is an oversimplification, there are many 
respects in which employing the constructivist spectrum to analyse 
international justice does offer balance between competing claims. The ability 
to unpack the relationships: between positivism and post-positivism; between 
the material and the ideational; and between states’ rights and HR, rather 
than to embrace them as inescapable dichotomies represents one of the main 
strengths of constructivist theorising. It is the reason that
C onstructiv ism  o ffe rs  a lte rna tive  understand ings o f a num ber of the central 
them es in in te rna tiona l re la tions  theory, including: the meaning of anarchy 
and the ba lance  o f pow er, the  re la tionsh ip  between state identity and interest, 
an e labora tion  o f pow er, and the  prospects fo r change in world po litics73.
iv. Empirical Constructivism
It is this final claim, that constructivism offers a unique appraisal of the 
‘prospects for change in world politics’ which informs the hypothesis that it is 
the most appropriate theory for an appraisal of international justice. This is 
because constructivism boasts both an ethical and an empirical component; 
the latter of which is illustrated by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink 
whose collaboration has produced an outline for the likely patterns of the 
process of norm formation. Indicating that constructivism, whilst capable of 
extensive normative analysis, is nevertheless anchored in an appreciation of 
the realities which govern interaction between state actors, Finnemore and 
Sikkink argue that in order for a norm to be incorporated into the practices of 
IR, it will likely pass through three distinct phases: emergence, acceptance (a
73 Kopf, ‘Promise’, pp. 172
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so-called “norm cascade”74, resulting from a “tipping point”75 whereby at least 
a third of the states which constitute international society embrace the terms 
of the new norm), and finally internalisation76. They assert that once the 
development o f any new set of behaviours or values reaches this final stage, 
the process of crystallisation will result in the norm acquiring a “taken-for- 
granted quality”77 which will consolidate its place in state practice and allow 
for the possibility that it may become the “prevailing standard of 
appropriateness against which new norms emerge and compete for 
support” .78 This process accounts for, among other key developments in 
international society, the institutionalisation of female suffrage and the 
establishment of the Geneva Convention, both of which appear to evidence 
the validity of Finnemore and S ikkink’s analysis; an analysis which, in and of 
itself, suggests that the empirical framework of constructivist theorising 
grounds its ethical com ponent in a sophisticated understanding of the ways in 
which social mores develop into normative standards through the 
mechanisms of real world  politics.
v. The Limitations of Conventional Constructivism
For detractors of constructivism , this focus on the realities of international 
politics is the basis o f critique. Even those persuaded by the ability of 
constructivism to assess both ‘what is’ and ‘what could be’ have tended to 
express concern over whether it is conceptually capable of envisaging what 
‘ought to be’. Those who doubt the normative credentials of the theory have
74 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘Norm Dynamics’ pp.895
75 Ibid
76 Ibid, pp.891
77 Ibid, pp. 895
78 Ibid
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suggested that the work of those commentators who have attempted to trace 
the development of certain norms and trends amounts to little more than 
sociological description and that those who have failed either to acknowledge 
or to explore “the subterranean normativity that motivates much of their 
work”79 risk squandering the opportunity to generate progress in international 
politics. For these critics, simply to explain how IR functions without engaging 
in the requisite moral critique as to whether it does so successfully is 
inadequate and welcomes attempts to amalgamate the descriptive power of 
constructivism with a more normatively demanding theoretical framework.
The remainder of this chapter takes aim at this accusation and provides a 
detailed exposition of the various ways in which conventional constructivism 
has evolved in response to alternative theoretical influences. This analysis of 
the subdivision, redefinition, and hybridisation of constructivism is a core 
element of the wider thesis. As well as providing an innovative and unusual 
lens through which to appraise the strengths and limitations of constructivism 
itself, it also offers a means by which to assess the degree to which the 
nature, and limits, of an international duty of justice may be reflected in a 
convergence between a range of theoretical traditions, or among notions of 
becoming rather than being.
79 Ibid, pp.488
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IV. Cosmopolitan Constructivism
The first theory with which constructivism will be hybridised is 
cosmopolitanism. This is partly because it is the approach most readily 
associated with international justice, since all proponents of the theory share 
an explicit commitment to the dissemination o f HR. In many respects, it is also 
the most challenging form of hybridisation since, ostensibly, cosmopolitanism 
and constructivism are fundamentally opposed to one another. After all, in 
cosmopolitan terms ‘basic HR’, albeit defined very differently by various 
adherents of the tradition, represent an a priori commitment to the moral 
equality of persons and are therefore not contingent upon the processes of 
socialisation and crystallisation which are so vital to the constructivist outlook. 
Nevertheless, the relationship between the two theories is instructive and 
certain commentators have attempted, though not necessarily consciously, to 
fuse the respective terms of both positions.
For those inspired by the suggestion that the changing tone of IR theorising 
(represented by the developing critical perspective of the ‘third debate’) has 
the potential to affect change, conventional constructivism’s continued focus 
on states, as against the individuals which constitute them is insufficiently far- 
reaching. In response to this, an argument has emerged which asserts that 
the appreciation of norm dynam ics engendered by constructivism might be 
successfully combined with an explicit attempt to build and codify a set of 
universal HR. This has led certain commentators to embrace what might be 
thought of as “the clear cosmopolitanism that motivates”80 many constructivist
80 Ibid, pp.491
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projects. In simple terms, some ‘cosmopolitan constructivists’ seem to 
suggest that the development of norms might be manipulated in an attempt to 
expedite the dissemination of HR. Having established that the desire to 
maintain a reputation as a state which ‘plays by the rules’ can constrain even 
the most powerful of actors, cosmopolitan theorists often argue that the key to 
progress lies in adapting these rules so that they might more accurately reflect 
the dignity owed to all individuals, by virtue of their humanity. This may result 
in deliberate attempts to exclude or shame pariah states and in the building of 
new institutions, or the adaptation of existing mechanisms, to systematise this 
process of exclusion. For advocates of this approach: state boundaries do not 
dictate the nature of morality, or the limits o f an international duty of justice; 
state majoritarianism is not a good unto itself; and the norms which find favour 
in international society ought to be those which take aim at guaranteeing the 
conditions which are necessary for all individuals to be able to live “decent 
human lives”81. In other words, the processes of ‘becoming’ ought to follow a 
teleological path constructed in line with HR standards.
Fundamental to cosmopolitan constructivism (as against traditional 
cosmopolitanism or conventional constructivism) is the related assertion that 
certain HR norms are already firm ly established within the fabric of 
international society. However, from the perspective of liberal 
cosmopolitanism in its traditional form, it is the content of HR norms, not their 
widespread acceptance, which infuses them with their moral authority. These 
standards transcend the formal establishment of PIL and the international
81 Allen Buchanan Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for 
International Law, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004), p.109
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community and, therefore, cannot be said to derive their legitimacy from 
acceptance within this community. By way of contrast, a conventional 
constructivist approach assumes that there is something implicit in the 
patterns of norm formation which imparts legitimacy to those norms which 
survive the processes of selection and diffusion; since these are the values 
around which international society has tended to converge.
Cosmopolitan constructivism  attempts to synthesise these viewpoints by 
contending that certain HR standards ought to be regarded as foundational 
and are, in fact, already firm ly established within the normative expectations 
of the international community. Nevertheless, their continued influence and 
development are dependent upon the institutional mechanisms which operate 
within international politics and, as such, the task of IR theorists and 
practitioners is to address the institutional shortcomings which threaten the 
content and scope of HR norms. In the case of HI, for example, cosmopolitan 
constructivists contend that the norm of human protection, or the standards 
governing ‘sovereignty as responsibility ’ have generated sufficient consensus 
to indicate that the inability to enact their terms must logically be due to the 
political deadlock generated by the structure of the UNSC, or a lack of political 
will amongst particular, intransigent, global political actors. In short, the 
normative commitment exists but the political commitment does not and only 
thorough-going institutional change which introduces accountability 
mechanisms or compliance monitoring can force the hand of those who 
refuse to acknowledge the moral and normative shifts which the 
universalisation of HR has already engendered.
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From this perspective, the suggestion that HR norms exist a priori is, 
seemingly, relatively incidental since, even if this were not the case, they have 
come to exist and, as such, there is now a moral imperative to bring 
institutions in line with the values which give them purpose. This conception of 
becoming as a normative process which is, nevertheless, constrained by the 
political and legal realities of a consensual system is more restrictive than an 
overtly cosmopolitan comm itm ent to reframing international society in 
opposition to existing PIL. However, breaching PIL may be permitted, in 
certain cases, if the mismatch between normative and legal considerations is 
sufficiently marked to justify such a deviation. This is because, for 
cosmopolitan constructivists the value of PIL lies in its ability to codify and 
enforce moral standards. As such, when its terms conflict with these moral 
imperatives its legitimacy may be called into question. Nevertheless, the 
constructivist component o f the hybridised theory tends to place limits on the 
circumvention of PIL by emphasising the need to respect the consensual 
nature of the system and avoid imposing liberal values with no regard for 
cultural diversity.
i. Post-Rawlsian Constructivism
This thesis asserts that the cosmopolitan constructivist position might equally 
be described as a form of ‘post-Rawlsian constructivism’ which seeks to retain 
the constructivist fram ework o f John Rawls’ Political Liberalism82 whilst also 
liberating an analysis o f justice from the restrictions put in place in A Law o f
82 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1996)
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P e op les83 The suggestion is that in distinguishing between national and 
international justice and claiming that the former is necessarily deferential to 
the latter Rawls arrives at an account of justice which is often considered to 
place excessive emphasis on the perceived practical and moral authority of 
states. Consequently, the range of HR standards which his theory allows him 
to endorse as universal or universalisable is, by cosmopolitan standards, 
relatively narrow. Post-Rawlsian constructivists take aim at expanding the 
conception of ‘justice as fa irness’ to render it more amenable to the arena of 
international politics.
ii. Thomas Pogge
Perhaps the best known com m entator to engage in this endeavour is Thomas 
Pogge, Rawls’ one-time student. Troubled by the statist parameters of his 
mentor’s work and arguing that it is conceptually incoherent to treat national 
and international justice as separable entities, Pogge attempts to: appropriate 
the Rawlsian contention that “Justice is the first virtue of social institutions”84; 
emphasise that, despite Raw ls’ assertion to the contrary, this is as compelling 
an argument at the international level as it is domestically; and move beyond 
what he considers to be the unrealistic focus on ‘bounded political 
communities’; and the associated contention that “justice belongs inside 
national borders” ,85 to draw attention to the causal mechanisms which 
perpetuate injustice and m isery throughout international society. For Pogge, 
the standards which govern the ‘domestic basic structure’ as identified by
83 See John Rawls, The Law o f Peoples, (Cambridge Massachusetts, Harvard University 
Press, 1999)
84 Hurrell, Order and Justice, p.24
85 Buchanan, Justice, p.30
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Rawls (specifically the suggestion that institutional mechanisms which 
profoundly and unavoidably impact upon the life prospects of individuals must 
be subject to the demands of justice) also applies internationally. His claim is 
twofold. The first premise is:
that the re  is a g loba l bas ic  structure  -  a worldw ide co-operative schem e 
consisting  o f a com p lex  pattern  o f institu tions, including the international legal 
system , w hose  w o rk ings  have profound, pervasive, and lifelong effects on 
ind iv idua ls and g ro u p s86.
The related assertion runs as follows:
because these  e ffec ts  are fo r the  m ost part neither chosen nor consented to 
by those  a ffec ted  -  the  g loba l basic structure is... [also]... sub ject to 
assessm ent from  the  s ta n d p o in t o f ju s tice87.
Accordingly, Pogge argues that injustice is perpetuated by our tendency to 
accept the inequalities engendered by this global basic structure as a given, 
without exploring the consequences of our own participation in this system, or 
the possibilities of modifying its terms in favour of the world’s poorest people. 
Whilst he acknowledges that Rawls’ “conception of justice is self-consciously 
parochial” ,88 he places no such limits on his own agenda, which is, ultimately, 
to provide the basis for constructing an alternative world order which might not 
be subject to the lim itations of the loose association of self-interested states, 
which currently characterises international politics.
87
Ibid
Ibid
Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls, (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1989) p.212
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This emphasis on ‘value-overlap’89 as a development of “overlapping 
consensus”90 leads Pogge to reject the two-step contract identified by Rawls, 
(in which individuals contract together to form a political community and then 
such communities contract to agree upon standards of international justice). 
Instead he claims that individuals in the ‘Original Position’, would not adopt 
the same standards of justice as the ‘peoples’ empowered to make such 
choices on their behalf in the Rawlsian construct. In fact, he goes as far as to 
claim that the modus vivendi structure of international society does not 
adequately represent the interests of individuals; especially those who are the 
worst off in society. For Pogge, the persistence of this modus vivendi -  in 
which states interact based on considerations of expediency and compromise, 
rather than shared values, encourages statespeople to: abandon their own 
moral compass in the name o f competition; respect assumptions regarding 
spheres of influence and turn a blind eye to HR violations which take place 
therein; focus on increased defence expenditure to the detriment of other 
more pressing concerns; create an atmosphere of mistrust which tends to 
result in violence; induce crises in other states to increase their relative 
strength; and maintain a vicious circle of violence and instability which realists 
take to be inevitable but which could be counter-acted in a system based on 
shared values.91 The continued predominance of the modus vivendi 
framework also has direct consequences for HI in the sense that it 
consolidates the lack o f political will and unflinching commitment to the 
national interest, which renders consensus on this issue so difficult to
89 Ibid, p.211
90 John Rawls, Theory o f Justice: Fourth Edition, (Cambridge Massachusetts, Harvard 
University Press, 1999) p.340
91 Pogge, Realizing, p.211-226
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generate. This is because “risk-averse players” in the international system are 
unlikely to “make unilateral sacrifices for human needs and welfare” .92
It is in response to these issues that Pogge takes aim at a bold project; the 
building of new institutions designed to bring balance to the global inequalities 
which cause and consolidate human suffering. In order for such institutions to 
function effectively, they must embody a commitment to an extensive set of 
HR standards. Furthermore, they cannot derive their normative legitimacy, or 
their effectiveness, from a continued deference to the balance of power. 
Instead,
An institu tiona l schem e is va lue -based  only if its partic ipants hold in com m on 
som e im portan t u ltim a te  va lues (includ ing som e principles fo r balancing or 
ordering them ) tha t are s ign ifican tly  em bodied in the institu tions regulating 
the ir in te rac tions .93
In terms which reflect the theme of ‘becoming’ rather than ‘being’, this would 
seem to suggest that progress in international society would be facilitated if 
institutions were restructured to reflect existing normative commitments. In 
response to critics who claim that justice is too contested a notion to provide 
the building blocks for effective institutions, Pogge argues that
[o ju r prim ary p red icam en t is not tha t there is no value overlap, or even that 
there is too little, bu t tha t even those  core values that are w ide ly shared play 
too m arg ina l a ro le in the  design o f in ternational institu tions and in the 
conduct o f fo re ign  p o licy .94
92 Ibid, p.228 (emphasis added)
93 Ibid
94 iu ;^ i
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In simple terms, the imperative outlined by Rawls to construct just institutions 
at the national level is expanded by Pogge to the international plain. In this 
respect, it is reasonable to assert that Pogge’s approach to international 
justice is post-Rawlsian in nature. Furthermore, the fact that those institutions 
must reflect what Pogge characterises as an existing normative consensus 
across international society (and cannot simply be seen as a means to 
impose liberal or western values on the rest of the international community) is 
consistent with his association with constructivists, who would insist that 
values derive their legitimacy from the consensus which surrounds them. In 
essence, Pogge is attempting to frame his argument in terms of institutional 
rather than interactional cosmopolitanism, thereby limiting his prescriptions for 
reform in international society to those which can be reconciled with the 
normative convergence, so highly prized among constructivist commentators 
and so vital to the processes of institutionalisation. His position remains 
considerably more ambitious than that of Rawls, however, because he 
contends that the extent o f ‘value-overlap’ is far broader than his mentor 
would have been prepared to concede. In this respect, Pogge has laid the 
foundation for a more expansive reading of Rawlsian principles; one which 
has influenced the work of A llen Buchanan.
iii. Allen Buchanan
In recent years, Buchanan has attempted to formulate a framework for HR 
and HI which seeks to combine a respect for the realities governing norm 
formation with a conviction that certain HR are so fundamental to the fabric of 
international society that they ought to be enforced by institutions of global
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governance. In other words, like so many theorists of justice, he has 
attempted to imbue his understanding of universal standards of morality with a 
practical appreciation of the dynamics of becoming at the international level. 
Accordingly, Buchanan outlines the terms of a “moral theory of international 
law”95 capable of anchoring extensive obligations of justice between citizens 
and strangers and com prehensible from any number of theoretical or ethical 
perspectives. Although one element of his project, like that of Pogge, takes 
aim at ‘internationalising’ the Rawlsian principles of the ‘basic structure’ and 
‘justice as fa irness’, what is particularly engaging, from the perspective of 
attempts to hybridise his views with constructivism, is Buchanan’s assertion 
that this can be achieved w ithout a reliance on cosmopolitan first principles. 
This bold claim, together with his extensive exploration of the issue of HI, 
renders Buchanan an invaluable contributor to an overview of international 
justice. His conception of becoming as practical as well as moral informs the 
principle of “ institutional moral reasoning”96 which underpins his approach to 
both international politics and PIL. This thesis asserts that institutional moral 
reasoning is based on a constructivist understanding of the relationship 
between becoming and the socialising power of institutions of global 
governance. Like Pogge, Buchanan argues that the key to progress lies in the 
notion of ‘value overlap’. However, through his principle of institutional moral 
reasoning (the twin beliefs that the institutions of international society should 
reflect the values o f international society and that moralising must be 
constrained by feasibility) Buchanan claims that this focus on values is 
accessible even to those who reject specifically liberal ideals.
95 Buchanan, Justice, p.97
96 Ibid, p.22
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Reiterating the fam iliar criticism of Rawls that the statist focus and narrow 
conception of HR at the heart of The Law o f Peoples undermine the scope 
and success of the arguments therein, Buchanan calls for an expanded (and 
expanding) conception of HR. The gulf between the normative consensus 
which he identifies in international society and the ill-conceived political and 
legal compromises which he believes serve only to stifle it, is one which 
troubles Buchanan and motivates much of his enquiry. However, despite his 
undeniable cosmopolitan convictions, he maintains, in a manner which is akin 
to conventional constructivists, that a realistic appreciation of norm formation 
must steer the processes of change which he advocates.
In effect, Buchanan’s institutional moral reasoning is defined in the same 
terms as this project: it is inter-disciplinary in its focus on law as well as 
morality; it is concerned with the balance between continuity and change; and 
it acknowledges that moral progress in the international system is contingent 
upon a realistic understanding of the consensual nature of the society of 
states. Nonetheless, allied to this apparently conservative approach to the 
issue of international justice is a radical agenda for reform. Buchanan believes 
that there exists sufficient value overlap and normative consensus in 
international society to justify extensive reform to the current state system. In 
fact, he is prepared to argue that, in certain circumstances, the conscious and 
calculated breaching o f PIL is justified, provided that the intention informing 
this infringement is the long-term improvement of the status quo and the
58
Being and Becoming: Humanitarian Intervention and the Constructed Duty of Justice Claire Malcolm
implementation of the values which, he believes, the UN in particular came 
into existence in order to promote.
Like Pogge, Buchanan presents a dynamic conception of HR standards 
which, rather than being embedded in a fixed and limited overlapping 
consensus among states, is capable of evolving in response to changing 
normative and moral imperatives. The suggestion, which will be explored in 
much greater detail in the forthcoming chapter on Buchanan, is that the set of 
norms surrounding the moral equality of persons and the HR to which this 
entitles all individuals are now so intrinsic to human relations that they provide 
a significant challenge to notions o f NS. As such, the institutional framework 
of international society will continue to fail the individuals to whom it ought to 
be answerable, until such time as it comes to embody this normative 
transition, or to reflect the processes of becoming of which it is indicative.
It is on this basis that Buchanan has framed his response to the issue of HI, a 
further dimension of his work which is compatible with the scope of this 
project. His views amount to a defence of a rule-governed ‘League of 
Democracies’ which, he claims, could and should take responsibility for HI. 
His argument is based on the suggestion that recent normative developments 
dictate that states which do not represent the interests of their citizens ought 
not to be empowered to overturn the convictions of those with a 
democratically obtained mandate. Calling into question the assumption that 
multilateralism and HR are necessarily inherently compatible, Buchanan 
criticises the foundational assumption that state majoritarianism is the most
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just form of international decision-making and suggests that for as long as the 
UNSC continues to demonstrate that it is neither effective, nor legitimate, its 
privileged position, and the disproportionate power and authority which it 
confers upon the Permanent Five (P5) will remain profoundly unjust.
Buchanan believes that agreement over core values gives rise to normative 
constraints, and although those values may derive their ‘normative legitimacy’ 
from an a priori commitment to the moral equality of persons, (hence 
Buchanan’s cosmopolitanism) they gain their ‘sociological legitimacy’, or their 
efficacy, through reiteration and crystallisation (hence his characterisation as 
a constructivist). In this respect, moralising is of little long-term value, for 
Buchanan, unless it can be reconciled with the demands of institutionalisation, 
and becoming is as much a political journey as a moral one. As such, 
Buchanan establishes the standards according to which he wishes his work to 
be judged. This thesis will attempt to ascertain how successfully he fulfils his 
own criteria.
V. Communitarian Constructivism
Perhaps surprisingly, the cosmopolitan constructivist understanding of 
becoming shares much with that o f communitarian constructivists, in that 
theorists on both sides o f the debate accept that values gain resonance 
through dissemination and crystallisation. However, the key difference 
between cosmopolitan and communitarian constructivists is that for the former 
the moral equality o f persons dictates the legitimacy of normative 
development, even absent consensus among global political actors; whereas
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for the latter it is the very processes of socialisation which bestow legitimacy 
upon normative developments. Hence, the suggestion is that the only norms 
which could or should impact upon international politics are those which are 
agreed upon by the majority of global political actors. This is not simply a 
retreat into the realist suggestion that powerful states dictate the will of the 
international community. Rather it is a self-consciously moral claim that our 
identities and interests are, and ought to be, shaped and defined by our 
membership of a specific political community. Consequently, “[hjowever 
imperfectly, the nation-state is the primary locus of political legitimacy and the 
pursuit of justice” .97 In other words, far from being a barrier to justice, 
individual political communities are integral to justice claims.
Every state has the  bounda ries  and popula tion it has fo r all sorts o f accidenta l 
and historical reasons; but g iven tha t it exercises sovereign pow er over its 
citizens and in the ir nam e, those  citizens have a duty o f jus tice  toward one 
another th rough the legal, socia l, and econom ic institu tions that sovereign 
power m akes poss ib le . T h is  du ty  is su i generis, and is not owed to everyone 
in the world, nor is it an ind irec t consequence o f any o ther duty that m ay be 
owed to eve ryone  in the  w orld , such as a duty o f hum anity. Justice is 
som ething w e ow e th rough  ou r shared institu tions only to those w ith whom  
we stand in a strong po litica l re la tion. It is, in the standard term inology, an 
associa tive  o b lig a tio n .98
Thus, for communitarian constructivists there is something inherently morally 
significant about the emergence and maintenance of national boundaries. 
Whilst they may have come into being for arbitrary and often forgotten or 
contested reasons, their continued existence is vital to the practical and moral
97 Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 33(2), 2005, 
pp.113-147, pp.113
98 Ibid, pp.121
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infrastructure of international society. In some respects, then, 
communitarianism offers the most straightforward synthesis with 
constructivism since proponents of both theories agree that values originate 
within the boundaries of a given political community, which itself is constitutive 
of the identities and interests of its members, and that it is negotiation 
between these competing values which results in what might be thought of as 
the terms of international justice. Moreover, even if an international duty of 
justice can be said to exist, it is substantially less demanding than the 
obligations owed between fellow citizens of a political community and can only 
be generated by the most egregious violations of those minimal values which 
are subscribed to by the majority of international society. In other words, 
becoming is a slow and incremental process built on cross-cultural consensus 
and maintained by a com m itm ent to non-intervention in all but the most 
extreme of cases.
i. Robert Jackson
In fact, there are those who are inclined to argue that international society 
represents such a loose affiliation of identities and interests that becoming 
and the international duty o f justice which might result from it are somewhat 
fanciful notions. For instance, Robert Jackson has framed his defence of non­
intervention in explicitly pluralist terms. Jackson defines the distinction 
between communitarian and cosmopolitan theorising in this context as 
analogous to the difference between a “societas of sovereign states” and “a 
global universitas”99 o f individuals. The former is a system of independent,
99 Robert H. Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World o f States, (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2000), p.251
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self-interested, political communities which are capable of forging superficial 
alliances and agreements in certain key areas but which are, and ought to be, 
if cultural imperialism is to be guarded against and international order 
secured, essentially atom istic in their social relations. The latter system is 
characterised by some as the inevitable consequence of the increased 
interdependence generated by globalisation. It dictates that
it is no longer m ora lly  tenab le ... to concentra te  only on the interests o f those 
w ithin sta tes and ignore  o u r ob liga tions to the whole o f hum anity. Individuals 
rather than s ta tes  have to  be the starting point in the search fo r global 
ju s tice .100
Jackson emphasises that, in his view, the societas approach is entirely more 
persuasive than the cosmopolitan suggestion that NS is imperilled by the 
development of HR norms. He states that there is very little evidence to 
suggest that a transition from the form er to the latter has taken place, or is 
likely to do so in the foreseeable future and he contends that the very nature 
of globalisation itself, though subject to hyperbole and misunderstanding, 
relies for, its existence and development, on the mechanisms of the state 
system101. Equally, Jackson rejects the dichotomy which necessarily pits 
states’ rights and HR against one another, embracing instead the suggestion 
that NS is sometimes the best defence against predation. After all,
one o f the reasons w hy  poor, w eak, countries are so keen to hang on to state 
sovere ignty and the norm  o f non-in tervention  is a quite jus tifiab le  fear that
Hurrell Order and Justice p.13
101 See Robert H. Jackson, ‘Sovereignty and its Presuppositions: Before 9/11 and After’, 
Political Studies, 55(2), 2006, pp.297-317
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w ithou t these  de fences they w ould be even more at the mercy of the rich and 
pow erfu l than they  are now .102
Furthermore, his work on HI is illustrative of the tendency among 
cosmopolitan theorists, constructivist or otherwise, to manipulate world events 
in order to fit them into an existing normative outlook, rather than to 
objectively appraise them in the correct historical and political context. 
Considering the cases of: the Kurdish safe havens of the first Gulf War 
(1991); the deployment o f US and UN troops to Somalia (1993); inaction in 
the face of the Rwandan genocide (1994); the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia 
(1995); and the NATO-led incursion into Kosovo (1999), Jackson rejects the 
suggestion that these events are indicative of an increased activism, based on 
a developing cosmopolitan sentiment, which prioritises individuals over states. 
Instead he points to: inconsistency; poor choice of military means; lingering 
issues of national self-interest; and an on-going tendency for leaders to 
concern themselves predom inately with the welfare of their own military, over 
that of non-combatants, to counter the suggestion that a linear pattern of 
interventionism is emerging. Moreover, he argues that even if such a 
tendency were gaining ground within international society, it ought, on both 
moral and prudential grounds, to be treated with extreme caution, since the 
norm of non-intervention offers more effective protection for individuals and 
states than would a general license to intervene. For Jackson, the lesson of 
HI in the 1990s is not that the infringement of NS on humanitarian grounds 
has become the prevailing norm, nor that it should be rejected out of hand. 
Instead he suggests that
102 Chris Brown, ‘Review Article: Theories of International Justice’, British Journal o f Political 
Science, 27(2), April 1997, pp.273-291, pp.294
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hum an ita rian ism  can be pursued w ith in  the p luralist fram ew ork of 
in te rna tiona l soc ie ty  at least up to a point. The ethics of human rights have to 
be fitted  into the p lu ra lis t fram ew ork o f in ternational society and cannot 
s idestep tha t fram ew ork . Tha t is the only operational context w ithin which 
hum an be ings can be de fended in contem porary world po litics.103
Conversely, acts of HI cannot be governed by inflexible rules and 
unshakeable moral precepts o f the sort that cosmopolitans tend to attempt to 
apply to issues of HR. Jackson argues that, in cases of HI, “What the most 
responsible choice would be in any particular case is not something that can 
be determined in principle or in advance”104 but rather on a case-by-case 
basis which takes into consideration a range of factors and contingencies. In 
fact, in his view, this speaks to the w ider issue of how international politics 
must be conducted. For Jackson, IR can only be understood in terms of a 
“situational ethics”105 which is responsive to the realities of inter-state 
interaction, as well as the “ intractability of all political situations, and the moral 
quandary in which all statecraft operates” .106 Against this backdrop, 
responsible criticism of international society must be contextualised by an 
acceptance of political realities. This is because
[o]ne cannot d ivo rce  s tanda rds  from  c ircum stances and judge international 
action accord ing to the  one  o r the  o the r w ithou t relapsing into the lofty idealist 
outlook or the narrow  rea lis t o u tlo o k .107
Jackson, Global, p.289
104 Ibid, p.250
105 Ibid, p.136
106
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In this context, an acceptance of cultural and political pluralism, though 
imperfect, is not only the most effective way in which to maintain order but it 
also demonstrates that the pursuit of universal values, for their own sake, is 
almost entirely devoid of merit.
Significantly, however, Jackson’s is a relatively extreme solution to the issue 
of international justice, precisely because it is framed in terms of a 
comprehensive defence of the value of pluralism. Although, in his view, an 
international duty of justice is tantam ount to a duty of non-interference and the 
processes of becoming are unlikely to alter this relationship, an engagement 
with competing theorists demonstrates that communitarian constructivism 
need not necessarily prove to be so constrained. In essence, 
communitarianism demands a respect for NS, whilst constructivism 
encourages theorists and practitioners to view NS as a malleable social 
construct. Although com m unitarian constructivists are unlikely to countenance 
the over-turning of NS in the name of HR, they are prepared to concede that 
the values generated within a political community could ultimately come to 
impact upon the ways in which the members of that society view the NS of 
their own state and that o f others. In other words, the ideas underpinning 
‘sovereignty as responsibility’ or the notion that NS might be limited, or even 
set aside, in extreme cases is not at odds with the communitarian 
constructivist conviction that it is a core value of international society. Instead, 
communitarian constructivists can acknowledge that the normative 
developments which give meaning to becoming at the international level can,
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in the correct circumstances, alter the terms of even the most established 
elements of PIL.
Intriguingly, even Jackson himself has conceded that the nature of NS is far 
from static. In his work on decolonisation he points to the emergence of what 
he terms “juridical statehood”108 to explain how territories which failed to fulfil 
the criteria of effective governm ent (outlined as a core element of statehood in 
the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States), were 
nonetheless welcomed into international society under the auspices of a form 
of associative statehood109. This was because the widespread acceptance of 
the principle of self-determ ination, and the practical issue of the financial 
burdens associated with colonisation, increased pressure on states still in 
possession of colonies to grant independence to these territories by any 
means necessary. This is indicative of the ways in which the rules which 
govern membership of the society o f states are potentially responsive to 
normative and political developments. Just as decolonisation could be said to 
have refined the terms of NS, an increased emphasis on HR standards may, 
over time, result in a comparable linguistic and normative shift. This would not 
be the direct consequence of an overt commitment to the a priori moral 
equality of persons but rather would result from incremental changes in the
108 Robert H. Jackson, ‘Quasi-States, Dual Regimes and Neoclassical Theory: International 
Jurisprudence and the Third W orld’, International Organisation, 41(4), Autumn 1987, pp.519- 
549, pp.529
109 The example pointed to by Jackson is the Congo. He cites James Crawford in claiming 
that “Anything less like effective government it would be hard to imagine. Yet despite this 
there can be little doubt that the Congo was in 1960 a State in the full sense of the term. It 
was widely recognised. Its application for United Nations membership was approved without 
dissent” (The Criteria for Statehood’, British Yearbook o f International Law 1976-1977, 
(Oxford, University Press, 1978) p.95)
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perception and expectations of global political actors, in line with a 
constructivist ontology of becoming.
ii. Emanuel Adler
So it is that combining communitarianism with constructivism generates a 
wealth of new possibilities for expanding our understanding of international 
justice, by balancing the constraints of the state system with an appreciation 
of conceivable modifications to it. As Adler argues in his book Communitarian 
International Relations: The Epistem ic Foundations o f International Relations
com m unitarian IR, spurred by constructiv ism , [is] en liven ing and driv ing the 
quest for a syn thes is  o f trad itiona l and com m unita rian  approaches... Such a 
synthesis could... be ins trum en ta l in ground ing  constructiv ism  in political 
philosophy and in con fe rring  on construc tiv ism  w hat it currently  lacks most: a 
theory o f politics. It a lso cou ld  p rov ide  norm ative  IR theory w ith the onto log ical 
and ep istem olog ica l too ls  fo r b ridg ing  the gap betw een the present reality and 
the desired hum an co n d itio n 110.
In other words, properly framed, what Adler refers to as “constructivist-led 
communitarianism”111 can serve to identify and develop the overlap between 
legal, political, and moral conceptions of norm formation and may provide the 
tools both for effective analysis o f the status quo and for the much needed 
adaptation thereof; or, for both being and becoming. This is because a refined 
version of Adler’s argument that constructivism occupies a theoretical ‘middle 
ground’ demonstrates that it is the most effective means by which to interpret 
and judge the behaviour o f global political actors and assess and respond to 
change at the international level. Offering a rebuttal to cosmopolitan
110 p.4-5
111 Ibid, p.7
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assumptions concerning the nature of rights and belief systems and the 
institutions which enforce them, Adler summarises his communitarian 
constructivist conviction that normative standards develop and are 
consolidated through processes of human interaction.
Constructiv ism  show s tha t even our m ost enduring  institu tions are based on 
collective understand ings; tha t they  are re ified structures that were once upon 
a time conceived ex n ih ilo  by hum an consciousness; and that these 
understandings w ere  subsequen tly  d iffused  and conso lida ted until they were 
taken for g ran ted112.
For Adler, this process of norm formation and crystallisation is neither amoral 
nor descriptive. Instead, it offers the most effective means to expand the 
moral community and infuse it with minimal standards of justice. Engaging 
with those political communities beyond the liberal West and acknowledging 
the historically and culturally contingent nature of some of the values which 
we hold dear allows for dialogue both between states and their competing 
conceptions of morality. Rather than merely seeking to export liberal notions 
of justice to unwilling and even hostile states, communitarian constructivism 
calls for even-handed and culturally sensitive debate. Adler suggests that this 
process might serve to identify consensus where it does exist and sow the 
seeds for future negotiation where such agreement proves illusive.
A genera lised p rac tice  o f com m un ica tion  and conversation m ay m ake it 
possible to expand the  com m un ity  to the universal level, w ith no need to 
d im inish or e lim ina te  ‘the  o th e r’ in the process. W hile com m unication may not 
be able to ach ieve  the un iversa l com m unity, to which liberals aspire, it may
112 Ibid, p.322
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still create a community thick enough to solve the problems of justice in world 
politics.113
This commitment to toleration (somewhat reminiscent of Rawls), the 
emphasis on the role of language and negotiation in becoming (typical of 
constructivist theorising) and the distinction between minimal and maximal 
morality, provide the terms for a communitarian constructivist definition of an 
international duty of justice. However, as instructive as Adler’s work is in 
delineating the nature and extent o f justice-based obligations between political 
communities, it is to Michael W alzer’s contribution to the debate that this 
thesis now turns.
iii. Michael Walzer
Although Adler identifies the potential for the synthesis of communitarianism 
and constructivism, he fails explicitly to acknowledge that this hybridised 
conception has already been employed by one his predecessors. It is for this 
reason that Michael Walzer, rather than Adler himself, is the chosen 
representative of communitarian constructivism in this overview of the 
ontology of becoming and any resultant international duty of justice. The 
decision to incorporate the work of W alzer into an analysis of HI is relatively 
uncontroversial. Over thirty years after its initial publication, his seminal Just 
and Unjust Wars remains one o f the most influential and compelling 
appraisals of the dilemmas governing the use of force in international society, 
and his subsequent works, including the recent Arguing About War, have 
consolidated his reputation as a leading figure in IR theory. In fact, an
113 Ibid, p.9
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examination of HI would be incomplete w ithout at least a cursory engagement 
with Walzer’s viewpoint. Throughout his career, Walzer has grown 
increasingly preoccupied with the inability of the international community to 
respond effectively to humanitarian crises and, in so doing he has produced 
some of the most astute observations of his long career. His pioneering views 
on ‘emergency ethics’ and non-combatant immunity, and his assertion that a 
form of “thin universalism” or “moral m inimalism”114 could serve to bridge the 
cultural gaps between states, whilst demonstrating the necessary respect for 
the unique ability of a political community to inform the identities of its 
constituent members, render W alzer’s contribution to any understanding of 
justice almost uniquely valuable.
Ostensibly, however, it is somewhat more contentious to argue that Walzer’s 
views represent a form of constructivist theorising. In fact, he has frequently, 
and often derisively, been labelled as a communitarian, whose commitment to 
the concepts of self-determ ination and non-intervention, except under the 
most extreme of circumstances, represents the work of “a statist with a 
sovereignty fixation”115. This caricatured version of his approach takes little or 
no account of his understanding of the basis of morality and its relationship to 
international politics. In fram ing his principle of ‘reiterative universalism’, 
Walzer demonstrates the constructivist epistemology which underpins his 
work as he argues that changing norms allow for morality to be constructed
114 Nicholas J. Wheeler, ‘Agency, Humanitarianism and Intervention’, International Political 
Science Review, The Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention’, 18(1), January 1997, pp.9-25,
pp.10
115 Peter Sutch, ‘Reiterating Rights: International Society in Transition’, Bruce Haddock and 
Peter Sutch (eds), Multiculturalism, Identity and Rights, (London and New York, Routledge, 
2003), p.215
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and reconstructed through extensive international deliberations. In stark 
contrast to the cosmopolitan approach which seeks to argue that certain 
moral principles are timeless and universal, reiterative universalism as against 
covering-law universalism and as an element of norm dynamics more 
generally, provides an alternative conception of becoming and the 
development of morality, in which a thin conception of the ‘good life’ emerges 
through negotiation and legitimation. W alzer’s theory can be defined as a 
means by which
[w]e abstract from  the pa rticu la r to  the  un iversa l th rough repeated experience 
of shared political p rob lem s...[to ],..deve lop  a re ite ra tive ly  universal standpo int 
to judge them  fro m .116
That is to say that, in line with constructivist theorising, Walzer believes that 
as claims are raised and legitimated within international society, a minimal 
code of conduct begins slowly to emerge and behaviours which fall outside 
these confines become increasingly sub-optimal for global political actors. It is 
by dint of this process that the once indomitable norms of national sovereignty 
and territorial integrity have gradually come to be mitigated by HR-based 
imperatives. In this respect, W alzer is able to counter accusations that 
constructivism merely represents a simple sociological description of the 
manner in which international society functions. His work is rooted in the 
assertion that:
understanding how  th ings  are put toge the r and how they occur is not mere 
description. U nders tand ing  the  constitu tion  o f th ings is essentia l in explaining 
how they behave and w h a t causes politica l outcom es... an understanding of
116 Ibid, pp.214-215
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how sovere ign ty , hum an rights, laws o f war, or bureaucracies are constituted
soc ia lly  a llow s us to hypothesise  about the ir effects in world po litics.117
This ensures that W alzer’s communitarian constructivism is sufficiently 
nuanced to take account of a theoretical space as broad as the debate 
surrounding the lim its o f an international duty of justice. The complicated 
nature of this debate finds expression in the interdependent and mutually 
constituted nature of the normative developments governing HI. Whilst 
embodying the norm of human protection, which itself owes much to the 
discourse of HR, it also represents a direct challenge to the norm or series of 
norms which speak to the sacrosanct nature of territorial integrity. It is 
intrinsically connected with the doctrine of JW, in which Walzer is a leading 
commentator, and can reasonably form part of an analysis of a range of other 
issues implicit in the human security discourse.
Communitarian constructivism  is not simply premised on the oversimplified 
notion that, through processes of socialisation, one set of norms comes 
ultimately to displace another. Proponents of this viewpoint contend that 
competing norms exist, co-exist, challenge, legitimate, and delegitimate one 
another and only very few secure the extensive consensus necessary for 
them to become, what might be thought of as, settled or embedded norms, of 
the sort identified by cosmopolitans. Thus, the suggestion made by some 
cosmopolitans that the right to democratic governance, for example, is so 
firmly established in normative terms, that it is now a ‘basic human right’ 
which should be intrinsic to all political communities, would be rejected by
117 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘Norm Dynamics’, pp.894
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communitarian constructivists, and by W alzer in particular, as unsustainable 
and ethnocentric. In contrast, the rights of life and liberty, defined in narrow, 
specific and often negative terms, could be said to have successfully 
transcended state boundaries.
Walzer’s emphasis on the cultural diversity at work in international society 
provides an explanation for the multitude of reasons that norm formation is 
fraught with such uncertainty, and the fact that his most famous contribution to 
the literature boasts the subtitle A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations 
is indicative of the fact that his analysis of IR is explicitly normative. In 
engaging with the foundations of morality, Walzer is able to differentiate 
between those norms which have proven to be universalisable and those 
which ought to be universalised and, despite accusations levelled at his work 
by his most vocal detractors, these categories are not necessarily identical. 
As the forthcoming chapter on W alzer will demonstrate, the value of his 
contribution to this debate lies in his willingness to claim that whilst certain 
values are sufficiently accessible to a broad range of political communities to 
encourage and facilitate the modification, or circumvention, of ineffective 
institutions of governance, their origins lie in human design, rather than 
metaphysical or deontological reasoning. Alternatively phrased, for Walzer, 
becoming is driven by negotiation and legitimation among global political 
actors.
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VI. Solidarist Constructivism
Once again the overlap between this position and an alternative hybridised 
account o f constructivism is striking. Solidarism, a theoretical subcategory of 
the English School, is premised on an understanding of international society 
as both constitutive of, and constituted by, its diverse membership; a 
theoretical fram ework which resonates with both conventional and 
communitarian constructivism. However, it is also associated with the claim 
that individuals as well as states are valid subjects of international justice 
claims and, in this respect it is potentially compatible with elements of the 
cosmopolitan constructivist project. In order fully to appreciate the potential 
contribution of the English School, and in particular its solidarist elements, to 
debates surrounding HI and becoming in international society, and to critique 
the compatibility o f solidarist and constructivist epistemology, it is first 
imperative to gain an understanding of the theoretical and historical context 
upon which this approach is based. Engaging primarily with the development 
and functions of international society, as well as the normative standards 
which underpin it, like constructivists, English School theorists have sought to 
combine elements of philosophy, political science, and law in a framework of 
IR which rejects both realism and liberalism. Proponents of this viewpoint
m aintain tha t the  in te rna tiona l politica l system  is more civil and orderly than 
realists and neo -rea lis ts  suggest. However, the fact tha t v io lence is 
ineradicab le in th e ir v iew  puts them  at odds with Utopians who believe in the 
possib ility  o f pe rpe tua l p e a ce .118
118 Andrew Linklater, The  English School’, Scott Burchill Andrew Linklater Richard Devetak 
Jack Donnelly Matthew Paterson Christian Reus-Smit and Jacqui True, Theories of 
International Relations: Third Edition, (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p.85
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As such, the theoretical middle ground assigned by Adler to constructivism 
can equally be said to be occupied by English School theorists, the so-called 
“Janus-faced [thinkers] capable of looking in two different directions at the 
same tim e”.119
Most notable among the work of the English School is an extensive literature, 
most readily associated with Hedley Bull and Martin Wight, concerning the 
development and activities o f international society. Wight, in particular, 
famously conceived o f the three traditions of international theory: international 
systems, international societies, and world societies120 and the appeal of such 
a distinction in the context o f an attempt to synthesise elements of the English 
School with constructivism is the potential for methodological pluralism (or 
hybridisation) implied by this triptych. As Richard Little has suggested, 
international systems are “associated with recurrent patterns of behaviour that 
can be identified most effectively using positivist tools of analysis”121 and, as 
such, this component o f the English School is most obviously compatible with 
the realist approach to IR. By way of contrast, international society calls upon 
a methodology already fam iliar to advocates of constructivism, specifically, 
through a “focus on the language that lies behind the rules, institutions, 
interests and values that constitute any society” .122 Given that this is the case, 
the proposition that constructivism and solidarism are fundamentally 
compatible seems increasingly credible. Finally, world society, according to
119 Richard Little, The  English School’s Contribution to the Study of International Relations’, 
European Journal o f International Relations, 6(3), 2000, pp.395-422, pp.396
120 John Williams, ‘Pluralism, Solidarism and the Emergence of World Society in English 
School Theory’, International Relations, 19(19), 2005, pp.19-38, pp.20
121 Little, ‘English School’, pp.395
122 Ibid
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Little “can only meaningfully be discussed by drawing on critical theory that 
identifies the direction that the society needs to take in order for human values 
to be realised” .123 This somewhat more constitutive approach is 
commensurable with cosmopolitan constructivism, in particular, since it 
implies that the processes of norm formation may be manipulated or re­
evaluated with a given moral goal in mind. In this case, such an objective 
could be defined in terms o f the demands of international justice.
In fact, the epistemological and ontological similarities between constructivism 
and the English School are numerous, particularly when the latter is 
subdivided into its two principal theoretical factions: pluralism and solidarism. 
In essence, the pluralist position is very similar to that advocated by Jackson, 
specifically that whilst the state system is enormously flawed, it is the most 
effective means by which to secure international stability; stability which, itself, 
is key to the achievement, dissem ination, and maintenance of justice. In the 
context of HI, pluralists are staunch defenders of territorial integrity, since they 
believe that states are the only subjects of PIL, that “the rules of the society of 
states... uphold plural conceptions o f the ‘good’”124 and that to establish a right 
of unilateral HI in a multicultural international society is: theoretically and 
practically flawed; potentially dictatorial in its tendency to champion ‘western’ 
values to the detriment of others; and an undeniable threat to order. The 
rallying cry of pluralism is continuing concern regarding the emergence of a 
new precedent, which would be subject to abuse by powerful states and 
impossible to constrain. In a more general sense, pluralists view the
123 Ibid
124 Wheeler, Saving, p.27
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processes of becoming at the international level as contingent upon and 
subject to the will o f states. W hilst they acknowledge that this perspective is 
intrinsically conservative they are also inclined to argue, as Jackson does, 
that sustainable change is only achievable within the current confines of the 
international system.
By way of contrast, advocates of solidarism argue vociferously for a 
reconceptualisation of the long-standing privileging of order over justice which 
leads their pluralist counterparts to claim that a right of HI would breed 
instability. Whilst a simple inversion of this principle is neither feasible nor 
desirable, an acknow ledgem ent o f the symbiosis which connects these two 
concepts and the manner in which changing social mores impact upon their 
relative importance represents a key element of the solidarist approach. In 
terms of becoming, solidarists contend that significant reform to international 
society has already taken place, insofar as the legitimacy of states is 
increasingly connected not simply to their efficacy but also to their ability to 
uphold HR standards. This developing solidarist sentiment, which is 
consolidating the view that humanity can transcend borders, forms the 
cornerstone of the solidarist understanding of becoming which itself is 
epistemologically comparable to the cosmopolitan agenda. In essence, 
pluralists are predominately concerned with the relationship between being 
and order, whereas solidarists tend to be more inclined to investigate the 
relationship between becoming and justice.
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As a consequence, there exists a tension between pluralists and those who 
occupy the more radical territory of solidarism. The distinction was first arrived 
at by Bull, who foreshadowed a number of recent claims concerning the 
potential of the international community to work together in the application of a 
basic level of law enforcement. Bull identified the conflicting positions of the 
solidarist or “Grotian” movement, as against “‘pluralist’ conceptions of 
international society”125 which are largely based on the writings of Vattel. Bull 
maintained that the “central Grotian assumption is that of the solidarity, or 
potential solidarity, o f the states comprising international society, with respect 
to the enforcement o f the law .126 This viewpoint has been particularly 
influential in the arena of HR where the notion that “individual human beings 
are subjects of international law and members of international society in their 
own right”127 is gaining increasing credence. As a consequence, solidarists 
are disturbed by the “glaring contradiction between the moral justification of 
pluralist rules and the actual human rights of their citizens” .128 Hence,
[d jiscussions abou t w h e th e r s ta tes should intervene to prevent hum an rights 
v io la tions have b rough t the  ‘so lida ris t’ concern with individual rights into 
conflic t w ith the ‘p lu ra lis t’ s tress  on the dangers involved in breaching national 
sovere ign ty129.
i. RJ Vincent
The relatively radical theoretical agenda of solidarism has ensured that many 
thinkers have struggled to sustain their commitment to its terms and have,
125 Burchill et al, Theories, p.93
126 Ibid
127 Ibid
128 Wheeler, Saving, p.27
129 Burchill et al, Theories, p. 109
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ultimately, either embraced the full implications of a cosmopolitan conception 
of the moral equality of persons, or reverted to a pluralist understanding of the 
atomistic nature of individual political communities. The latter is arguably true 
of Bull who concluded that, given the lack of consensus over the content of 
norms of justice, the solidarist framework for IR remained “premature”.130 
However, RJ Vincent, a one-time student of Bull, proved to be more steadfast 
in his approach to solidarism. Vincent believed that international society could 
successfully take aim at more than the preservation of order. The uniqueness 
of his contribution, and its value in the context of attempts to analyse the role 
of becoming in the construction of an international duty of justice, lies in his 
approach to the pluralist/solidarist framework and his exploration of “the 
possibilities for the practical realisation of a human rights agenda in the 
society of states”.131 In a conscious attempt to escape the pluralist parameters 
which had limited the scope of the work of his predecessor, Vincent grounded 
his theory in a ‘basic rights initiative’ which represented “‘a common floor 
under the societies of the w orld ’ by creating a ‘global cosmopolitan culture’ 
that would offer consensus on essential values”.132 Under the auspices of a 
comparable agenda to W alzer’s pursuit of ‘thin universalism’, Vincent 
accepted that there existed cultures in which the comprehensive set of HR 
championed by cosmopolitans, could not be fully embraced but he also 
suggested that respect fo r this cultural pluralism could accommodate a focus 
on two different dimensions o f right: “the right to security (meaning freedom
130 Nicholas Wheeler and Timothy Dunne, ‘Hedley Bull’s Pluralism of the Intellect and 
Solidarism of the W ill’, International Affairs, 72(1), January 1996, pp. 91-107, pp.98
131 Ana Gonzalez-Paleaz and Barry Buzan, ‘A Viable Project of Solidarism? The Neglected 
Contribution of John Vincent’s Basic Rights Initiative’, International Relations, 17(3), 2003,
pp.321-339, pp.321
132 Ibid, pp.322
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from oppression) and the right to subsistence (meaning freedom from 
starvation)” .133 The latter demonstrates a commitment to the holistic 
appreciation of IR at the heart o f the modern discourse of human security, by 
explicitly acknowledging the inter-related nature of physical and economic 
security. The form er infused “his attempt to bridge the pluralist demands of 
international society (sovereignty and non-intervention) with the humankind 
that joins individuals across frontiers” .134
For Vincent, the “assertion of ‘basic rights’ is joined by the observation that 
this idea is increasingly shared among individuals in an emergent world 
society”135 and the fact that states often fail to respect these rights, even in the 
face of mounting humanitarian legislation, was seen by Vincent, “not as a 
cause for despair, but as a clarion call to action” .136 Neither did he accept that 
the challenge of defending HR need necessarily entail the destruction of the 
current state system, or that o f the UN framework. Instead, he asserted that 
far from undermining global security, an increased emphasis on HR and 
justice might conceivably serve to strengthen the legitimacy, and therefore the 
efficacy, of the existing system. Like communitarians, Vincent remained 
wedded to the idea that individual states provide and promote collective 
identity but he also argued for “the need to bring morality into the schemes of 
international society”.137 In so doing, he believed, the similarities between 
states would gradually increase and the possibility of consensus over key HR 
issues would result from this convergence. Like constructivist moral
133 Ibid, pp.321
134 Ibid, pp.322
135 Wheeler, ‘Pluralist or Solidarist’, pp.478
136 Ibid
137 Gonzalez-Paleaz and Buzan, ‘A Viable Project’, pp.323
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theorising, this process of becoming would be necessarily incremental but 
over time, Vincent affirmed, international society could begin to conceive of 
values “inside sovereignty” .138 He provides us with a notion of
hum an rights conso lida ting  the state rather than transcending it... [arguing 
that] we m igh t extend  a cautious w elcom e to both the penetration o f the state 
and to its s treng then ing  itse lf in response .139
Perhaps it was the potential for these ideas to reconcile cosmopolitan and 
communitarian theoretical approaches, or the appeal of processes of change 
and development which can be constrained by, yet significantly improve upon, 
the current status quo, which inspired attempts to combine solidarist 
reasoning with constructivism.
ii. Nicholas W heeler
Arguably the most successful attempt to do this finds expression in the work 
of Nicholas Wheeler. Of course, W heeler is by no means the only scholar to 
have identified the potential for the two approaches to be hybridised and his 
assertion that “the English School and constructivism occupy the same 
terrain”140 is supported by Tim othy Dunne, with whom he has collaborated on 
a number of articles. Sim ilarly, “John Ruggie begins his... survey of... 
[constructivism]... by acknowledging the influence of the English School”141 
and Stephen Krasner, best known for his enormously influential volume
139 RJ Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations, (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), p.151
140 Wheeler, Saving, p.4
141 Rengger, International Relations, Political Theory, p.83
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Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy  has also identified the inherent similarities 
between the two positions:
The English School and som e o the r constructiv is t analyses understand 
institutions as genera ting  agents tha t re in force  or enact, as a result o f 
norm ative socia lisa tion  into a com m on c iv ilisation, a particu lar set of 
principles, norm s, and ru le s142.
Reus-Smit calls upon W heeler’s attempt to amalgamate the two theories as 
part of his own demonstration of the ways in which a more productive 
relationship might be forged between the competing approaches, if advocates 
of each took a more nuanced and sophisticated account of the common 
ground which they share. In simple terms, he concludes that constructivism 
may have the ability to systematise the findings of the English School, which 
in turn is well-placed to flesh out the normative presumptions so often 
unacknowledged in constructivist theorising.143 Nevertheless, it is Wheeler 
whose appreciation of the inter-relationship between the two positions is of 
the greatest value to this thesis, not least because he has combined his 
theoretical endeavour with an extremely compelling analysis of HI.
The hybridised theoretical approach which allows Wheeler to make his moral 
claims is informed by a range of different influences. His views on non- 
combatant immunity and his incorporation of JW principles to provide the 
criteria for acts of HI draw heavily upon the influence of Walzer, 
demonstrating the validity o f Brown’s claim that “[t]he similarity o f  W alzer’s 
“position to that of the English School... makes it surprising that neither they
142 (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1999) p.71
143 See Reus-Smit, ‘Imagining Society’
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nor [he] seem to recognise each other as kindred spirits”.144 However, 
Wheeler’s approach to international justice also owes much to that of Vincent. 
In essence, W heeler’s ‘solidarist constructivism ’ proceeds from the 
assumption that “an unjust world is a disorderly one”145 and, as such, 
characterises NS as a duty rather than a right. The obligation which is brought 
to bear on sovereign authority is “to protect ‘the values of individual life and 
communal liberty’ within their borders” .146 It follows then that, in line with the 
emerging discourse of the R2P, respect for NS should be contingent upon the 
willingness and ability of a state to guarantee such values. In short, Wheeler 
is inclined to question “what moral value attaches to the rules of sovereignty 
and non-intervention, if they provide a license for governments to violate 
global humanitarian standards” .147 It is on this basis that he calls for a re- 
evaluation of the traditional role of state borders in international society. The 
current hegemonic discourse of the statist paradigm is based on an 
unflinching commitment to the notion that “the state is only responsible for its 
own citizens and... its obligations and duties are limited to them”.148 Such 
assertions are anathema to the solidarist movement, the terms of which are 
predicated on a rejection of the assumption that “the sovereign boundaries 
humans have constructed are morally decisive”.149 This claim itself owes 
much to the constructivist position that:
144 ‘Theories of International Relations’, pp.286
145 Wheeler, Saving, p.301
146 Ibid, p.27
147 Ibid
148 Bikhu Parekh, ‘Beyond Humanitarian Intervention’, Holly Cullen, Dino Krisiotis and 
Nicholas J, Wheeler (eds), Politics and Law o f Former Yugoslavia, University of Hull 
European Union Research Unit,1993, pp.15
149 Wheeler Agency pp. 10
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There is noth ing natural o r inevitab le  about the sta tist conception of moral 
boundaries. The moral fron tie r -  w hom  ‘w e ’ choose to include or exclude -  is 
an historical and social cons truc tion .150
Thus, a process of moral learning, whereby concepts such as HR are 
embedded in new social norms, may allow for these boundaries, and the legal 
standards which have been implemented to protect them, to be redrawn or to 
become permeable, if breaching them can be said to advance humanitarian 
concerns.
Although there are clear parallels between solidarist and cosmopolitan 
constructivism, advocates of the form er tend to have a much more restrictive 
sense of which among those HR commonly thought of as ‘basic’ have 
attained consensus extensive enough to represent a challenge to the state 
system. Especially in W heeler’s case, the determination to balance a 
commitment to humanitarianism with a fidelity to PIL, two values which are 
never more squarely at odds as in discussions regarding HI, ensures that he 
does not advocate institutional reform as radical as that recommended by 
cosmopolitan constructivists like Buchanan. The attempt to create and sustain 
a framework of HR which is compatible with the legal and political restrictions 
governing inter-state relations is a challenge which has confounded most of 
the IR theorists who have accepted it but, even if, as a more thorough 
engagement with his best known work will demonstrate, Wheeler’s approach 
to the issue is occasionally inconsistent, its dual focus on legality and morality 
is certainly of great value in any appraisal of becoming in international society.
150 Ibid
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VII. Feminist Constructivism
So far the conceptual differences which separate each hybridised version of 
the constructivist project from the last are significant but not necessarily 
insurmountable. The key points of departure among cosmopolitan, 
communitarian, and solidarist constructivists concern the origins of morality, 
and the role and nature of boundaries. In essence, all three branches of the 
theory are united in their conviction that normative constraints develop and 
gain increased purchase as the consequence of negotiation among global 
political actors. However, communitarians contend that these processes of 
becoming are the source of both the efficacy and the legitimacy of normative 
standards whereas both cosmopolitans and solidarists argue that certain core 
HR are owed to all individuals by virtue of their humanity and it is only the 
institutionalisation of these rights which relies upon patterns of socialisation. 
These differing perceptions impact upon the respective understanding of 
national borders which, for communitarians boast the morally valuable ability 
to insulate political communities against cultural imperialism and for 
cosmopolitans and solidarists cease to be morally defensible when a state 
lacks ‘political legitimacy’. Despite this apparent divergence, all three 
subcategories of constructivism are capable of licensing some form of 
intervention as a response to egregious violations of HR, since even 
communitarian constructivists are inclined to acknowledge that enormously 
abusive or irresponsible regimes fail to abide by those moral standards 
rendered universal through reiteration and, therefore, may be subject to the 
terms of conditional sovereignty. The specific threshold for HI, as well as the 
nature and duration of an act of military incursion, or the agent deemed to
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possess the ‘proper authority’ to spearhead it are matters for debate. 
However, even the more conservative subsets of constructivism could provide 
the basis for HI in extreme cases, if sufficient consensus in favour of it can be 
identified across international society. This demonstrates that whilst their 
perceptions of the source of international justice may vary, in some cases, 
commentators from each branch of constructivist theorising are capable of 
arriving at comparable solutions to the quandaries which the debate implies.
However, feminist constructivism illuminates certain flaws which impact upon 
all other hybridised forms of constructivist theorising. In assessing not simply 
the forms of negotiation which govern norm dissemination, but also the power 
relations that determine which members of society are liable to participate in 
such interactions (generally, white middle class males), feminist 
constructivists are strongly positioned to problematise many inequalities which 
are currently taken for granted in the international system. For instance, 
feminism (in both its general and its constructivist incarnations) often rejects 
the communitarian conception of the state as a means for individuals to 
achieve self-realisation. Instead, fem inists contend that the institutionalised 
patterns of discrimination within individual political communities result in 
subordination and subjugation for women and feminised groups. Feminist 
constructivists, persuaded by the assertion that ‘national ideas’ can become 
‘international standards’ through processes of political interaction, argue that 
these unequal power relations begin in the home, are expanded to the level of 
the state and ultimately translated to the international plain. Thus, the 
suggestion, common to most theorists o f HI, that it is only in cases of tyranny
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or anarchy that the apparatus of the state poses a tangible threat to the 
welfare of its citizens, is erroneous. The state is in fact a constant source of 
repression for those who are robbed of political agency by its gendered 
hierarchies. Similarly, for feminists, the notion of the state as the protector of 
citizens is, in fact, a macrocosm of the patriarchal perception of man as the 
protector of woman and both viewpoints are gendered and morally suspect. 
Consequently, the shift from a ‘right to intervene’ to a ‘responsibility to protect’ 
has met with some suspicion from a number of feminist perspectives, 
including feminist constructivism.
Equally, the critical lens of fem inism takes aim at the cosmopolitan 
(constructivist) belief in supposedly ‘universal’ HR as the basis for 
international justice. This is because many of the HR conventions which 
liberals identify as evidence of progress within the state system remain at best 
inconsistent and, at worst, blind to the lived experiences of women. The 
“competing rights”151 which these documents generate often “operate to the 
detriment of women” .152 For example, “[tjhere is a serious conflict between 
freedom of religion and the equality of wom en”153 since “many accepted 
religious practices entail reduced social positions and status for women”.154 
On this basis, it might be argued that ‘human rights’ and ‘women’s human 
rights’ are not one and the same and that the latter is almost always 
deferential to the former. As such, just as cosmopolitan philosophers have
151 Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin and Shelley Wright, ‘Feminist Approaches to 
International Law’, The American Journal o f International Law, 85, 1991, pp.613-628, pp.635
152 Ibid
153 Susan Moller Okin, ‘Political Liberalism, Justice and Gender’, Ethics [online], 105(1), 
October 1994, pp.23-43, pp.31
154 Charlesworth et al, ‘Feminist Approaches’ pp.635-636
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sought to demonstrate that IR is characterised by “the contradiction between 
its constitutive catalogue of ‘basic rights of man’ and their actual restriction to 
a certain class of men”,155 feminist scholars draw attention to the fact that a 
liberal critique of inequality rarely takes into consideration the disjuncture 
between the rights of ‘man’ and the rights of all human beings. This is 
because the cosmopolitan and solidarist traditions are born out of a particular 
patriarchal account of autonomy and rationality as the basis for individual 
human rights which, as the forthcoming chapter on feminist constructivism will 
demonstrate, provide the foundations for a peculiarly male (and Western) 
conception of both the content of HR and the appropriate response to their 
infringement.
Feminism, therefore, contests the perceptions of becoming at the heart of 
cosmopolitan, communitarian, and solidarist constructivism by encouraging 
theorists and practitioners of IR to reconsider their definition of the category of 
‘human’ and the ways in which this may impact upon their understanding of 
international society.
i. ‘Mainstreaming’ Feminism
Given that, among its many contributions to IR discourse, feminism offers the 
means to critique more established theories, it is perhaps surprising that its 
insights are not more frequently combined with those competing theoretical 
frameworks. The reasons for this reluctance are manifold and are partly 
attributable to the dismissive attitude of mainstream scholars, many of whom
155 Thomas McCarthy, ‘Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism: Rawls and Habermas 
in Dialogue’, Ethics, 105, October 1994, pp.44-63, pp.48
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view the expansive nature of fem inist theorising as a weakness rather than a 
strength. The assumption is that feminists are engaged in an insufficiently 
‘scientific’ form of research which is too ethereal or multi-disciplinary to 
generate practical solutions to the most pressing issues in international 
politics and that ‘critique for critique’s sake’ is o f no value. Such is the source 
of J. Ann Tickner’s observation that most fem inist scholars have found 
themselves “homeless as fa r as the cannons of IR knowledge are 
concerned”156. However, the hybridisation of feminism is also frequently 
resisted by feminist commentators themselves, many of whom are disturbed 
by the possibilities of cooption or m isunderstanding which such a synthesis 
may generate. For example, liberal institutionalist Robert Keohane’s attempt 
to explore the “contributions o f a fem inist standpoint” ,157 although almost 
certainly ill-conceived, was perhaps not deserving of the scathing criticism of 
Cynthia Weber who accused it o f “fetishising”158 and “mutilating”159 the 
feminist body by taking an unnecessarily narrow view of its diverse features. 
Those attempting to infuse the ir own understanding of international politics 
with a feminist perspective should, of course, be mindful of Weber’s 
suggestion that theoretical ‘cherry picking’ may only allow us to “look at 
feminist lens”160 rather than through them. However, the assumption which 
underpins this thesis is that embracing certain elements of a theoretical 
tradition whilst rejecting others is a reasonable tool in achieving
156 J. Ann Tickner, “You Just Don’t Understand’ Troubled Engagements between Feminists 
and IR Theorists’, International Studies Quarterly, 41, 1997, pp.611-632, pp.612
157 See Robert Keohane, ‘International Relations Theory: Contributions of a Feminist 
Standpoint’, Millennium: Jo u rn a l o f International Studies, 18(2), 1989, pp.254-245
158 Cynthia Weber, ‘Good Girls, Little Girls, and Bad Girls: Male Paranoia in Robert Keohane’s 
Critique of Feminist International Relations’, Millennium: Journal o f International Studies,
23(2), 1994, pp.337-349, pp.341
159 Ibid
160 i l ; j
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methodological pluralism. Equally, the fact that some elements of the feminist 
project might be used to furnish other theories with a greater understanding of 
the role of gender relations has the potential to positively impact upon IR, 
without forcing feminism to apologise for its more radical components. 
Nevertheless, the hostile reaction which has tended to greet the few thinkers 
who have attempted to explore elements of fem inist theorising goes some 
way to explaining the continued marginalisation of feminist voices and 
indicates that locating the middle ground between feminist and constructivist 
IR is one of the most challenging dimensions of this thesis.
ii. J. Ann Tickner
The assertion that feminism and constructivism might prove to be 
complimentary theories is not exclusive to this project. In highlighting and 
exploring the feminist understanding of gender, for example, Tickner has 
demonstrated a substantial overlap between notions of social construction 
and the consolidation of inequalities. She suggests that the 
miscommunications between feminism and the mainstream often result from 
the belief among conventional IR scholars that their research is in some 
sense gender neutral, or that gender itself need play no specific role in an 
analysis of international politics. From the feminist perspective “gender 
differences permeate all facets of public and private life, a socially constructed 
divide which they take to be problematic in its e lf .161 The emphasis on the 
social construction of gender as a category lends itself to comparison, and 
arguably amalgamation, with the linguistic and norm-based turns in
161 Ibid, pp.614
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constructivism since, as Tickner argues, “almost all feminists who write about 
international relations use gender in a social constructivist sense” .162
Tickner echoes the viewpoint of Sandra Harding in asserting that the 
manipulation of language to create dichotomies which privilege masculinity at 
the expense of femininity, serves to ascribe value to that which is perceived 
as male and banishes to the apolitical that which is dismissed as female.163 
Hence, Harding’s claim that gender consists of three dimensions: gender 
symbolism, gender structure, and individual gender164 and that these are 
representative of three distinct processes: “assigning dualistic gender 
metaphors to various perceived dichotomies, appealing to these gender 
dualisms to organise social activity, and dividing necessary social activities 
between different groups of humans” .165
Although language is a vital element of the process of denying women 
political agency, IR feminists argue that gender is more than a linguistic 
constraint. The perceived differences between men and women have 
gradually been naturalised to the extent that gender is now most accurately 
described as a socially constructed system, which gives meaning and context 
to IR in both its political and economic incarnations and has “rarely been 
subjected to the tests of justice” .166 Gender inequality is an integral element of 
the hegemonic economic paradigm of neo-liberalism and is ingrained in the
162 Ibid
163 Ibid
164 See Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminism, (Ithaca, Cornell University 
Press, 1986)
165 Tickner, ‘You Just Don’t Understand’, pp.614
166 Susan Moller Okin, ‘Justice and Gender’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 16(1), Winter 
1987, pp.42-72, pp.43
92
Being and Becoming: Humanitarian Intervention and the Constructed Duty of Justice Claire Malcolm
dominant theoretical frameworks of the Enlightenment; not least the 
cosmopolitan tradition which, whilst claiming to aspire to universalism, 
functions as both the cause and the consequence of gender inequality by 
reaffirming masculine conceptions of autonomy and individualism.
Rejecting the criticism that feminists lack the tools to tackle the most 
compelling debates in IR, Tickner argues that IR feminists are more inclined 
to gather data from those who are directly affected by a particular policy, 
rather than relying on the testimony of those elites who helped to create the 
policy in the first instance. As she argues with reference to warfare:
W hereas IR theoris ts  focus on the causes and term ination  o f wars, fem inists 
are as concerned w ith w ha t happens during w ars as well as w ith the ir causes 
and endings. R ather than see ing m ilita ry capab ility  as an assurance against 
outside threats to the state, m ilita ries are seen as frequently  antithetica l to 
individual security, pa rticu la rly  to the security  o f wom en and o ther vulnerable 
groups.167
This, in itself, helps to delineate an area of research suited to feminist 
constructivism; an analysis not simply of how norms come to exist but also of 
how they impact upon the lives of ordinary people, particularly those who are 
disenfranchised or discrim inated against.
So it is that the suggestions that: “agency and structure are co-constituted”;168 
that language is key to the understanding and development of justice-claims;
167 Tickner, You Just Don’t Understand’, pp.4
168 Locherand Prugl, ‘Feminism and Constructivism’, pp.114
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and that “gendered patterns of social relations”169 are themselves constructed, 
unite advocates of feminism and constructivism, at least to a sufficient degree 
to enable meaningful dialogue and to create a perspective, according to 
which, an international duty of justice may take aim at identifying not only the 
presence of discrimination, but also its systemic causes.
iii. Birgit Locher and Elisabeth Priigl
Tickner’s attempts to identify the commonalities shared by feminists and 
constructivists has been developed by Birgit Locher and Elisabeth Prugl, who 
have investigated the suggestion that the two theories could be thought of as 
“sharing the middle ground”170 of IR theory. Emphasising their determination 
not to: “risk papering over considerable diversity among feminists and 
constructivists”;171 their intention to avoid “making light of profound differences 
between the two”;172 and their unwillingness to “risk styling feminism as 
supplementary to constructivism” ,173 they, nevertheless, identify a number of 
key areas in which a constructivist response to a feminist critique might 
provide the foundations for a theory which combines the strengths of both 
approaches. Locher and Prugl are concerned that despite the very real 
possibility that constructivism could offer an alternative to mainstream IR, the 
tendency among those who frame their work in terms of this theory, is to 
accept, with little critical engagement or enquiry, the positivist account of
169 Robert O. Keohane ‘Beyond Dichotomy: Conversations Between International Relations 
and Feminist Theories’, International Studies Quarterly, 42, 1998, pp. 193-198, pp. 193
170 See Locher and Prugl, ‘Feminism and Constructivism’
171 Ibid, pp. 112
172 ,
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power and the way in which it is formed and perpetuated in international 
politics.
Because they leave the socia l construction  of power under-theorised, 
constructiv ists lack the too ls  to  exp la in  how  gender and power reproduce, 
how and w hy certa in  constructs  em erge as m ore influentia l than others. They 
miss an im portant part o f the em pirica l rea lity  o f in ternational po litics.174
Locher and Prugl argue that the ontology of becoming (a term which they 
themselves have coined) unites feminism and constructivism and should take 
aim at transforming gender relations by seeking to expose the inside/outside 
or public/private dichotomy which gives meaning to the very normative 
structure of IR. After all, the marginalisation of women is not a coincidental or 
incidental by-product of IR but, rather, is integral to the fabric of the state 
system and PIL:
Since the prim ary sub jec ts  o f in terna tiona l law  are states, it is som etim es 
assumed that the im pact o f in te rna tiona l law  fa lls on the state and not directly 
on individuals. In fact, the  app lica tion  o f in ternational law does affect 
individuals, which has been recogn ised by the International Court in several 
cases. International ju risp ru d e n ce  assum es that in ternational law norms 
directed at ind iv idua ls  w ith in  s ta tes are un iversa lly  applicab le and neutral. It is 
not recognised, how ever, th a t such princ ip les m ay im pinge d ifferently on men 
and wom en; consequen tly , w o m e n ’s experiences o f the operation o f these 
laws tend to be s ilenced o r d isco u n te d .175
The emphasis on the impact of PIL on vulnerable individuals fuels the feminist 
drive to reform the international system and it is the belief of Locher and Prugl 
that the ontology of becoming might be the most effective tool for executing
174 Ibid, pp.113
175 Charlesworth et al, ‘Feminist Approaches’ pp.625
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such change; a suggestion which is a vital component of this thesis. However, 
the constraints of this project ensure that the expansive category of becoming 
must be restricted by some degree of political feasibility. Ostensibly, this may 
appear counter-intuitive, especially to those who might perceive it as one of 
many familiar attempts to ‘tam e’ fem inist theorising. It is not the contention of 
this project that theory is only as valuable as the practical prescriptions to 
which it might give rise. However, the limited scope of this endeavour is to 
assess the value of HI in light of a constructed duty of justice which might be 
applicable to the current international system, rather than to conceive of 
alternatives to that model. In other words, the project seeks to improve upon 
the status quo rather than to dispense with it entirely and this ensures that the 
framework for becoming is one which must be responsive to the demands of 
institutional feasibility. Accepting that the privileged position of states and the 
consensual nature of international politics are key characteristics of IR is 
justifiable from a feminist constructivist perspective. Whilst there are certainly 
many feminist commentators who would reiterate the assertion that because 
the intrinsic inequality o f the state system aggravates the plight of women and 
of the world’s poorest people, who, due to that very system, tend to be 
women, states themselves should no longer act as the main focal point of 
international politics. For those who reject this viewpoint, however, it is just as 
credible to suggest that, as imperfect as they are, states are the most 
effective and efficient means by which to administrate, institutionalise and 
enforce HR standards and, as such, they remain the best vehicle for 
responding to the needs of women and feminised groups. This is far from an 
endorsement of the moral primacy o f states and is always accompanied by an
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insistence that comprehensive reform to the system both nationally and 
internationally is imperative if the discourse of HR, the practices of IR and the 
norms which govern PIL are to obtain any degree of universality, or even 
meaning, for those disenfranchised by patriarchy. Nonetheless, this project is 
premised on the suggestion that for such reform to prove durable and 
effective it cannot be so radical as to preclude the possibility of some form of 
institutionalisation.
v. Feminist Constructivism and Humanitarian Intervention
It has been established that a commitment to becoming unites the feminist 
and constructivist projects; that fem inism can imbue constructivism with a 
more sophisticated understanding of the origins and perpetuation of unequal 
power relations; and that constructivism can consciously narrow the scope of 
feminist theorising so as produce a hybridised account of justice which is 
applicable to the current international system. All that remains is to consider 
the implications of this hybridised theory for the discourse of HI. One of the 
most engaging attempts to do this is that of Anne Orford in her volume 
Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the Use o f Force in 
International Law. As an Australian, feminist, Professor in International Law, 
Orford found herself fascinated by the overwhelming support, among her 
fellow nationals, for an Australian-led intervention into East Timor in 1999 and, 
in unpacking some of the language and behaviours which informed this 
support, she has begun fundamentally to question the foundations upon which 
the discourse of HI is based. In precised terms, which will be expanded upon 
in the forthcoming chapter on fem inist constructivism, Orford argues that, in
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this case and others like it, HI calls upon a series of ‘heroic narratives’,176 
fundamentally “premised on the notion of the international community facing 
new dangers, acting to save the oppressed and to protect values such as 
democracy and human rights” .177 These narratives, which encourage the 
reader to “identify with the active hero”,178 rather than to develop a more 
nuanced understanding of the plight of the ‘victim ’ have: oversimplified an 
inherently complex issue; re-entrenched colonial assumptions concerning the 
superiority of Western, masculine, values; encouraged the use of force in 
place of a more holistic appreciation of the causes and consequences of 
humanitarian disaster; and allowed powerful states and international 
organisations to fail to acknowledge their own role in the creation and 
perpetuation of human suffering across the globe.
This is not to suggest that O rford ’s position is entirely restrictionist. In fact, she 
refuses to state that there are no circumstances under which HI might be the 
appropriate response to egregious and systematic HR abuses. However, she 
does argue that the value and function of feminism in this context, is to rebuke 
ill-conceived narratives and expose the hypocrisy and inconsistency at work in 
traditional readings of the subject. In line with Vincent’s focus on the inter­
related nature of violence and poverty, for example, Orford argues that a 
feminist “reading of humanitarian intervention that seeks to avoid enabling 
exploitation must pay careful attention to the context of increasing economic
176 Anne Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the Use o f Force in 
International Law, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 166
177 Ibid, p.67
178 .
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integration in which such intervention takes place” .179 Similarly, if international 
lawyers are to identify and unlock the potential “for remaking the law in the 
image of justice” ,180 they must embrace the inter-disciplinary nature of such 
an endeavour and attempt to circumnavigate some of the barriers erected by 
the belief that IR and PIL have little to learn from one another, or from the 
‘non-scientific’ academic community.
VIII. Conclusion
Although the literature which surrounds IR theory is vast, and responses to 
the issue of HI are as varied as they are numerous, a number of key themes 
forge links across the cosmopolitan, communitarian, solidarist and feminist 
branches of constructivism. All are committed to some conception of HR, 
albeit to varying degrees and for different reasons; all concede that 
individuals, as well as states, number among the subjects of PIL, even if the 
question of the balance between these competing interests remains 
contentious; all are capable of arguing in favour of a reconceptualised version 
of NS, in which the right to non-intervention is conditional to some extent upon 
respect for individual rights; and despite enormous diversity among and 
between each tradition, elements of each project can reasonably be 
associated with the doctrine of human security, which has sought to expand 
the definition of threat beyond militarism to incorporate ‘threats without 
enemies’, including econom ic and environmental issues. All forms of 
constructivism focus on the ways in which language restricts and enables the 
establishment of normative standards and, conversely, on the manner in
179 Ibid, p.70
180 Ibid
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which these developing norms can become constitutive of the identities and 
interests of global political actors. Unlike realists, most constructivists are as 
concerned with the potential for change in the international system, as with 
the establishment of patterns and repetition. Equally, unlike some 
cosmopolitan liberals, constructivists tend to argue that the attempt to 
institutionalise change must be regulated by certain political constraints and 
must encompass a realistic response to the processes which govern norm 
formation. Whilst there is considerable divergence over the specific 
interpretation of justice claims and the matter of how, and even why, they 
might be pursued, it seems credible to suggest that the analytical and 
normative scope of constructivism in its many forms provides a unique 
perspective from which to consider the changing relationship between 
international order and international justice. Or that, in simple terms, all forms 
of constructivism, irrespective of how they may differ in their specific 
epistemologies or methodologies are united by their commitment to the 
ontology of becoming and it is this convergence which provides the tools for a 
fruitful analysis of developing discourses and practices across international 
society.
Accordingly, the remainder of this project will endeavour to establish, through 
a detailed examination of the work of Birgit Locher, Elisabeth Prugl and Anne 
Orford (among other fem inist commentators), Allen Buchanan, Nicholas 
Wheeler and Michael W alzer, which of the forms of constructivist theorising, 
or combination thereof, most effectively addresses the challenges posed by 
the doctrine of HI and, by extension, which is best equipped to provide the
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foundations for assessing the existence, and limits, of an international duty of 
justice.
101
Being and Becoming: Humanitarian Intervention and the Constructed Duty of Justice Claire Malcolm
Chapter Two: Feminist Constructivism, Gender Constructivism and
Humanitarian Intervention
I. Introduction
This chapter investigates the insights into becoming and international justice 
provided by the hybridisation of feminism and constructivism. In so doing, it 
attempts to appraise the implications for constructivism of taking seriously the 
interrelationship between gender inequality and an increasingly nuanced 
appreciation of humanitarian suffering. Since the fusion of feminism and 
constructivism is arguably the most contentious synthesis with which this 
project engages, analysis must begin with an overview of several branches of 
feminist theorising and their relationship to both gender and social 
constructivism. This is a reflection of Marysia Zalewski’s assertion that 
“feminism is really fem inisms”,181 and the related suggestion that “a diversity 
of voices is not only valuable, but essential, and that the search for, or belief 
in, one view is unlikely to capture the reality of women’s experience, or gender 
inequality”.182 Accordingly, the chapter will draw on a range of competing 
viewpoints, designed to illustrate the varied and sometimes contradictory 
views espoused by feminist commentators, seeking to reconcile violence with 
humanitarianism. As well as deconstructing the traditional dichotomy between 
states’ rights and HR and calling into question the ‘heroic’ assumptions which 
often infuse and inform HI, this chapter will also assess the degree to which 
an analysis of feminist IR might serve to illuminate a reconceptualised path for 
social constructivist research. The suggestion is that the insistence that
181 ‘Women’s Troubles Again in IR’, Terrell Carver (ed), The Forum: Gender and International 
Relations, International Studies Review, 5, 2003, pp287-302, pp29
182 Charlesworth et al, ‘Feminist Approaches’, pp.613
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gender is itself a social construction, one which underpins a host of other 
preconceived notions and inadequacies at the heart of IR, draws together 
various forms of constructivist theorising under the banner of the ‘ontology of 
becoming’; which encourages a focus both on critiquing the status quo and 
rebuilding it in pursuit of international justice.
Finally, the limitations of a feminist constructivist approach to HI, and the 
wider justice claims with which it is associated, will demonstrate that the issue 
of gender has purchase beyond fem inist IR and that, in fact, the tendency to 
conflate the consideration of wom en’s experiences with an analysis of gender 
is flawed and tends to inform an unnecessarily narrow conception of 
becoming. This leads to the assertion that if it is to respond effectively to 
complex and contentious issues such as HI, the category of conventional 
constructivism must develop to incorporate a conception of ‘gender 
constructivism’, which may be separate from feminism in its best known form. 
It is the contention of this thesis that the systemic causes, scale, and true 
nature of humanitarian suffering can only be understood and, by extension, 
meaningfully addressed, once this gender-sensitive ontology of becoming is 
embraced.
II. Hybridising Feminism
The first task of this chapter is to address the controversy which is liable to be 
engendered by attempting to combine feminist and constructivist insights into 
a hybridised conception of becoming. Situating feminist analysis into the wider 
field of IR theory is likely to meet with some resistance, either from feminists
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themselves or from those who argue that a feminist perspective lacks the 
conceptual tools to advance an understanding of policy choice, legal principle, 
or state practice. Identifying the basis in fem inist theorising for a given policy 
or legal doctrine is an inherently challenging process since feminists are often 
more concerned with unpacking received discourses than with engaging in 
what might be thought of as a justification for the status quo. In fact, this is the 
source of much misunderstanding between fem inist commentators and what 
is sometimes referred to as the ‘malestream ’ of IR theory. Feminist analysis is 
often met with apathy or hostility from the more established branches of the 
discipline, advocates of which tend to conceive of IR in unnecessarily 
restrictive terms; an attitude typified by statements such as “there are few 
activities more pointless than criticism which does not have a constructive or 
explanatory effect” .183
Equally, however, attempts by non-feminists to engage with the feminist 
discourse (and, in particular, with the concept of gender) have been known to 
provoke a scathing reaction from those who fear the cooption of the hard- 
fought theoretical territory which feminism has carved out for itself. This 
break-down in communication is exacerbated by that fact that “[A]ll too often, 
claims of gender neutrality...hide gender differences and gender 
inequalities”,184 leading mainstream theorists to believe that they may 
successfully address an issue in international politics without taking seriously 
the impact of gender.
183 Harris, ‘Order and Justice’, pp.730
184 Tickner, ‘You Just Don’t Understand’, pp.614
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Tensions between traditional and feminist IR derive from the perception that 
the latter is too broad or atheoretical to provide meaningful prescriptions for 
change in international society; a suggestion which is at odds with the 
contention of this thesis that an understanding of gender is key to an 
appreciation of becoming in international society. Nevertheless, it is 
reasonable to suggest that feminists conceive of the basis for becoming in a 
different way to many other commentators. In contrast to the institutional 
focus which unites many constructivist commentators and the more general 
assertion that “criticism on its own is... unproductive, if it is not accompanied 
by alternatives or proposals for change”,185 feminists tend to reject the “siren 
call of liberal legality”186 which “requires that lawyers must claim the capacity 
to solve all problems through public, institutional means” .187 Instead, drawing 
on a range of methodologies and epistemologies from fields as diverse as 
literary studies, film studies, political theory, and social criticism, many 
feminists employ discourse analysis as a means to problematise the 
assumptions which permeate the practice and theory of IR.
Among these preconceptions is an increasing faith, common to most 
constructivists, in the liberating potential of institutions of global governance. 
Andrew Hurrell has claimed that a focus on the establishment and 
development of institutions is common to all forms of constructivism:
185Anne Orford, ‘Muscular Humanitarianism: Reading the Narratives of the New
Interventionism’, European Journal o f International Law, 10(4), 1999, pp679-711, pp704
186 Ibid
187 . . . .
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For constructivists, institu tions m atte r because they do m ore than jus t reflect 
power (as neo-realists argue) or so lve  co llective  action prob lem s (as 
institutionalists suggest). They a lso m atte r because they help to explain how 
new norms em erge and are d iffused across the in ternationa l system  and how 
state interests change and evolve. Institu tions p lay an im portant role in the 
diffusion of norms and in the patterns o f soc ia lisa tion  and in terna lisation by 
which w eaker actors com e to absorb  those  norm s. Institu tions m ay be the 
forum where state o ffic ia ls are exposed to  new  norm s: they m ay act as 
channels or conduits through w hich  norm s are transm itted  (as w ith neo-liberal 
econom ic ideas); or they m ay re in force dom estic  changes that have a lready 
begun to take place (via state s tra teg ies o f externa l llo ck -in ’, o r via pressures 
exerted through transnational c iv ic  soc ie ty ).188
However, many feminists harbour deeply sceptical views with regard to the 
proliferation of institutions. After all,
[t]he structures o f governance tha t have deve loped  w ith in  in ternationa l society 
both reflect and re inforce the b roader patterns o f inequa lity  tha t m ark the 
global system. Institutions are not, as libera l theo ry  often suggests, neutral 
arenas for the solution o f com m on prob lem s but ra the r sites o f pow er and 
dom inance.189
Having exposed the constructed nature of so many of these ‘naturalised’ 
hierarchies, it is far from surprising that most fem inists are not inclined to 
advocate the creation of institutions which are likely to reproduce them. 
However, this is often perceived as indicative of the impractical and unrealistic 
nature of a feminist approach to PIL and international politics, rather than a 
liberating and insightful appreciation of the gendered patterns which govern 
these disciplines.
Hurrell, ‘Global Order’, pp.70-71
189 ~ * -t
106
Being and Becoming: Humanitarian Intervention and the Constructed Duty o f Justice Claire Malcolm
In fact, it is common for feminists to perceive as strength the very 
characteristics which their detractors dismiss as weakness; not least the 
seemingly boundless scope of feminist analysis. The suggestion implicit in 
this thesis, that feminism and constructivism might be hybridised in order best 
to explore and exploit the analytical potential of both theories, is one which 
would be rebuffed by many as an attempt to place limits on feminist 
theorising. After all, combining feminist insights with those based in an 
alternative theoretical perspective requires that certain elements of what is 
frequently, though non-specifically, described as the ‘fem inist agenda’ must 
be redrawn or even set aside in order more effectively to establish a clear 
research framework. As the forthcoming detailed exposition of ‘gender 
constructivism’ will demonstrate, for many, proponents of such hybridisation 
are little more than apologists for the malestream, capable of only the most 
superficial engagement with gender and determined to rob feminism of the 
very characteristic which makes it so unique; its multidisciplinary focus. 
Hence, Zalewski, in criticising attempts to narrow the investigative scope of 
feminism, cites Nietzsche’s claim that ‘“ [T]he worst readers are those who 
behave like plundering troops: they take away a few things they can use, dirty 
and confound the remainder, and revile the whole” .190 In fact, she appears 
mystified by the fact that “[h]owever meticulously fem inism ’s ambiguity is 
articulated, the silent vociferousness of the impulse to contain, constrain, and
» 191cauterize invites the ‘eternal return’ o f critiques of feminism in IR”. Thus, 
Zalewski warns against the attempt to ‘discipline’ feminism.
190 (Cited) Zalewski, Women’s Troubles, pp.293
191 Ibid
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Although this perspective is fairly widespread among fem inist commentators, 
it seems unnecessarily dismissive and territorial. Critique and discourse 
analysis provide a unique means to demonstrate that much of what is taken 
for granted within the paradigms of, for example, ‘protection’ or 
‘humanitarianism’ is far from immutable. Similarly, challenging researchers 
and practitioners to acknowledge the ways in which their own context situates 
their response to debates is certainly invaluable. Nevertheless, engaging with 
the mainstream has produced change, however incremental, and is indicative 
of what can be achieved when those who take seriously the nature and 
impact of gender infuse a meaningful exchange surrounding the limitations of 
international politics with their own insights. The trade-off for securing a more 
sophisticated and humane account of justice may be that these individuals are 
forced to assimilate, at least slightly, into the current language of the debate 
even as they battle to develop it. In R. Charli Carpenter’s terms:
If the goal is to add gender to the ir fram e o f re fe rence  and dem onstra te  w h y ...
[mainstream  theoris ts ]... canno t do w ithou t it, w e need to speak w ith in  that
frame in order to be hea rd .192
In the past, the reluctance to do this has resulted in the continued 
marginalisation of feminist analysis and the ongoing neglect of gender among 
mainstream thinkers. Both conditions ultimately serve to limit our 
understanding of the most pressing issues in world politics, not least HI and 
international justice.
192 ‘Stirring Gender into the Mainstream’, pp.297, Terrell Carver (ed), The Forum
108
Being and Becoming: Humanitarian Intervention and the Constructed Duty o f Justice Claire Malcolm
In simple terms, the cause of both feminists and mainstream theorists can be 
advanced through dialogue between one another, and the debate surrounding 
HI is best understood using the terms and conceptions which arise from such 
an exchange. If social constructivism teaches us how the norms surrounding 
HI have developed, a gender-based turn in constructivism may help us to 
appreciate the ways in which certain institutional inequalities have limited that 
development and the associated pursuit of a constructed duty of justice. 
Employing gender as an analytical tool, as well as a social construct, serves 
to cast the practice and discourse of HI in a new and intriguing light, one 
which is most successfully investigated once the multifaceted nature of 
feminism is understood.
III. The Theoretical Basis for Intervention
i. Feminism(s) and Humanitarian Intervention
The second task of this chapter is to draw out the link between feminism, in its 
various incarnations, and the practice and discourse of HI. As Zalewski’s 
characterisation indicates, the range of theories and approaches incorporated 
into feminist theorising is vast. However, for the purposes of effective 
exposition, it is reasonable to contend that three main sub-categories of 
feminism have impacted upon the study of IR: feminist empiricism, feminist 
standpoint and post-modern feminism. Each varies in its conception of the 
use of force for humanitarian, or any other, purposes and each boasts the 
means to critique both mainstream IR and alternative feminist theories.
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ii. Humanitarian Intervention and Feminist Empiricism
Feminist empiricism, often associated with liberal feminism, effectively 
contends that the implementation of ‘equality of opportunity’ is both necessary 
for, and sufficient to, the task of redressing female subordination. The 
argument is that if women are given the opportunity to compete on an even 
playing field, through more egalitarian mechanisms for recruitment and more 
equitably balanced institutions, the gender gap can be reduced. In other 
words, gender equality can be gained by “winning equal access to the 
educational and political rights enjoyed by men within the existing system”.193 
Although the prevalence of gender bias is undeniable, the assumption is that 
“once these biases are elim inated... a value-neutral epistemology will 
ensue”194 which will “liberate knowledge” .195 The clear implication here is that 
international society can be improved upon from within and that, at the 
systemic level, the problems which limit its efficacy are soluble, if the 
proportion of women working within its confines increases.
Kimberly Hutchings associates this sub-category of fem inist analysis with 
what she terms “enlightenment” or “cosm opolitan” fem inism ,196 which she 
argues is “conceptually linked to the tradition of just war theory, in particular in 
its latest manifestation as humanitarian intervention” .197 As its name suggests, 
cosmopolitan feminism shares and modifies many of the core epistemological 
assumptions of cosmopolitan political theory and, as such, focuses on the
193 Naomi Malone, From Just War To Just Peace: Re-Visioning Just War Theory From 
A Feminist Perspective, 2004, http://etd.fcla.edu/SF/SFE0000339/Thesis-new.pdf,pp.26,
194 Ibid
195 lbid
196 Kimberly Hutchings, ‘Feminist Ethics and Political Violence’, International Politics, 44,
2007, pp.90-106, pp.94
197 Ibid
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inclusion of all forms of humanity in a framework of HR. Its emancipatory 
agenda aims to extend these freedoms to all human beings, creating a 
conception of becoming which is neutral in terms of sex, race, age, or 
geographical location. In this respect, cosmopolitan feminism:
[au tho rises  the transform ation  o f the  w orld  in acco rdance  w ith  its ideals. For 
enlightenm ent fem inism , e th ics acts as a co rrec tive  to  both ‘w o rld ’ and 
‘politics’. Fem inist en ligh tenm ent e th ics  is cosm opo litan  in so fa r as it 
challenges the restriction o f e th ica l s tandards  to pa rticu la r contexts across 
space and time, expand ing the boundaries  o f e th ica l s ign ificance to 
encom pass all hum anity. Fem in ist en ligh te nm en t e th ics  is e th ica l in so fa r as 
it purports to derive from  firs t p rinc ip les ra the r than from  the realm  of 
contingency characteristic o f w orld  and p o litic s .198
This last statement is perhaps the most compelling in that it signifies an 
overlap between cosmopolitan constructivism, solidarist constructivism, and 
cosmopolitan feminism; namely the willingness to derive moral convictions 
from first principles concerning the moral equality o f persons, something 
which would be rejected both by communitarian constructivists and by other 
branches of feminist theorising. The further significance of this observation is 
that it demonstrates that cosmopolitan fem inists are able to abide HI, provided 
that it is the only effective way to fulfil moral goals of emancipation. 
Intriguingly, liberal feminists, more broadly, might be prepared to countenance 
HI, provided that women played a proportionate role in operations, both 
organisationally and militarily. The fact that HI draws on a range of discourses 
and practices rooted in inequality and gendered and racialised patterns of 
discrimination, not least JW theory which is itself “written exclusively by or for
198 Ibid, pp.95
111
Being and Becoming: Humanitarian Intervention and the Constructed Duty o f Justice Claire Malcolm
men”,199 does not indicate that the practice itself will always remain without 
merit. It may simply be the case that HI, like so many other elements of 
international politics, is currently hampered by imbalances and imperfections, 
which concerted efforts to reduce gender bias might yet resolve. With this in 
mind, Hutchings sketches a cosmopolitan fem inist outline of the conditions 
under which HI might be defined and employed, in such a way as to avoid the 
pitfalls associated with gender bias.
Archetypically, th is will be in s itua tions  o f gross th rea ts  to hum an rights, 
including the rights o f w om en, w here  no a lte rna tive  m eans to  address the 
threat are available. In te rm s o f the m eans o f v io lence  em ployed, as w ith  jus t 
war thinking, en ligh tenm ent fem in ism  w ill seek to  lim it it th rough rules of 
engagem ent that m ake stric t d is tinc tions betw een leg itim ate  and illeg itim ate 
targets and ensure the p roportiona lity  o f the  v io lence  em ployed. A t the sam e 
time, enlightenm ent fem in ism  m ust a lso  be com m itted  to contesting  male 
monopolies over co llective  v io lence  and supporting  the righ t o f w om en to 
participate in fighting jus t w a rs .200
In other words, the feminist empiricist defence of HI takes much the same 
form as the accounts provided by the more mainstream thinkers with whom 
this project will engage. The obvious distinction concerns the involvement and 
consideration of women as active participants in both the appraisal of ‘just 
cause’ and the deployment of military forces.
Although feminist empiricism and liberal fem inism have been key to women’s 
progress within institutions at both the national and international level and 
have served to problematise the subordinate position of women in most 
societies, the majority of fem inist commentators writing on HI have moved
199 Malone, ‘Just Peace’, pp.2
200 Hutchings, ‘Feminist Ethics’, pp.95
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beyond the suggestion that an increased number of women amounts to better 
representation or greater equality. Furthermore, it has increasingly been 
acknowledged that “approximations to political and legal justice in various 
domains of life evidently cannot close the radical gap between men’s and 
women’s paths and prospects” .201 Detractors also argue that in embracing 
cosmopolitan first principles concerning ‘rationality’, ‘individuality’, and 
‘autonomy’, liberal feminism “assumes away relations of dependence and 
interdependence” which are “central to most lives actually lived by wom en”:202 
In so doing, it: conflates male values with human values; does little, if 
anything, to break down the gendered dichotom ies which favour ‘male’ over 
‘female’ characteristics; and fails to call into question the emphasis on 
individual rights as superior and prior to those of groups. In short, “ [djespite its 
aspirations, gender bias is integral to liberal justice”203 and, therefore, cannot 
be resolved through liberal feminism. This strikes a blow to cosmopolitan 
constructivism in particular since advocates of this position base their 
arguments on the assumption that the moral equality o f persons is a realistic 
aspiration of liberal theory.
Furthermore, critics of fem inist empiricism suggest that the often under­
theorised and cliched suggestion that increasing the number of women in 
positions of authority is likely to increase the chances of peace, or create 
conditions for fairness, has been undermined by recent events in international 
politics. Hence, Barbara Ehrenreich’s polemic statement that “[w jhat we have 
learned from Abu Ghraib, once and for all, is that a uterus is not a substitute
201 O’Neill, ‘Gender and International Relations’, pp.442
202 Ibid, pp 440
203 Ibid, pp.443
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for a conscience”204. Furthermore, even it if were possible to make the case 
that women are in some sense ‘naturally’ more peaceful or less barbaric than 
men, an assertion which many feminists would reject in itself, the 
incorporation of women into an international system which is characterised by 
violence and competition is more likely to corrupt those individuals than it is to 
improve the system. As such, a HI regime fashioned, for example, along the 
lines of the existing UN system but with an increased number of female 
participants would likely prove to be as flawed as the current framework.
The association of feminist empiricism, in this context, with the development 
of JW theory is also considered by some commentators as an inherent 
limitation because of the gender bias built into its development. However, 
there are those who claim that “ it is possible to construct a fem inist vision of 
just war and peace by examining the variety of fem inist based approaches to 
ethics that have developed in response to the underrating of wom en’s moral 
experience”.205
iii. Humanitarian Intervention and Feminist Standpoint
Among those who argue against the supposedly universalist ethic of feminist 
empiricism are advocates of fem inist standpoint. This branch of feminism can 
be most readily associated with constructivism, in its many forms, because of 
the shared belief that knowledge is socially constructed through language and 
expectation. For standpoint feminists, not only is the mere incorporation of
204 Barbara Ehrenreich ‘Prison Abuse; Feminism’s Assumptions Upended; A Uterus is not a 
Substitute for a Conscience. Giving Women Positions of Power Won’t Change Society by 
Itself, LA Times, May 16th 2004
205 Malone ‘Just Peace’ pp.25 (emphasis added)
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women into an existing system inadequate, it also overlooks the extent to 
which the marginalisation of women may be perceived as advantageous in 
terms of their ability to critique IR. As Jacqui True has argued:
knowledge which em erges from  w o m e n ’s expe rience s  ‘on the m arg ins ’ o f 
world politics is actua lly m ore neutra l and critica l because  it is not com plic it 
with, or blinded by, existing institu tions and pow er re la tio n s .206
The category of feminist standpoint can, in fact, be subdivided further into, 
“care feminism”207 and “postcolonial fem inism ” .208
a. Care Feminism
Advocates of care feminism assert that rather than seeking to promote 
essentially masculine conceptions of moral agency, as if they are in some 
sense universal, we must instead argue for an entirely separate form of 
ethics; one which is:
self-consciously based on the  recogn ition  o f hum an in te r-dependence  and the 
generalisation o f the va lues inhe ren t in w o m e n ’s caring w o rk ... and the 
concom itant revaluation o f e th ica l va lues a round caring  v irtu e s ... Care ethics 
is still inherently cosm opo litan . H ow ever, instead o f hum an ity  as the reference 
point, care eth ics assum es tha t the  va lues and princ ip les tha t can be 
abstracted from  the practice  o f care  are re levan t across  boundaries o f culture 
and power and should be app lied  un ive rsa lly .209
The suggestion that the differences between men and women should be 
embraced by feminist theorists and activists, rather than subsumed in the
206 Scott Burchill et al (ed), p.215
207 Hutchings, ‘Feminist Ethics’, pp.95
208 Ibid
209 Ibid, pp.96
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discourse of equality, is also an element of care feminism and is at the heart 
of Jean Tronto and Carol Gilligan’s views on the ‘ethic of care’. The assertion 
is that men and women ‘moralise’ differently, with wom en’s marginalised 
status developing either as the cause or the symptom of their relegation to the 
private sphere. Whilst men are driven by the ‘ethic of justice ’, wherein the 
values of individual autonomy are paramount, women are motivated by the 
relationships to which they belong and the responsibilities which are their 
consequence.210 This gives rise to an alternative conception of becoming and 
international justice. As a general rule, “care feminism is conceptually 
connected to the ideals of pacifism”211 and, as such, the majority of care 
feminists do not feel able to sanction the use of force, even in cases of 
humanitarian disaster, since the recourse to violence is so squarely at odds 
with the values and practices of care. In essence,
[tjhe idea o f a fem in is t leg itim ation o f po litica l v io lence  re flects  the m asculine 
distortion of en ligh tenm ent fem in ism ’s m odel o f the  hum an. W hereas, in 
building on the fem in ised ideal o f the m oral sub ject, care fem in ism  locates 
non-violence as a core moral va lue .212
However, certain influential thinkers have made attempts to modify the use of 
force in the hope of incorporating an increased focus on the demands and 
virtues of an ethic of care. This is particularly noteworthy within the context of 
HI since it accords different priorities to different elements of an act of 
intervention. Often the assumption is that the most significant dimension of HI
210 For a detailed account of the data on which these findings were based see Carol Gilligan 
In a Different Voice (Cambridge Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1982). For an 
engaging account of the development of the concept of the ‘Ethic of Care’ see Naomi Malone 
‘From Just War To Just Peace’
211 ‘Feminist Ethics’, pp.94
212 Ibid
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is the (short-term) cessation of violence, by any means necessary. Less 
consideration is given to the aftermath of an intervention and the gendered 
patterns of settlement. Since the ends of ‘justice ’ are supposedly served 
through military engagement, the consequences in terms of ‘care’ are under­
estimated.
[tjhe traditional security concerns o f v io len t con flic t and its a fte r-e ffects  have 
enormous, usually untold im plica tions fo r re la tionsh ips o f care and fo r the 
nature and am ount o f necessary carew ork; dea ths o f fam ily  m em bers; 
internal d isplacem ent and refugee s itua tions; persona l in jury, illness or 
disability as a d irect result o f conflict; unem p loym ent o r extrem ely  low 
incomes; inadequate m edical care and nutrition; m enta l and em otiona l traum a 
resulting in increased substance abuse, dom estic  v io lence, and fam ily  conflic t 
-  all o f these circum stances increase the burden o r w o m e n ’s carework. 
Rarely is explicit consideration g iven to  how  the hundreds o f thousands of 
injured, disabled, abandoned, em otiona lly  traum atised , and acute ly  or 
chronically ill will be cared for, and by w hom .213
However, the ethic of care is not simply a useful device for reminding 
advocates of HI of the costs of their actions in human terms. Tronto also 
argues that it can be used to critique the very concept o f R2P. Questioning 
the belief that R2P represents a development of the HI discourse, one which 
focuses on the needs of the oppressed rather than the imperialistic ambitions 
of the powerful, she claims that “the only way to make certain that R2P really 
is a different paradigm is if it goes further in the direction of a feminist practice
213 Fiona Robinson, ‘Feminist Ethics and Global Security Governance’,
Paper prepared for panel on The Ethics of Global Governance’, International Studies 
Association, Chicago, 2007
http://www.allacademic.eom/meta/pmlaaparesearchcitation/1/8/0/4/2/p180423index.html,
[02/07/08]
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of peacekeeping”.214 For Tronto the ethic of care is the most effective means 
by which to expose poorly executed and strategically motivated interventions. 
In effect, since an ethic of care prioritises the needs of those in receipt of care, 
rather than those dispensing it, its terms can be used to assess the success 
of a given intervention.
In the end... the criterion by w hich w e de te rm ine  w he the r o r not an 
intervention was successfu l is w he the r the abuses have ended, Accord ing to 
this criterion, there have been rem arkab ly  few  successfu l hum anitarian 
interventions, in part because questions about respons ib ility  and com petence 
have not been able to overcom e the in terests o f s ta tes in conducting 
humanitarian interventions in a se lf-serv ing  m anner. C are is about meeting 
the needs o f those in need; in th is respect, m ost o f w ha t has been called 
humanitarian intervention is not hum an ita rian .215
Tronto’s position is not entirely restrictionist but neither does she feel able to 
endorse R2P in its current form. Identifying the obvious yet significant fact that 
HI will almost always take place in the context of “unequal power relations”,216 
she places the onus on intervening states not to act “paternalistically or even 
against the interests of those in need” .217 In so doing, she argues, along with 
many of her contemporaries that if a more holistic approach were adopted to 
social and economic inequalities and the dichotomous power relations with 
which they are intrinsically connected, fewer instances of HI need be 
occasioned. Nevertheless, Tronto concludes her findings on a tentatively 
optimistic note. She claims that:
214 Jean Tronto, ‘Is Peacekeeping Care Work? A Feminist Reflection on The Responsibility to 
Protect’, Global Feminist Ethics: Feminist Ethics and Social Theory, Peggy DesAustels and 
Rebecca Whisnant (eds), (Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), p. 181
215 Ibid, p. 194
216 Ibid
217 Ibid
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[T]he responsib ility to protect m akes c lea r w ha t an ideal tha t fem in ists  could 
endorse m ight look like, espec ia lly  if w e push the pos ition ’s in ternal logic in a 
more fem in ist and care-based d irec tion .218
Although care feminism provides an engaging perspective from which to 
critique the use of political violence and to explore the seemingly contradictory 
relationship between the use of force and the defence of HR, it is not without 
its critics. Perhaps most significantly, it is accused of essentialising both men 
and women by categorising the former as the perpetrators o f violence and the 
latter as society’s ‘natural’ carers. This tendency to characterise women as 
the perennial ‘victims’ of violence, especially during times of warfare is not 
only historically inaccurate (as accounts of wom en’s participation in the 
Yugoslavian Civil War and the Rwandan genocide attest) it is also 
counterproductive in that it threatens to rob women o f their political agency.
Perpetuating im ages o f w om en as pow erless v ic tim s o f w a r m ight unw itting ly 
function to strip w om en o f m any types o f power, inc lud ing the power to 
resolve or prevent conflic t. D esp ite  h is to rica l exam p les  to the contrary, 
women who partic ipate in w a r con tinue  to be view ed as aberra tiona l.219
This narrow conception of women and political violence limits the scope of a 
discourse of becoming, or an aspiration toward non-violence, by 
unnecessarily assigning reductivist gender dualisms to inherently complex 
debates.
Ibid, p. 196
219 Karen Engle, ‘Feminism and its Discontents: Criminalising Wartime Rape in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, The American Journal o f International Law, 99(4), October 2005, pp778-816
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b. Post-Colonial Feminism
The attribution of specific roles and behaviours to oppressed groups, 
regardless of historical or biological fact, is vehemently criticised by advocates 
of another form of feminist standpoint; post-colonial feminism. In some sense, 
this subcategory of analysis can be read as an endorsement of political 
violence, in that it is “conceptually linked to the possibility o f legitimating 
revolutionary violence or wars of liberation against colonial regimes”220. 
However, in certain other respects, its rejection of liberalism ’s pretentions to 
universalism provides the basis for a cynical appraisal of the liberal 
conception of becoming and international justice. This is because
[w jhat is posited as inc lus ive  in en ligh te nm en t fem in ism  is in practice 
exclusive, priv ileging a pa rticu la r se t o f W este rn  cu ltu ra l va lues and h istorical 
developm ents above o the rs  and ignoring the e th ica l s ign ificance o f 
con text...For postco lon ia l fem in ism , the eth ica l s ign ificance  o f context is 
twofold: firstly, because it a ffec ts  the  m ean ing  o f a pa rticu la r right, value, or 
principle; secondly, because  it a ffec ts  the w ay in w h ich the effects o f 
measures prom oting pa rticu la r va lues  and p rinc ip les are expe rienced ... even 
where contexts are equ iva len t, from  a po in t o f v iew  tha t g ives prio rity  to self- 
determ ination, a va lue o r p rinc ip le  tha t is im posed by an externa l body has a 
different ethical s ign ificance  from  one tha t is vo lun ta rily  adop ted .221
As the forthcoming chapter on communitarian constructivism will demonstrate, 
this is analogous to John Stuart M ill’s views on self-determination, in the 
sense that it concurs with the suggestion that the conditions for democracy or 
stability are artificial and unlikely to prove durable unless they have been
22D Hutchings, ‘Feminist Ethics’, pp.94
221 Ibid, pp.96
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generated from within a particular political community. Attempts to impose 
such values are inherently problematic and generally born out of an 
inaccurate or caricatured perception of ‘backward’ or ‘helpless’ foreigners 
incapable of affecting change themselves. Any framework of becoming based 
on such an analysis is likely to take the form of the developed West ushering 
‘less sophisticated’ political communities toward increased ‘civilisation’. 
Concerns over this ethical perspective account for the fact that post-colonial 
feminists often criticise liberal feminists for adopting a stance toward women 
in the developing world which mirrors the relationship between men and 
women in the West. They also emphasise that just as it is factually inaccurate 
and morally irresponsible to conflate male values with human values, it is a 
grotesque oversimplification to assume that ‘fem inin ity’ or ‘women’s 
experiences’ are likely to take only one form.
iv. Humanitarian Intervention and Post-modern Feminism
Furthermore, post-colonial feminists have done much to illuminate the role of 
narrative in the use of force. This has served to bridge the gap between their 
position and that of post-modern feminists, “who view reality as structured by 
discourse representing relations of power and dom ination” .222 Post-modern 
feminists treat with suspicion any attempt to label or categorise particular 
groups and “criticise the structure of this society and the dominant patriarchal 
order within which women and other marginalised people are perceived as the 
Other”;223 something which is commonplace in the literature surrounding the 
use of force. Jean Bethke Elshtain, in particular, argues that the dualistic roles
222 Malone, ‘Just Peace’, pp.30
223 Ibid, pp.31-32
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assigned to the actors in war stories provide the moral justification for the loss 
of human life. For Elshtain, the “gendered distinction”224 at work in such 
scenarios is between the “just warrior”225 and the “beautiful soul” .226
The form er is an ethical sub ject w illing  to figh t fo r an appropria te  ju s t cause in 
protection o f the vu lnerab le  or o f spec ific  va lues. The la tte r is an ethical 
subject who is protected by the ju s t w arrio r, bu t he rse lf eschew s v io lence  and 
embodies values o f care and peace. It can be argued tha t en ligh tenm ent 
fem inism  m odels the e th ica l sub jec t on the  ju s t w arrio r, w hereas care 
fem inism  m odels its eth ica l sub jec t on the  beautifu l soul. In both cases these 
archetypes sustain an e th ics o f v io lence  tha t is un tenab le  from  the point o f 
view of the prom otion o f va lues o f p lu ra lism  and se lf-de te rm ina tio n .227
Anne Orford has also argued that the practice of HI is sustained through the 
creation and perpetuation of “heroic narratives” ,228 which have their roots in 
the “encounters between Europe, later the ‘W est’ or the ‘international 
community’, and those colonised or enslaved by Europeans”.229 Although the 
name of the failed state, the number of civilian casualties, the particular 
intervening agent, or the duration of the campaign may vary, Orford argues 
that the ‘plot’ of intervention stories has become entrenched in the 
machinations of international politics. In almost all cases, it runs as follows:
These narratives present rogue sta tes, ru th less  d ic ta to rs  and e thn ic  tensions 
as threats to the estab lished libera l in te rna tiona l order. The a rgum ent made 
by those in favour o f hum an ita rian  in te rven tion  is tha t the  use o f force is 
necessary to address the p rob lem s o f rac is t and ru th less d ic ta to rs ... ethnic
224 Hutchings, ‘Feminist Ethics’, pp.97
225 Ibid
226 Ibid
227 Ibid22ft
‘Muscular Humanitarianism’, pp.687
229 Ibid
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tension, civil w ar and re lig ious fundam en ta lism  th row n up in the post-Cold 
W ar era. The need to halt the horrors o f genoc ide  o r e thn ic  c leansing, or 
address the effects o f in ternal arm ed con flic t on c iv ilians, is suffic ient 
justification for m ilitary in tervention . A  com m itm en t to hum anitarian  ideals 
dem ands m ilitary action from  the in te rna tiona l com m unity , increasing ly in the 
form of aerial bom bardm ent. The fa ilu re  to  take  such action am ounts to 
‘abstention from  the fo re ign  po licy d e b a te ’ and any cha llenge to 
interventionism  ‘rew ards ty ra n ts ’ and ‘be trays the  ve ry  purpose o f the 
international o rder’ .230
As these narratives are constructed and reproduced by global political actors 
and the Western media, we are called upon to identify with the hero of the 
story, the white male, capable of civilising  the black man and defending the 
white women. In this respect, HI, for Orford, must be approached cautiously 
as the latest incarnation of an old, fam iliar story based on falsifiable 
assumptions and gendered and racialised power relations.
The hero’s jou rney is about the  c iv ilisa tion , progress, o r deve lopm ent o f that 
colonised subject. In tervention  by w h ite  m en is jus tified  in o rder firs t to civilise 
the natives o f sub ject co lon ies, and later, in the  era o f deco lon isa tion  to assist 
the developm ent o f those fo rm e r co lon ies .231
The danger is, then, that in this era of ‘hum anitarianism ’, HI is now framed as 
an attempt to ‘rescue’ this same subject from the conditions of tyranny and 
anarchy and install regimes which allow the hero to recreate the world in his 
own image. In other words, the account o f becoming which HI informs is not 
the product of an innocuous attempt to universalise basic HR but rather to 
homogenise (and thereby exercise control over) rival political communities.
230 Ibid, pp.691
231 Ibid, pp.688
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Such is the conceptual and practical link between HI and democratisation 
since “[t]he nature of international intervention rules out the possibility” of a 
‘rescued’ peoples “choosing political, social or economic arrangements that 
differ from those in place in intervening states. The people living in states 
subjected to HI are only free to choose to be (almost) the same as those 
‘saving’ them”.232 This process denies the political agency of those in target 
states, fundamentally calling into question the extent to which they are 
capable of self-rule and self-determ ination and extending the hegemonic 
influence of Western states, both in political and economic terms.
Moreover, HI narratives, so framed, provide the ultimate justification for 
selectivity since the West need only intervene in those cases wherein a 
sufficient degree of ‘civilisation’ exists to provide reasonable prospects of 
success. If the situation is deemed to be intractable, the word ‘genocide’ is 
often avoided in place of ‘tribal vio lence’, as if to signify that this is a problem 
so deeply woven into the ‘irrational squabbles of a backward peoples’ that it 
can only be resolved internally. Even the most cursory overview of HI in 
recent years, highlights the striking coincidence that areas lacking in natural 
resources often collapse into the kind o f disorder that the West feels 
powerless to address. In other words, the self-determ ination of a struggling 
peoples is only of any value in heroic narratives when a lack of strategic 
motivation necessitates a rationalisation for non-intervention. In short, current 
HI narratives serve either to legitimate inaction, or to perpetuate assumptions 
concerning the supremacy of the West. As Iris Young puts it:
232 Ibid, pp.698
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[T]o the extent tha t w e identify  w ith a rhe to ric  o f w a r fo r the  sake o f saving the 
victims of tyranny, we put ou rse lves  in a position  supe rio r to those we 
construct as in need o f our a id .233
IV. The Components of Humanitarian Intervention
i. Feminism and the Transition to R2P
Much of the remainder of this thesis will be structured to reflect a JW mode of 
analysis which subdivides HI into certain core conceptual categories 
(including ‘just cause’ and ‘proper authority’). However, HI tends to be 
investigated by feminists in terms of the discourse on which it is based, rather 
than in terms of specific military conventions or international organisations. 
With this in mind, the insights provided by IR feminism into HI are most 
effectively appraised in light of the transition from HI to the R2P, rather than in 
accordance with a traditional JW framework. Intriguingly, the limitations 
associated with HI, from the perspective of IR feminists, are not ameliorated 
by the linguistic shift to the R2P. In fact, many of the inadequacies of the 
intervention discourse are exacerbated by this recent development. Again, 
emphasising the way in which language constructs and enables certain 
behaviours, both post-colonial and post-modern feminists, have expressed 
dissatisfaction with the use of the word ‘protection’ in this context. The 
element of HI narratives which emphasises the duty o f the developed West to 
offer ‘protection’ to the citizens of struggling or failing states is part of a wider 
“logic of masculinist protection”234 which infantilises and condescends to these
233 ‘The Logic of Masculinist Protection: Reflections on the Current Security State, Signs: 
Journal o f Women in Culture and Society, 29(1), 2003, pp.679-711, pp.700
234 Ibid
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very individuals. Echoing the constructivist focus on the creation and 
manipulation of meaning, Young encourages IR practitioners to analyse, in 
greater depth, the role of gender and language in the recourse to violence. 
“Viewing issues of war and security through a gender lens”235, she argues 
“means seeing how a certain logic of gendered meanings and images helps 
organise the way people interpret events and circumstances, along with the 
positions and possibilities for action within them, and sometimes provides 
some rationale for action.”236 For example, using the language of protection, 
the US government was able partly to justify its 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, 
a failed state with a history of HR abuses, particularly against women. 
However, what was not adequately addressed were the reasons that the 
Taliban, with whom the US had once closely collaborated, had been able to 
perpetuate such abuses unchecked for so many years before September 11th 
2001. Similarly, the burgeoning discourse of R2P was rocked when, once the 
implausibility of the pre-emptive self-defence justification for the 2003 invasion 
of Iraq was exposed, the responsibility of international society to the victims of 
Saddam Hussein took centre stage as a rationale for warfare. In both cases, 
the humanitarian motives cited by interveners were less than persuasive. As 
such, not only has the shift to R2P failed to guard against the tendency for 
national self-interest to govern HI but it has also failed to dismantle the 
gendered hierarchies of ‘v ictim ’ and ‘rescuer’ which hampered the discourse 
of HI.
235
236
Ibid, pp.681 
Ibid
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The abiding significance of the linguistic shift from a ‘right to intervene’ to a 
‘responsibility to protect’, at least in view of the concern with becoming which 
motivates this project, is the fact that it was designed to reflect a concern for 
the individuals who suffer egregious HR abuses, rather than the global 
political actors who choose to respond to them. However, there is still great 
contention as to whether intervening troops are, generally, greeted as 
liberators, or feared as invaders. Moreover, fem inists often call into question 
whether the ‘victims’ of atrocities will benefit from the ‘protection’ of those 
whose own self-serving economic policies and neo-imperialistic agendas have 
contributed to the backdrop in which conflict is taking place. This is indicative 
of the wider limitations of the heroic narratives which have surrounded HI and 
the R2P, since the normative developments of the 1990s brought the 
discourse to increasing prominence.
The new enthusiasm  fo r m ilita ry in te rven tion  as a w eapon o f hum an rights 
enforcem ent... had system ic e ffects. The resort to ad  hoc  in tervention ist 
responses to hum an rights crises by m a jo r pow ers a llow ed them  to avoid 
funding, supporting, and streng then ing  exis ting  m ultila tera l m echanism s for 
promoting and protecting hum an rights. The use o f fo rce  as a response to 
security and hum anitarian crises con tinued to m ean tha t insu ffic ien t attention 
was paid to the exten t to w h ich the  po lic ies o f in ternationa l institutions 
them selves contribute to creating the cond itions tha t lead to such crises.237
This is a recurring theme among fem inist commentators who emphasise the 
holistic nature of international injustice, the multifaceted character of 
humanitarian suffering, as well as the need to acknowledge that the values 
and ambitions of the West are not necessarily neatly interchangeable with 
those of other global regions.
237 Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention, p. 13
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[m ]any people living in Asian, A frican, and Latin A m erican  socie ties believe 
that not only U.S. m ilitary hegem ony but a lso in terna tiona l trade and financia l 
institutions, as well as m any W este rn -based  nongovernm enta l deve lopm ent 
agencies, position them  in th is w ay as fem in ised  or in fantilised w om en and 
children under the protection and gu idance o f the w ise and active fa the r.238
The cumulative effect of these reiterated narratives, which position the heroic 
figure of the US, the UNSC, or a given regional organisation as the saviour of 
a panicked, repressed, victimised peoples, acts to distance observers from 
the real life consequences of military intervention. Since the interveners are 
acting in defence of humanity and global HR standards, they gain a certain 
license over the rules of war and non-combatant immunity. Aerial 
bombardment, which is known to be a highly ineffective tool in this context, 
and one which costs many civilian lives, nevertheless becomes the 
established standard for a military incursion on humanitarian grounds. This is 
largely due to the fact that:
[t]here is no space w ith in  the dom inan t narra tive  o f post-C old W ar 
internationalism  to cons ide r the e ffects  o f the he ro ’s actions on the human 
targets o f in tervention, or to  trea t the  ta rge ts  o f in terven tion  (w hether states or 
peoples) as having leg itim ate  agency .239
The failure to acknowledge the agency of the targets o f intervention speaks, 
from the perspective of many IR feminists, to the heart of the failure of the 
practice of HI. Equally, the reproduction of the flawed ‘knowledge’ which 
informs heroic narratives renders any change to the practice highly unlikely. It 
is for this reason that Orford goes on to claim that critics of the current
238 Young, ‘Masculinist Protection’, pp. 19
239 Orford, ‘Muscular’, pp.702
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intervention regime must identify the “construction of truth”240 in these stories 
as serving a very particular purpose; the continued hegemony of Western 
masculinity. Equally, those dissatisfied with the current constraints of the HI 
discourse should seek ways of “producing knowledge more ethically” .241 In 
this respect, she allies herself to techniques which are fam iliar to advocates of 
post-modernism in the wider sense; specifically arguing for discourse analysis 
as a means by which to render the familiar, unfamiliar, and to reject narratives 
and assumptions associated with liberalism. She also suggests that 
“[Rjemembering the constructed nature of these stories is perhaps the most 
useful way to counter the speed and power with which such stories are 
disseminated”242 and, therefore, arrest the processes which might otherwise 
allow them to become part of the vernacular o f international politics. This, she 
acknowledges, will also involve divesting oneself of the sense of belonging 
and identification which participation in such HI narratives provides. Only in so 
doing might we rid HI of some of its paternalistic and neo-colonial overtones. 
However, so entrenched have HI stories become that even this process may 
not successfully overturn their dominance. This is due to
the speed with which such sto ries can be constructed  and conveyed, the 
capacity o f the m edia to lavish a tten tion  upon a pa rticu la r state, the  am ount o f 
information that is h idden in pub lic  debates about the desirab ility  of 
intervention, the great leaps o f log ic  tha t occu r betw een one story and the 
next, and the ability  o f in terven tion  sto ries to  d ism iss v io lence  and suffering as 
som ehow necessary.243
"4U Ibid, pp.682
241 Ibid, pp.703
242 Ibid, pp.708
243 Ibid, pp.708-709
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Nevertheless, the suggestion is that in subverting HI narratives, we will be 
better placed to resist manipulation and less inclined to abdicate responsibility 
for decisions which are made on our behalf. Analysing the NATO-led 
intervention in Kosovo, Orford highlights the corrupt processes of becoming 
which ensure that knowledge is concealed, and self-reflection discouraged, by 
an unthinking acceptance of a given narrative:
... belief in the story tha t the con flic t in Kosovo w as abou t e thn ic  o r re lig ious 
tension involves repressing questions such as: W ha t kind o f politica l and 
historical processes have given rise to th is  conflic t?  H ow  am  I a benefic ia ry of 
the knowledge that is being produced abou t the  lives o f these  people? W hat 
identity am I being invited to construct fo r m yse lf and m y com m unity  while 
these people are portrayed to me as fana tics , re lig ious b igots, p re-m odern or 
racists? W hat role has my governm en t p layed, e ithe r acting on its own or 
through international institu tions, in con tribu ting  to the causes o f the  conflict? 
Do I have any pow er to in fluence ... those  w ho supposed ly  represent me in 
Kosovo? How does the rise o f popu lis t rac is t parties th roughou t the 
industrialised world re late to w ha t is happen ing  in Kosovo? W hy do 
com m entators on Kosovo be lieve tha t these  people are a ‘p rob lem ’ tha t ‘w e ’ 
can solve? W hat politica l and persona l s take  do I have in th is narra tive? Each 
of these questions, and m any m ore, m ust be avo ided in o rder to create faith 
in a narrative that te lls us tha t in te rven tion  is necessa ry .244
Intriguingly, despite concerns over the relationship between becoming and 
heroic narrative, neither Orford nor Young are prepared entirely to dismiss the 
role of HI in international society, since neither w ishes to under-estimate the 
devastating impact of humanitarian disaster on the citizens of failing states 
and their surrounding territories. In fact, perhaps surprisingly, Young 
characterises HI in much the same way as mainstream theorists:
244 Ibid, pp.709
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I would not argue that hum anitarian reasons can never jus tify  going to w ar 
against a state. I think, however, tha t such p ro tec tion is t g rounds fo r m ilitary 
intervention m ust be lim ited to s itua tions o f genocide  o r im pending genocide 
and where the w ar actua lly m akes rescue poss ib le .245
However, feminist IR stresses the need to make good on the letter o f the R2P 
by embracing the demands of prevention, which were said to distance it from 
the language of ‘the right to intervene’. This focus on preventative measures 
must, they argue, take aim at problematising the hegemonic influence of the 
liberal economic paradigm which maintains vast disparities between rich and 
poor, as well as unsustainable dichotomies between the public and private 
spheres which themselves perpetuate gendered hierarchies in social 
relations. It is these inequalities which so often create the conditions for 
conflict and the associated calls for acts of HI.
ii. Feminist Constructivism and Humanitarian Intervention
Having established that a broad interpretation of fem inist ethics is well 
positioned to illuminate debate surrounding HI and that such insights resonate 
with more general international justice claims, what remains at issue is the 
suggestion that a specifically ‘fem inist constructivism ’ can enrich our 
understanding of becoming in international society. There are several inter­
related ways in which feminist IR and conventional constructivism could be 
said to dovetail, particularly in an analysis of HI. A focus on the development 
and institutionalisation of norms has the potential to compliment the 
emancipatory agenda which underpins fem inist theorising, and an 
understanding of gender as a social construction may serve to advance
245 ‘Masculinist Protection’ pp.20
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constructivist understandings of international politics. After all, in critiquing 
gender, many feminists embrace very sim ilar analytic terms to those adopted 
by their constructivist contemporaries.
A social constructiv ist v iew  o f gende r... locates “gende redness” in the 
distributions of ideas regard ing men and w om en— the cultura l attributes 
associated w ith m ascu lin ity  and fem in in ity— tha t prop up the world system . 
Understanding how it opera tes - by channe lling  men and wom en 
disproportionately into d iffe ren t institu tions, by deva lu ing  a ttributes and 
behaviours associated w ith the fem in ine , and by underw riting  d iscourses of 
international affa irs - is a key com ponen t o f unders tand ing  world  politics per 
se.246
This framework is supported by, among others, Birgit Locher and Elisabeth 
Prugl who identify ontological, and to some extent epistemological, 
commonalities between the two theories; not least a shared focus on the ways 
in which the ideational and the material are united in a symbiotic relationship, 
and the manner in which norms can enable and constrain the behaviours of 
global political actors. Furthermore, the conviction that feminism and 
constructivism share certain complementary assumptions is reflected in the 
criteria which Tickner claims that a theory must fulfil if it is to incorporate 
gender in a successful fashion.
Paraphrasing Sandra W hitw orth , T ickne r c la im s theories tha t incorporate 
gender m ust satisfy th ree criteria : ‘1) they  m ust a llow  fo r the possib ility  o f 
talking about the socia l construction  o f m eaning; 2) they m ust discuss 
historical variability; and 3) they m ust perm it theoris ing  about pow er in ways 
that uncover hidden pow er re la tions ’.247
246 R. Charli Carpenter, ‘Gender Theory in World Politics: Contributions of a Non-feminist 
Standpoint?’, International Studies Review, 4(3), (2002), pp. 153-165, pp. 155
247 Carpenter, Gender Theory, pp.162
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There can be little doubt that constructivism conforms to the first two 
requirements but Locher and Prugl claim that, absent a response to the 
feminist critique, it lacks the analytical tools to engage with the third criteria 
because it operates within the confines of existing power relations, without 
questioning their origins or perpetuation. The suggestion is that constructivists 
must take more sophisticated account o f the ways in which these power 
relations are replicated through the creation and maintenance of binary 
oppositions which denigrate the female relative to the male. This does not 
simply manifest itself in the subordination of women but in the dismissal or 
marginalisation of values which are taken to be ‘fem ale’ and the championing 
of behaviours which are deemed to be ‘male’. Indeed, entire political 
communities are ‘feminised’ in this way because the assumption in favour of 
male superiority is replicated in the belief that western political frameworks are 
more civilised and advanced than alternative regimes and the associated 
assumption that the West is well placed to offer guidance and ‘protection’ to 
those in other parts of the world.
As such, if feminist constructivism is to make a significant contribution to the 
debate surrounding HI (and related questions as to relationship between 
becoming and the limits of an international duty of justice) and if its 
transformative ontology is to provide the tools for reform, it must assimilate 
insights drawn from each dimension of the broader fem inist tradition. Some of 
the most compelling of these perspectives can be delineated as follows: 
feminist empiricism calls for the involvement o f an increased number of
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female actors in international politics. W hilst unto itself this is insufficient to 
ensure progress, it remains a key component of feminist IR; the current 
absence of which is demonstrated by the fact that only one of the twelve 
commissioners involved in the drafting of the ICISS was female. Feminist 
standpoint, in the guise of care feminism, encourages an engagement with a 
different form of ethical debate; one which focuses not simply on the rights of 
the individuals and the theoretical justifications for acts o f violence but rather 
on gendered roles within the political community. For example, its advocates 
draw attention to the real life consequences of consolidating wom en’s ‘double­
burden’, of both productive and reproductive tasks, by increasing the level of 
care work required within a particular group. Post-colonial feminism guards 
against the tendency to deny the political agency of an infantilised ‘other’ by 
rejecting the notion that, in a macrocosm of the male/female relationship, 
protection is something which the W est is uniquely placed to offer the 
developing world.248 This form of fem inist IR encourages dialogue between 
different political communities and attempts to foster notions of becoming 
which move beyond assumptions in favour of Western superiority. This is 
linked with the post-modernist focus on unpacking the received narratives of 
liberalism, in which binary oppositions are constructed with a view to justifying 
and naturalising chauvinistic or neo-imperialist behaviours among global 
political actors. Post-modern feminism has the potential to infuse alternative 
theoretical approaches with a level of self-reflection, ensuring that 
commentators in the field do not grow complacent concerning the origins of
248 Many feminists point to the fact that in extreme Islamist cultures, the Western framework of 
human rights, which extends certain freedoms to women in terms of clothing and freedom of 
movement, is accused of failing to ‘pr°tec t’ women from involvement in pornography and 
prostitution. This is indicative of how open to interpretation the value of ‘protection’ can be and 
of the range of behaviours which it can be used to legitimate.
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their own knowledge-claims. Furthermore, although as the transition from HI 
to the R2P demonstrates, a mere change in language is not a guarantee of 
lasting progress, close-reading and narrative deconstruction do allow for such 
shifts, however incremental, to be seized upon, increasing the possibility that 
global political actors may be bound by their public commitments. Feminist 
constructivism can embrace a range of these elements of feminist IR more 
generally and through a focus on the constitutive role of language and the 
changing parameters which govern international politics, can both trace the 
development, and critically assess the impact, of gendered power relations on 
the processes of becoming in IR.
However, the hybridisation of feminism and constructivism does place certain 
constraints on the feminist theoretical framework. The, arguably, unique value 
of constructivism rests in its ability to provide the linchpin between more 
traditional readings of IR and the ‘ontology of becoming’ which unites a 
number of critical approaches to the discipline. Although many feminists 
would argue that maintaining credibility in the eyes of the ‘scientific’ academic 
community of IR is not a pressing concern, or that attempts to institutionalise 
progress in PIL are inherently fruitless, it is the lack of communication 
between feminist and traditional IR which has served to maintain the 
marginalised nature of fem inist commentary. It is for this reason that even the 
most committed of IR fem inist scholars accept that appropriating the language 
of the mainstream in order to improve it from within need not amount to an 
irrevocable abandonment of core principles. In the context of HI, even Orford 
concedes that “[t]here are times when it is useful to accept the imagined world
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of intervention stories in order to achieve a change that is possible within its 
logic”.249 Equally, those who are not persuaded by the emancipatory agenda 
of feminist commentary may, nevertheless, incorporate an understanding of 
gender into their own research. It is this suggestion which has given rise to 
what Carpenter refers to as “gender constructivism” .250
V. Gender Constructivism
The final task of this chapter is to explore the suggestion that, irrespective of 
whether a theorist of international politics chooses to commit themselves to 
the full implications of what is often clumsily referred to as the ‘feminist 
agenda’, the conception of becoming which they espouse will benefit from 
taking seriously the impact of gender. It is reasonable to suggest, as Tronto 
does, “that when people begin to talk about gender, they often begin to talk 
really about women”251 and it is for this reason, among others, that gender is 
often considered the exclusive preserve of fem inist commentators. However, 
Carpenter argues that the imperative of incorporating gender as an analytical 
category should not, and need not, be contingent upon the decision to “self- 
identify”252 as a feminist. In fact, she is particularly persuaded by the 
fundamental compatibility of social constructivism and gender analysis.
Although incorporating gende r (and sex) w ou ld  enrich all s trands o f IR theory, 
the absence o f gende r ana lyses w ith in  the em erg ing  literature on norm s and 
identities is particu la rly  consp icuous. If rea lity  is soc ia lly  constructed and 
material outcom es depend la rge ly  on shared beliefs, the  ubiqu ity and salience
‘Muscular’, pp.703
250 Carpenter, ‘Gender Theory’, pp.164
251 Global Feminist Ethics, p.87
252 Carpenter, ‘Gender Theory’, pp.156
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of beliefs about sexual d iffe rence in areas re levant to IR are w orthy of 
study.253
In the context of her own research, Carpenter focuses on the impact of 
gender on issues surrounding non-combatant immunity; over-turning the 
assumption that the category of ‘c ivilian’ implies, principally, women and 
children.254 Crucially, however, she does so in ‘descriptive’ rather than 
‘prescriptive’ terms, acknowledging and analysing the role of gender without 
necessarily exploring the ways in which its associated misconceptions or built- 
in hierarchies might be remedied as part of a w ider emancipatory project. She 
also encourages commentators from all theoretical persuasions to take 
account of gender, (even if they believe their field of interest or expertise to 
relate to a ‘non-feminist’ area of research) and to do so in a fashion which is 
truly inclusive.
W hile ostensib ly about gender, the  con tribu tions [o f fem in is ts ] actua lly  focus 
on women and the ir s trugg les: the re  is little e ffo rt to broaden the scope of 
gender in such a w ay as to  d raw  in d ive rse  pe rspec tives ... The question for 
“m ainstream ing” gende r in IR is how  to  put the  ana ly tica l ca tegory o f gender 
to work on top ics tha t are not spec ifica lly  fem in is t, w ithou t underm in ing the IR 
fem inist agenda.255
Carpenter anticipates the hostile reaction which such a suggestion may 
provoke from feminists, both within IR and beyond its complex and permeable 
disciplinary boundaries and, in response, she points out that the
253 Ibid, pp.153
254 A typical example of Carpenter ‘using gender’ but rejecting feminism can be found in 
‘Gender Theory in World Politics’. It runs as follows: “The trope “civilians now account for 
about 90 percent of war casualties, the majority of whom are women and children” is a 
gendered construction of the “civilian” that flies in the face of, among other things, refugee 
statistics and the widespread targeting of civilian men and boys for massacre in armed 
conflicts around the world” (pp. 157)
255 Ibid, pp. 154
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marginalisation of feminist commentary is a two-way process. It can be 
attributed both to the puzzling fact that “so few theorists interested in 
understanding the world are willing to accord to gender the causal and 
constitutive role it plays” ,256 as well as to the tendency of feminists to resist 
“the co-option of gender as an explanatory framework separate from feminist 
normative commitments”.257 This latter factor has even led to the suggestion 
that, in some cases, feminists self-consciously cling to their ‘ghettoised’ 
status, as an element of their own identity. This resistance, coupled with the 
implications of framing “gender analysis as fem inism ”,258 guarantees 
continued miscommunication.
[T]he m ainstream  IR scholar, even if s/he finds a rgum ents  about gender 
compelling, faces an apparen t cho ice betw een adopting  fem in is t theory to 
study gender (m igrating from  es tab lishm en t to fringe ) or jo in ing  in the 
collective m arginalisation o f gende r as an exp lana to ry  va riab le  and fem inism  
as a normative perspective .259
In fact, Carpenter seems to argue that an analytical focus on gender, (freed 
from the specific agenda of improving the lives of women) avoids some of the 
pitfalls associated with feminist theorising. In particular, she claims that the 
normative commitments of some feminists lead to an eschewed or inaccurate 
characterisation of international politics, in which decisive factors are 
overlooked or under-estimated.
256 Ibid
257 Ibid, pp.155
258 Ibid, pp.156
259 . . . .
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W riting w ith a declared agenda fo r prom oting  the in terests o f all wom en, 
fem inists run up aga inst em pirica l and theore tica l d ifficu lties when the results 
of gender in operation conflic t w ith the ir norm ative  agenda .260
In the context of the debate surrounding the use of force, this may account, in 
part, for the problematic assumption at work in some feminist commentary 
that women are rarely active participants in warfare; something which has 
been all but disproved by empirical analysis. It also provides an indication as 
to why so few feminist theorists have engaged with the issue of 
“gendercide”.261
Incorporating an appreciation of gender into an analysis o f genocide and 
ethnic cleansing has the potential to save many lives by providing something 
akin to an ‘early warning system ’.
[t]he genocidal or p ro to -genocida l ta rge ting  o f m ales, espec ia lly  ‘ba ttle -age ’ 
men, is one o f the m ost re liab le  ind ica to rs  o f the onset, o r im pending onset, o f 
full-scale genocide.262
Monitoring such patterns of violence is, therefore, one means by which to fulfil 
the prevention requirements written into the R2P and may help to bridge the 
gap between taking preventative measures, on the one hand, and respecting 
the requirement of ‘last resort’ on the other. It may be that once large-scale 
killing of battle-age men is observed, the diplomatic measures normally put in 
place, before HI, could be circumvented to guard against full-scale genocide.
260 Ibid, pp. 158
261 Adam Jones, ‘Genocide and Humanitarian Intervention: Incorporating the Gender
Variable’, Presented as a paper to the Fourth International Bi-Annual Conference of the 
Association of Genocide Scholars, Minneapolis, 10th-12th June 2001, pp. 1, 
http://www.iha.ac/articles/a080.htm. [27/05/08]
262 Ibid
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Genocidal violence often begins with the targeting of the male members of a 
given political community and spreads to incorporate the murders of women 
and children.
There are two key areas in w h ich  gende r seem s to  p lay a s ign ifican t role in 
preludes to genocidal killing: m ass deten tions, to rture , and se lective  killing of 
‘battle-age’ males, and the dem on iza tion  o f both m ales and fem ales, but 
especially males, as part o f the  cam pa ign  o f s tigm atisa tion , m argina lisation , 
and concentration tha t s tandard ly  p recedes the onse t o f la rger-sca le  or fu ll­
blown genocide. Those seeking to iso la te ‘w arn ing  s ig n s ’ o f genocidal 
outbreaks should there fo re  a ttend c lose ly  to these  gendered  patterns of 
anathem atisation and persecu tion  -  a long w ith  o the r im portan t (and 
standardly gendered) ind icators, such as the deve lopm en t o f param ilitary 
forces, prim ordial appea ls to  racia l and e thn ic  identity, the  cu ltiva tion  o f the 
‘politics o f verbal assau lt and physica l v io lence ’ and the deepen ing  o f inter- 
generational c leavages” .263
Although there can be no doubt that other gendered patterns of violence both 
precipitate and follow genocide (not least the escalation of carework 
described by Tronto and Heidi Hudson) it is rare for the gendered effects of 
genocide on men to be articulated as a cause for concern by feminist, or any 
other, commentators since “[t]he challenge of expanding the framework of 
‘gender’ beyond women has... barely begun to be met, and urgently requires 
scholarly and institutional consideration”.264
The phenomenon of gendercide and the tendency of feminists to downplay its 
significance also typifies the reluctance among feminist commentators to 
acknowledge that the patriarchal structures and constraints to which women
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are subject have two contradictory effects; one is to perpetuate oppression 
but the other, perversely, is, at least on occasion, to shield women from 
certain forms of violence. Using among other examples, the slaughter of 
Bosnian civilians in the UN-safe zone of Srebrenica in 1995, Karen Engle 
points out that whilst it is impossible to over-estimate the trauma associated 
with the mass-rapes which characterised the Yugoslavian civil war, even 
amidst such campaigns of terror, the lives of women were often spared.
During the m assacre at S rebren ica , S erb ian fo rces separa ted out and took 
into custody boys and men from  the ages o f tw e lve, th rough seventy-seven, 
while buses transported app rox im a te ly  tw en ty -th ree  thousand w om en and 
children to sa fe ty.265
According to Carpenter’s line of argument, a ‘gender constructivist’ 
perspective can take account o f such disparities with an objectivity which a 
feminist analysis might lack. A common fem inist response to this issue, for 
example, is to claim that due to the social stigmas inherent in certain 
societies, to be labelled as a “ raped wom en”266 in this social context is to 
suffer “a fate worse than death” .267 Equally, fem inist commentators might be 
inclined to argue that the use of mass-rape as a tool of war is further evidence 
of the ways in which women are objectified, defiled, and used as a means to 
the end of ethnic cleansing through forced impregnation. However, Engle’s 
persuasive account of the process by which mass-rape was ultimately 
declared a ‘crime against humanity’, illustrates that many of these 
assumptions, at least in the case of the Former Yugoslavia, were based on
265 ‘Feminism and its Discontents’, pp.814
266 Ibid, pp.75
267 Ibid, pp.813
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exaggerated perceptions of: the level of religious fervour among ordinary 
Bosnian Muslims; the associated contention that women from Muslim 
societies who had been the victims of rape would find it impossible to rebuild 
their lives within the fabric of such societies; a distorted belief concerning the 
degree to which the intent behind so-called ‘rape camps’ was to forcibly 
impregnate women “with a different ethnic gene”268 and thereby to ‘breed out’ 
particular political communities; and a failure to appreciate that for many 
women the horrors of rape were consolidated by the deaths of loved ones, 
including young children, which for many would have represented a loss even 
greater than that which had been inflicted upon them by their attackers.
Certainly the purpose of Engle’s work is not to make light of the horrific 
abuses suffered by women in this, or any other, military campaign or indeed 
to set aside the everyday experiences of violence which many women endure, 
even in the apparent sanctity of their own homes. Rather, her perspective 
brings balance to an emotive discussion by demonstrating the ways in which 
gendered patterns of violence can make ‘victim s’ of both men and women. 
The significance of her findings in terms of this project lies in the suggestion 
that in order for any conception of becoming or prescription for progress in 
international society to take aim at injustice, it must first engage in a realistic 
appraisal of the ways in which gendered power relations impact upon all 
human beings.
268 Ibid, pp.789
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So it is that Engle’s insights bear out Carpenter’s argument that one need not 
self-consciously embrace all the parameters of feminism in order to 
appreciate the role of gender in IR. Furthermore, in highlighting the issue of 
mass rape as a crime against humanity, Engle also indicates how forcing the 
issue of gender into the mainstream can affect positive change. When the 
statute establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia defined the crime of mass rape and the rules according to which it 
might be tried, the hope was that any notion that such incidents might be 
considered as “a natural occurrence in w ar”269 would be confined to history. 
Whilst she is not entirely satisfied with the specific institutional mechanisms 
around which the process revolved, she acknowledges that many of the 
feminists campaigners who fought tirelessly for this change in the law 
consider it to be a major victory, and one which might ultimately “encourage 
individual nations to treat sexual violence more seriously” .270 Although this 
task is far from complete, even in its infancy, it is indicative of how a gender 
lens can broaden and deepen traditional understandings of IR. Perhaps, when 
allied with a constructivist focus on the creation, dissemination, and 
institutionalisation of new norms, positive developments such as these can be 
built into the foundation of PIL and IR, and the gap created by the failure to 
acknowledge gender as a social construction may be bridged, at least slightly.
Gender constructivism is not a popular concept among feminists, with critics 
arguing, variously, that it is: a tautology (since gender is a construction); an
269 ‘A Landmark Ruling on Rape’ The New York Times [online] 24/02/01
http://www.criminoloqv.fsu.edu/transcrime/articles/A%20Landmark%20Ruling%20on%20Rap
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attempt by the mainstream to borrow from feminism only that which it can 
embrace without substantial self-reflection, or to “add gender and stir” ;271 and 
an unnecessary abandonment of the rich cannon of fem inist political theory, 
which has helped to define the categories of sex and gender. Alternatively, 
certain commentators subscribe to the viewpoint that “[fue lling  the idea of 
eliminating feminism from gender seems to be the gratuitous desire to confine 
feminist scholarly work within specific contours” ,272 something which is 
strongly resisted by feminist theorists. Notwithstanding these core differences 
between gender and feminist constructivism, however, there is a clear 
consensus surrounding the notion that no account of international justice is 
complete without an engagement with the construction of gender and its 
impact on the options available to global political actors. In short, the 
parameters of becoming and a constructed duty of justice will be contingent, 
at least in part, on the power relations which, due to gender difference, real or 
perceived, permeate international politics.
VI. Conclusion
The contribution of feminist constructivism to the debate surrounding HI, and 
the demands of international politics more generally, rests in its ability to draw 
together competing strands of constructivism under the banner of ‘ontology of 
becoming’; a concept drawn from fem inist theory and one which is integral to 
the tone and scope of this project. Although feminist constructivism boasts the 
most self-consciously transformative agenda of any of the theoretical subsets
271 Helen Kinsella ‘For a Careful Reading: The Conservatism of Gender Constructivism’, 
pp295, Terrell Carver (ed), The Forum: Gender and International Relations, International 
Studies Review, 5, 2003, pp.287-302,
272 Ibid, pp.292
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outlined in this project, even those elements of constructivism which are not 
wedded to a particular emancipatory goal do tend to focus both on an 
appraisal of the current constraints of international society and the potential 
for change within or beyond it.
Feminist campaigners are often the most vocal detractors of the current HI 
regime and their ‘bottom-up’ approach to IR ensures that they concern 
themselves not merely with the justifications for HI but with their 
consequences for ordinary people, particularly women. In other words, 
compared with mainstream IR, fem inist commentary encourages the 
establishment of a more nuanced and far-reaching conception of the nature of 
humanitarian suffering and the potential (preferably non-violent) responses to 
it. On this basis, it is perhaps surprising that more fem inist scholars are not 
squarely opposed to HI, in any circumstances. In fact, a recurring viewpoint, 
and one which appears to be common to the majority o f constructivists writing 
on this issue, is that the use of political violence, if it is to be deemed 
legitimate, must be preserved for the most extreme cases of genocidal 
violence. This is not to say that, from a fem inist perspective, less systematic 
forms of violence should be accepted as specific to the cultural and historical 
heritage of a given political community but rather it is simply to suggest that 
even the most radical of fem inist theorists would not argue that issues such as 
pervasive domestic violence or economic inequalities can be resolved by 
means of military intervention. Ultimately, IR feminists generally assert that 
systemic inequalities are the root cause of political violence, both in the form 
of HI and in the form of the extreme disorder which begets it. As such, a
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feminist international duty of justice is one in which inequitable socio­
economic conditions are linked to the international organisations and western 
hegemonic masculinity which perpetuate such inequalities. It is by dint of this 
process that the underlying causes and consequences of injustice are 
addressed through widespread and sustained change.
In many respects, this is difficult to operationalise using a constructivist 
methodology. This is due to the fact that constructivism tends to assess and 
affect change by increments and within the boundaries of an existing system. 
In this context, moral claims are legitimated ad populum  and articulated in a 
language which already embodies shared meanings and understandings 
among powerful actors. This process is not always inherently conservative or 
reactionary since on occasion a subtle change in this language, or the way in 
which it is employed, can shift the terms of a debate, forcing the hand of even 
the most influential states or organisations. For example, despite a degree of 
scepticism among feminist and other commentators, there is almost certainly 
substantial merit in the linguistic transition from HI to the R2P, even if only in 
its under-emphasised focus on prevention.
Nevertheless, many feminists would argue that the language of international 
politics and PIL is so tainted by gender bias that little can be achieved by 
assimilating it. However, it is the contention of this thesis that feminist 
constructivists can ill afford to adopt such an inflexible position. It is certainly 
the case that constructivism can benefit from a more nuanced appreciation of 
gendered power relations. However, it is also reasonable to suggest that
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feminism will be better equipped to share its invaluable insights if its 
advocates are prepared to do so in a fashion which is more comprehensible 
to the mainstream and more amenable to the possibility of slow, and even 
inconsistent, progress. In other words, whilst feminism provides 
constructivism with a framework for understanding becoming (what might be), 
constructivism can anchor feminism into an appreciation of being (what is) 
and a balance between these two positions can produce a powerful 
theoretical synthesis which boasts a broad appeal. This need not necessarily 
entail embracing gender as a category which is entirely separate from its 
feminist roots but it will almost certainly involve encouraging those from 
beyond the feminist theoretical contingent to appraise the impact of gender on 
their own knowledge claims and wider considerations of international justice. 
It will also depend upon the w illingness and ability of fem inists to take 
seriously the possibility o f improving the system from within, as opposed to 
abandoning it in entirety. The fact that mass-rape is now formally considered 
to a be a crime against humanity and one which, according to the terms of the 
R2P, may well be sufficient to occasion HI, is due in no small part to a 
campaign which was spearheaded by those who acknowledged that gender, 
far from being an incidental component o f inter-state relations, was key to the 
establishment and maintenance of HR standards and international politics. 
Equally, there is much to learn from the assertion that for as long as the 
discourse of HI remains impervious to gender analysis, accepting as givens 
the assumptions implicit within its terms, the practice of HI will continue to rely 
upon, and as such to perpetuate, the belief that women and ‘fem inised’ men
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lack the political agency to govern their own lives, w ithout the heavy-handed 
assistance of the West.
One of the principal imperatives for the remainder of this thesis will be to take 
aim at reading the implications of a gender-sensitive ontology of becoming 
into more traditional conceptions of HI. The hope is that this gender-lens will 
illuminate the potential for a broader and more sophisticated account of 
becoming and humanitarian suffering to emerge in mainstream IR theory and, 
thereby, to increase the scope and influence of a constructed duty of justice.
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Chapter Four: Allen Buchanan, Cosmopolitan Constructivism and
Humanitarian Intervention
I. Introduction
This chapter will appraise the contribution of Allen Buchanan to the HI debate. 
It will analyse the claim that his principle of institutional moral reasoning 
represents a constructivist engagement with becoming and consider the 
extent to which it bears critical scrutiny from both a pluralist and a gender- 
based perspective. Central to this endeavour is an assessment of whether, as 
Buchanan claims, his theory is predominately concerned with the 
institutionalisation and systematisation of those justice claims which already 
operate at the heart of international society. Furthermore, the chapter 
attempts to unpack the associated contention that the moral claims which 
derive from his theory stand apart from the liberal cosmopolitan tradition and 
are, as such, accessible to advocates of any viable ethical perspective. In 
order to explore both these assertions, analysis will begin with an exposition 
of the traditional liberal defence of HI. This will be followed by an examination 
of the ways in which Buchanan’s theory purports to differ from it, and, in so 
doing, will provide a comprehensive account of this alternative argument, 
including the case for a ‘League of Democracies’, designed to enact 
interventionary policies.
Taken together, these processes will reveal that, at times, Buchanan conflates 
cosmopolitanism and constructivism by over-estimating the ‘settled’ nature of 
certain norms. He asserts that, even in the absence of first principles, any
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attempt effectively to institutionalise the HR which form the foundation of the 
UN system must necessarily lead to an endorsement of cosmopolitan 
reasoning. However, upon detailed evaluation it becomes apparent that this 
assumption is based on a flawed understanding of the relationship between 
multilateralism and HR. Furthermore, the notion that HR as they exist in the 
UN Charter and subsequent Conventions are interchangeable with their 
manifestation in cosmopolitan theorising understates the degree of 
controversy which continues to rage over some rights which cosmopolitans 
take to be basic (and by extension, over the issue of whether the failure to 
respect such rights can reasonably elicit HI). In this respect, there is very little 
substantive difference between Buchanan’s defence of HI and a more 
traditional liberal reading of the practice. These sim ilarities arise as a 
consequence of the fact that Buchanan’s account o f becoming and the 
international duty of justice is ultimately inseparable from his liberal 
cosmopolitan convictions and, therefore, incommensurable with the demands 
of the ontology of becoming.
II. The Theoretical Basis for Intervention
i. The Traditional Liberal Defence of Humanitarian Intervention
In order to situate Buchanan’s views on HI and international justice into the 
wider debate of becoming in international society, it is first necessary to 
assess his claim that a liberal reading of HI can be defended without recourse 
to traditional cosmopolitan assumptions and is, as such, not subject to the 
critiques levelled at this position. Therefore, the first task of this chapter is to
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establish the principal tenets of the liberal position. One of the most recent, 
and most comprehensive, explorations of the liberal defence of HI is that 
proposed by Fernando Teson in both his 1997 book Humanitarian 
Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality273 and his subsequent article 
The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention’.274 In both these texts, Teson 
contends that the liberal cosmopolitan argument in favour of acts of HI is 
framed in terms of a very specific conception of the role and nature of the 
state. According to Teson:
[A] standard assum ption o f libera l po litica l ph ilosop hy ... [is th a t]... a m ajor 
purpose o f states and gove rnm en ts  is to pro tect and secure  hum an rights, 
that is, rights tha t all persons have by v irtue  o f personhood alone. 
Governm ents and o thers  in pow er w ho  se rious ly  v io la te  those  rights 
underm ine the one reason tha t ju s tifie s  the ir po litica l power, and thus should 
not be protected.275
This is already familiar in the guise of conditional sovereignty, enshrined in the 
R2P and is essentially based on the notion that NS, far from being a public 
good unto itself, is of instrumental moral value in that (in its ideal form) it 
facilitates the protection of HR. On those occasions wherein states’ rights are 
exercised irresponsibly to the extent that they conflict with HR this intrinsic 
value has become corrupt and self-destructive and a moral right to overturn it 
is generated. According to Teson, this “moral collapse of sovereignty”276 is 
most likely to occur under one of two conditions, “tyranny and anarchy”277. 
The first describes circumstances under which the apparatus of the state is
273 Second Edition, (Transnational Publishers, 1997)
274 Public Law and Legal Theory, Working Paper, 39, (2001)
275 Teson, libe ra l Case’, pp.1
276 Ibid, pp.2
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directed against it own people, and the second speaks to those occasions 
when the infrastructure of the state is so profoundly compromised that no 
sovereign authority exists which might be capable of defending HR standards. 
Under either of these conditions, the ‘right to intervene’ is seconded by “the 
obligation to rescue victims of tyranny or anarchy, if we can do so at a 
reasonable cost” .278 As an engagement with a fem inist critique has already 
sought to demonstrate, this analysis is premised upon a very specific, and 
arguably overly narrow, conception of human suffering but one which is 
nonetheless common to many theorists of HI.
In essence, Teson and like-minded liberal cosmopolitans argue (in terms 
almost indistinguishable from both communitarian and solidarist 
constructivists) that the collapse of a political community threatens its 
members with annihilation and destroys the conditions under which self- 
determination would generally derive its meaning. In this context, the rights of 
life and liberty are imperilled to such an extent that only intervention by a 
foreign military force can restore order and bring the chaos to an end. 
Therefore, those in a position to intervene w ithout undue costs to themselves 
are obligated, or at the very least entitled, to do so. However, the fundamental 
difference between the communitarian constructivist position and the 
viewpoints which inform the cosmopolitan tradition concerns the origins of the 
rights which intervening forces are deployed to defend. Communitarians have 
tended to claim that HR “do not follow from our common humanity; they follow 
from shared conceptions of social goods; they are local and particular in
278 Ibid
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character”279 and, as such, are most effectively protected within the specific 
boundaries of a state. This is at odds with the cosmopolitan claim that, since 
“[h]uman rights are rights held by individuals by virtue of their personhood” , 
they are therefore “independent of history, culture, or national borders” .280 As 
such, the legitimacy of these rights is a reflection o f the inherent dignity and 
autonomy of human beings rather than any sense of consensus among global 
political actors. Consequently, the ‘shared moral assessm ent’ which forms the 
basis of HR claims in the constructivist conception is of little or no 
consequence and the pursuit o f tolerance or ‘overlapping consensus’, in the 
Rawlsian sense, must give way to bold statements concerning the universality 
of these rights claims. In simple terms, “Liberal analysis must assume that 
liberal assumptions (such as the importance of individual autonomy) are the 
better ones, universally”281 and this will entail a rejection of the pluralist belief 
that, in order to avoid ethnocentrism, liberals must be respectful of alternative 
cultures or forms of governance. For example, liberals often assert that the 
charge of ethnocentrism is frequently employed as a political tool to discredit 
genuinely humanitarian efforts.
.. ,[l]t is jus t as p o s s ib le ... th a t the  accusa tion  o f ln eo -co lon ia lism ’ is em ployed 
ideologically, in o rde r to  concea l g o ve rn m e n ts ’ a ttem pts to defend the ir own 
political power. D em ands th a t pa rticu la r va lues and trad itions  be observed 
and correspond ing dem ands  th a t cu ltu ra l and po litica l au tonom y be respected
may be pre texts fo r u n im pede d ly  dom ina ting  and oppress ing  segm ents of
282one’s own popu lace  o r ne ighb ou ring  sta tes.
279 Michael Walzer, Spheres o f Justice, (New York, Basic Books, 1983), p.312
280 Teson, ‘Liberal Case’, pp.3
281 Ibid, pp. 13
282 Rainer Forst, (Translated from the German by Jonathan M. Caver), The Basic Right to 
Justification: Toward a Constructivist Conception of Human Rights , Constellations, 6(1),1999, 
pp.35-60, Blackwell Publishing, pp.35
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Thus, for cosmopolitan theorists such as Teson, liberal democracy is the 
system of governance which offers the most effective protection of HR 
standards. Accordingly, in an ideal teleological conception of becoming, all 
political communities should be encouraged to pursue a democratic political 
framework until the values which inform it are promoted globally.
Embracing the superiority o f liberal morality allows liberal philosophers to 
argue that, “the objective of a theory of ethics, and of justice in particular, is to 
discover what is right, not simply to discern upon what people or institutions 
concur”.283 This complicates the m atter o f hybridising cosmopolitanism and 
constructivism since in a conventional constructivist conception what is ‘right’ 
and what is ‘agreed upon’ are almost always one in the same. Cosmopolitans 
acknowledge that extensive agreem ent exists between various political 
communities as to the im perm issibility and moral abhorrence of egregious 
crimes against humanity. However, they also suggest that even if this were 
not the case, liberals would retain the moral authority to take military action in 
the face of such flagrant HR abuses. This rejection of arguments ad populum  
in favour of a straightforward Kantian com m itm ent to individual HR separates 
the cosmopolitan from the constructivist tradition and seemingly renders them 
irreconciliable with one another.
So it is that the principal moral claims which inform the traditional liberal 
approach to HR run as follows: all human beings have rights by dint of their 
humanity; the only moral justification for sovereign authority is its ability to 
defend and disseminate those rights; consequently, borders boast no moral
283 Harris, ‘Order and Justice’, pp.733
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value if they insulate HR abusing states from punishment. A  related argument 
is that prohibitions against HI, as they appear in PIL, are exaggerated by 
restrictionist theorists, who take no account of the elements of legal doctrine 
which proscribe genocide and torture. Similarly, Teson claims that even if the 
opposition to HI is writ large in both customary and conventional PIL, this 
simply indicates that the terms of PIL itself must be adapted to facilitate 
legitimate HI. In other words, that the liberal defence of HI can be read as a 
“de lege ferenda proposal” ,284 providing the fram ework for developments in 
PIL, designed to bring it into line with the moral standards which ought to 
govern international society. The category of de lege ferenda refers to notions 
of what the content of law ought to be. It is often contrasted with de lege lata 
(the law as it currently exists). A lthough the distinction between these 
categories and the scope for normative development which it implies is 
certainly pertinent to an account o f becoming, it is the contention of this thesis 
that for the ontology of becoming to function most effectively the gulf between 
what is and what should be, especially in PIL, must be tempered by a realistic 
appreciation of what could be. On this basis, blueprints for the direction in 
which PIL might progress are generally expected to bear some relation to its 
current confines, proposing developm ents which are significant but feasible in 
the context of a consensual system; something which Teson’s position can 
reasonably be accused o f failing to do.
Nevertheless, he maintains not only that the liberal defence of HI might be 
read in this way but also that the pluralist contention that it is an
284 Teson, ‘Liberal Case’, pp. 122
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unconscionable threat to international order, and the relatively peaceful 
conditions which it serves to secure is erroneous. In essence, liberal 
cosmopolitans argue, in a fashion which many fem inist commentators would 
arguably support, that this definition of order and peace is flawed since the 
pluralist focus on peace between states allows and perpetuates extreme 
disorder, violence, and HR abuses within the confines of state borders (and 
indeed, from a feminist perspective, within the home). Given that 
cosmopolitans refute any claims regarding the morally decisive nature of 
boundaries this inconsistency is considered both nonsensical and morally 
reprehensible.
Finally, the apparent contradiction of cosmopolitan liberals arguing in favour of 
military incursions which will inevitably cost the lives of innocent people is 
seemingly problematic. W hilst a wealth o f responses to this issue characterise 
the liberal tradition most converge on one simple principle, that inaction, in 
cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing, or mass-deportation, will cost many more 
lives than a targeted military response. Although the deontological assumption 
that all individuals have a right to life does not allow for a simple 
consequentialist calculation, view ing the right to life in positive, rather than 
negative terms, suggests that, in such cases, the failure to rescue victims of 
atrocities represents a graver assault on HR standards than risking minimal 
civilian casualties, with a view  to restoring jus t and peaceful conditions.
In sum, the liberal analysis o f HI speaks to the notion of becoming more 
generally. According to this framework, an extensive set of normative
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principles and associated HR standards are morally prior to political society. 
Those institutions which fail to implement or support such standards must 
either adapt or be set aside in the pursuit o f international justice. Cultural 
particularism cannot shield HR abuses and liberal democracy represents the 
best hope for the containment o f these violations. In essence, if international 
politics is to become more just, a recognition of the inherent superiority of 
liberal principles must be at the core of the agenda for reform. Given the 
extremely bold nature of all of these statements, the challenge which 
Buchanan establishes for himself (specifically to defend this position without 
relying upon cosmopolitan first principles) appears exacting. Accordingly, this 
chapter will consider how plausible it is to suggest, as he does, that most if 
not all of the arguments underpinning the liberal approach to HI and 
international justice can be defended simply through a focus on the principle 
of institutional moral reasoning; a principle which can almost certainly be 
interpreted as constructivist in nature.
ii. The Foundations of Institutional Moral Reasoning
The foundational premise at w ork in Buchanan’s institutional moral reasoning 
is that in order for international politics to function in accordance with 
standards of justice and morality, both practitioners and theorists of IR must 
acknowledge the “necessity of taking institutions seriously” .285 This is 
because, in Buchanan’s view, any attem pt at sustainable reform (or, in the 
terms of this thesis, any conception of becoming) depends for its success 
upon the processes of institutionalisation. This leads to the two-pronged
285 Buchanan, Justice, p.22
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assertion that (a) the institutions which govern interaction between global 
political actors must embody consistent moral standards, rather than relying 
on post hoc rationalisations, or acting as a conduit for the interests of powerful 
states, and (b) those who accept the task of ‘m oralising’ in IR must do so 
within the constraints of practicality, ensuring that their prescriptions for 
international society are responsive to the demands of institutionalisation.
[T]he moral ph ilosophy o f in te rna tiona l law  m ust inc lude  institu tiona l moral 
reasoning; som e o f its m ost im po rtan t p rinc ip les  m ust be fo rm u la ted  and 
justified in light o f the  assum ption  tha t they  w ill be em bod ied  in ins titu tions .286
As an analysis of feminist constructivism  has already indicated, this focus on 
institutionalisation must be subject to further investigation. After all, if the 
establishment of new institutions or the modification o f existing mechanisms is 
to advance the cause of justice, it must take account o f the unequal power 
relations which currently characterise global governance and seek to avoid 
replicating them. This leads to a consideration of the ways in which institutions 
ought to be designed and regulated. For Buchanan, one dimension of this 
process involves ensuring that com plex moral issues, including HI, are neither 
appraised nor implemented on a case-by-case basis. As such, he rejects 
Jackson’s contention in The G lobal Covenant that “ [t]he ethics of 
intervention— like that o f statecraft generally — is subject to the norms of the 
international society in existence at the time and the circumstances of the 
case in question”.287 In contrast, he maintains that it is both plausible and 
morally desirable to establish general moral precepts and principles,
286 Ibid, p. 18
287 „  o c r T
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applicable to a range of scenarios and governed by just institutions. The 
resulting framework could guard against the worst excesses of indifference 
and self-interest, even among powerful states, and allow the infrastructure of 
international society to more accurately reflect the values which he believes 
already underpin it. It is the contention of this thesis that the systematic view 
of HR to which this claim appeals is at odds with the norm-based focus of 
constructivism. In simple terms, constructivists argue that moral standards 
emerge through negotiation and legitimation and, as such, it is consensus 
over the content of human rights which imparts to them their moral authority. 
This pattern of norm emergence and crystallisation necessitates and relies 
upon casuistical analysis which can assess and aggregate normative 
developments and extrapolate universalisable moral principles from this 
process. An underlying assumption built into the constructivist ontology of 
becoming is that it is the cross-cultural appeal of these principles which 
renders their institutionalisation feasible.
This focus on the institutionalisation o f moral principles appears to separate 
Buchanan from a number of other cosmopolitan theorists in two significant 
and distinct ways. The first relates to the concept of ideal theory as a means 
to assess justice and becoming. A lthough Buchanan is not opposed to ideal 
theory, as a matter o f principle, he is scornful of those commentators who 
employ it as a device w ithout relating, in some important respects, their 
subsequent findings to the realities o f international politics. Or, in his terms, 
without addressing w hether the moral principles which are advanced have a 
realistic possibility o f being incorporated into the international legal system.
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Buchanan also affirms that it is irresponsible to suggest that a course of action 
which can be defended either in terms of ideal theory, or in response to one 
specific set of circumstances, is necessarily suited to institutionalisation. After 
all,
[p rinc ip les  that m ay be p laus ib le  fo r an iso la ted  case o ften  prove inadequate  
or even counter-p roductive  if ins titu tiona lised  to  govern  a p ractice  tha t covers 
many cases.288
Similarly, those seeking to imbue their conception of progress in PIL or 
international politics with a durable and persuasive moral foundation cannot 
“proceed as if the justification of moral principles for institutions is wholly 
independent of the question of what the consequences of institutionalising 
these principles would be” .289 Three vital elements of Buchanan’s institutional 
moral reasoning (and, as such, his understanding of becoming) are, therefore: 
“feasibility” ,290 “accessibility”291 and “moral accessibility”292; a framework of 
analysis which this thesis takes to be extremely persuasive. In the first 
instance, the moral principles which are articulated must be responsive to, 
and representative of, the realities o f international politics. However unto itself 
this is not sufficient, since
[a] theory is access ib le  if it is not on ly  feas ib le , but if in add ition  there is a 
practicable route from  w he re  w e are  now  to at least a reasonable 
approxim ation o f the  s ta te  o f a ffa irs  tha t sa tis fies  its princ ip les. In o the r words,
Buchanan, Justice, p. 18
290
289 luviIbid
Ibid, p.61
291 i k ' jIbid
292 i l ' jIbid
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if an ideal theory is to be usefu l to  us, the  ideal it spec ifies  m ust be accessib le  
to us -  those to w hom  the theory  is d ire c te d .293
Furthermore, the theory must boast ‘moral accessibility ’ in the sense, that it 
must not represent a moral retrograde step, compared with the status quo; or 
as Buchanan phrases it, the implementation of the theory cannot entail 
“unacceptable moral costs”294. In fact, according to Buchanan’s ‘progressive 
conservatism’ those seeking to frame a moral theory of PIL must ensure that 
“[t]he principles it proposes ought, if implemented... [to] achieve an 
improvement of the existing system (at least some of the more serious defects 
in the current system’s conceptual and normative resources...)” .295
The ability of a proposal for reform to meet these criteria will depend upon 
“the institutions that currently exist, on the proposed institutionalisation of the 
principle in question and on the moral ‘risks’ entailed by the transition”296. As 
Peter Sutch claims: “This is what Buchanan means when he insists that moral 
theory needs a greater empirical e lem ent”297 and it is these restrictions on 
ideal theory which have the potential to afford greater credibility to 
Buchanan’s approach to reconciling morality and PIL, as well as to add weight 
to the suggestion that he ought to be categorised, not as a Kantian 
philosopher, but as a cosm opolitan constructivist. A fter all, a cursory 
engagement with his arguments would suggest that he, like conventional 
constructivists, believes that “moral principles of international law are
293 Ibid
294 Ibid
295 Ibid, p.348 (emphasis added)
296 ‘Governing the Use of Force: The United Nations or a League of Democracies, 
(forthcoming)
297 Ibid
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institutional principles that need to be developed in situ, as it were, with a 
proper respect for the existing world order” .298
It is for this reason that institutional moral reasoning, focusing as it does on 
the need to take account of the development of norms in international society 
and to avoid establishing standards which are more utopian than aspirational, 
can be said to conform to the broad definition of constructivism. Buchanan 
appears to argue that our transition from being to becoming must begin with a 
realistic appraisal of the constraints imposed by the international society 
framework and thereby provide the means to assess the likely success of 
alternative approaches to divisive and complex issues, such as HI. It is only 
within these normative and institutional boundaries that real and lasting 
change may be implemented. In fact, he claims that his prescriptions for 
becoming in international society represent nothing more than the systematic 
application of existing HR to the international legal order; an endeavour which 
is seemingly consistent with the w ider constructivist project. However, many 
of Buchanan’s assumptions as to the content of HR and the priority of the 
moral equality of persons are based on a reading of international politics and 
PIL which relies upon more than the institutional and political consensus 
underpinning constructivist analysis.
iii. Institutional Moral Reasoning and the Natural Duty of Justice
One of the functions of institutional moral reasoning is to give meaning to 
what Buchanan refers to as:
^Ib id
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[The] Natural Duty o f Ju s tice ... accord ing  to w h ich  each one o f us -  
independently o f w hich institu tions w e find ou rse lves  in or the special 
com m itm ents we have undertaken -  has a lim ited m ora l ob liga tion  to help 
ensure that all persons have access to ins titu tions  tha t p ro tect the ir basic 
human rights.299
This is undoubtedly an example of Kantian cosmopolitanism which goes 
beyond the Rawlsian assertion that we should defend just institutions where 
they have already been founded, arguing instead that “ [i]deal justice... comes 
into non-ideal politics by way of the natural duty to secure just institutions 
where none presently exist” .300 Although Buchanan has much to say as to the 
applicability and appeal of such a principle, he also claims that his theory is 
persuasive even to those who reject any notion of such a natural obligation. 
He argues that although institutional moral reasoning is the appropriate 
mechanism for developing a moral theory of PIL which would allow for the 
successful implementation of the natural duty of justice, significantly, it is also 
defensible on its own merits. This is the basis for Buchanan’s argument that 
his theoretical approach is accessible even to those who reject a 
cosmopolitan framework. In his own words:
I wish to em phasise tha t m uch o f w ha t I say in the rem a inde r o f th is vo lum e 
does not depend upon the a rgum en t tha t the re  is a Natural Duty o f Justice. 
My main concern is to deve lop  a m oral theo ry  o f in te rna tiona l law  that takes 
justice -  understood as a respect fo r bas ic  hum an rights — seriously. A ll that is 
required is the assum ption  tha t the re  are bas ic  hum an righ ts .301
Buchanan, Justice, p.27
300Charles R. Beitz, ‘Justice in International Relations’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4(4), 
Summer 1975, pp.360-389, pp.384
301 Buchanan, Justice, p.97
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In severing the link between institutional moral reasoning and the natural duty 
of justice, Buchanan is claiming that the former could be acknowledged as a 
functional principle even by those who reject the latter. As such, he is 
effectively arguing that his moral theory of PIL takes aim at the cosmopolitan 
constructivist task of institutionalising principles which are already widely 
accepted across international society; specifically, those implied by the 
acceptance of the existence of ‘basic’ HR. In Buchanan’s view, he is 
constructing a conception of becoming which appears relatively 
‘uncontroversial’ and universalisable. In making this claim, however, he 
subjects his arguments to a very particular kind of scrutiny. This is because in 
order for his account of morality in PIL to be persuasive to those outside the 
liberal tradition, Buchanan must either successfully demonstrate that it relies 
on more than traditional cosmopolitan arguments concerning the rationality, 
autonomy, and dignity of all human beings (in effect, arguments which inform 
a commitment to the natural duty of justice), or that these ideals are embraced 
with such a degree of universality across international society that no global 
political actors of note could reasonably reject them. He endorses the second 
position and, in fact, refuses to be drawn on a justification or defence of the 
the liberal cosmopolitan interpretation of the moral equality of persons. 
Instead he claims that:
[B jecause I have no in ten tion  o f sys tem a tica lly  engag ing  those  who are 
sceptical about m ora lity  a ltoge th e r o r abou t the  fundam en ta l m oral equa lity  o f 
persons in th is work, I w ill m ake no e ffo rt to a rgue fo r the  Moral Equality 
P rinciple.302
302 Ibid, p.88
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This represents a weakness in his argument since it is not only those who are 
devoid of moral impulse who call into question the ‘universalist’ ethic of 
cosmopolitan reasoning. As an overview of fem inist commentary on this issue 
has demonstrated, values and principles such as ‘autonomy’ and ‘rationality’ 
are heavily gendered constructs which any investigation into moral theorising 
would benefit from unpacking and problematising. Nevertheless, Buchanan 
treats the cosmopolitan reading of the moral equality principle as if it is 
already an embedded norm of international politics and PIL. Not only does 
this place him at odds with feminist theorists but it also reinforces his decision 
to distance himself from cosmopolitan constructivist Rawls, who is prepared to 
acknowledge that a particular regime or political community can be illiberal, 
inegalitarian, and yet reasonable.
For Buchanan, “any conception of morality worth seriously thinking about”303 
is premised on the moral equality of persons, and this foundation creates an 
extensive set of obligations. Accordingly, he argues that we are compelled 
both to avoid infringing HR, and to respond to their infringement at the hands 
of others. He asserts that:
[o]nly a laughably anaem ic conception  o f w ha t it is to recogn ise  the moral 
im portance o f persons -  an absurd ly  a ttenua ted  v iew  about w hat it is to 
respect persons and to be concerned abou t the ir w e ll-be ing  -  w ould count my 
m erely refra in ing from  v io la ting  o ther p e rsons ’ rights as su ffic ien t.304
Or, as he phrases it in his article Political Legitimacy and Democracy,
Ibid, p.89
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C onsider the im p laus ib ility  o f acknow led g ing  tha t persons are entitled to equal 
regard w hile  at the sam e tim e  deny ing  tha t one has any obligation to do 
anyth ing that w ill ensure  tha t the ir righ ts  are p ro tec ted .305
This viewpoint not only forms part of his defence of HI but is also a vital 
element of his understanding of how international institutions ought to 
function. In view of his contentious belief that the moral equality of persons is 
a universally recognised principle (or that those who do not recognise it 
should rightly be excluded from debate) and the associated claim that this 
principle gives rise to the natural duty of justice (the terms of which are 
reflected in the dynamics of institutional moral reasoning), Buchanan argues 
that institutions, like the individuals who constitute them, ought to be 
committed to the defence of HR. Thus, what is engaging in his chain of 
reasoning is the simplicity and the intuitive appeal of his suggestion that 
institutions which fail to protect the HR already built into the fabric o f PIL and 
international society, ought to be reformed or replaced. Hence, Buchanan 
presents institutional moral reasoning as a logical way in which to provide 
existing principles with the requisite ‘tee th ’ to promote and disseminate HR. In 
other words, his conception of becoming is one in which our institutions must 
evolve to reflect our existing ethical principles. In this respect, Buchanan’s 
prescriptions for reform in international society are presented simply as the 
natural consequence of taking seriously our commitment to HR.
[I]n develop ing a moral theo ry  o f in te rna tiona l law  B uchanan links his grasp o f 
public in ternational law  w ith  the  critica l pow er o f po litica l theory. His claim  is 
that such a m oral theo ry  w ou ld  not be pa rticu la rly  g rand iose  but w ould set
305 Ethics, July 2002, pp.689-719, pp.704
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about sys tem atica lly  exam in ing  the  p rinc ip les  at w ork  in the in ternationa l legal
order.306
This examination reveals, in Buchanan’s conception, a notable and morally 
unjustifiable gap between these principles and their implementation and 
institutionalisation in international society. Conventional constructivists assert 
that these apparent inconsistencies are merely indicative of the fact that many 
of the HR norms which cosm opolitans take to be basic are not embedded in 
international society. By way of contrast, Buchanan identifies addressing this 
disjuncture as the purpose and guiding principle of his moral theory of PIL. He 
contends that the protection of HR was intended to be integral to the UN 
system and that institutional failings currently preclude this possibility. 
Buchanan insists that his findings are simply the consequence of following the 
legal commitment to HR to its logical conclusion and it is this assertion which 
ultimately informs his understanding of progress in international society. In 
simple terms, he states that if the lim itations of the UN prevent it from making 
good on its principal goal, then its claim to exclusive legitimacy is undermined 
and radical reform is legitimated. Furthermore, he repeatedly states that any 
account of morality which takes HR seriously is bound to lead to such a 
conclusion. It is on this controversial basis that Buchanan outlines the 
institutional reform necessitated by the challenge of HI and, in the process, 
invites extensive critique of his position.
306 Sutch, ‘Governing’
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III. The Components of Hum anitarian Intervention
i. ‘Institutionalising’ Intervention
The forthcoming chapters on Nicholas W heeler and Michael W alzer will be 
structured to reflect the conception of the JW  mode of analysis adopted by 
both thinkers and intrinsically linked with the discourse of HI. However, an 
appraisal of Buchanan’s theory lends itself to a slightly different approach. 
This is because Buchanan is less methodical in his account o f HI than either 
of his contemporaries. Specifically, he chooses to focus predominately on the 
relationship between institutional moral reasoning and HI, rather than 
assessing in turn each element of the JW tradition. As such, the remainder of 
this chapter will trace his attempts to weave together the two concepts. This is 
not to suggest that Buchanan does not address the same fundamental 
components of HI as other theorists who have investigated the subject but 
rather it is to acknowledge that, for the most part, he is concerned with the 
institutional ramifications of any potential ‘right to intervene’.
As to the question of ‘just cause’, Buchanan’s views are comparable to those 
of Teson as he considers that the ‘moral collapse of sovereignty’ is likely to 
create conditions which warrant intervention in extreme circumstances. 
However, for Buchanan it is not adequate simply to apply the logic that, in the 
event of a just cause for intervention, we will ‘know it when we see it’. Rather 
he argues that the potential for abuse and inconsistency which characterises 
such case-by-case assessment can and must be avoided. A framework for HI, 
if it is to be implemented successfully, must be subject to the terms of
168
Being and Becoming: Humanitarian Intervention and the Constructed Duty o f Justice Claire Malcolm
institutional moral reasoning; that is to say that it must be a rule-governed 
practice, consistently enabled and constrained by appropriate institutional 
mechanisms. In simple terms, and in contrast to the tone of this thesis, 
Buchanan advocates systematic over casuistical analysis.
[w ]hen w hat is sought is a m ora lly  d e fe n s ib le  p ractice  fo r a d iverse  com m unity  
o f states, som e o f w h ich  are m uch s tro n g e r than  the others, substan tive  rules 
can reduce the risks o f fa llib ility , b ias, s tra teg ic  behaviour, and se lf-serv ing 
se lectiv ity .307
In this respect, Buchanan appears to suggest that much of the controversy 
surrounding HI (controversy which com m unitarian comm entators tend to think 
of as being intractable) could be overcom e through the establishment of an 
effective institutional solution. This entails a reworking of the traditional 
problematic of intervention:
[t]he proper choice is not be tw een  adhe ring  to  the  JW N  [just w a r norm ] and 
abandoning it in favou r o f a m ore pe rm iss ive  norm , but ra the r betw een 
adhering to the JW N and adop ting  a m ore  pe rm iss ive  norm  em bedded in an 
institu tional fram ew ork  tha t a m e lio ra tes  the  risks o f a m ore perm issive  
norm .308
If the balance between the constraints of the JW  tradition and the promise of a 
more permissive norm can be sustained, Buchanan argues, it may provide the 
means to resolve a number of pressing debates surrounding HI. Again, for 
Buchanan, the key to progress or becoming lies in devising a rule-governed 
institutional solution. For example, the matter o f agency would be addressed if 
a permanent body (free from the procedural lim itations of the UNSC) were
307 Buchanan, Justice, p.287
308 Buchanan, ‘Just War’, pp.3
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created. Equally, the accountability m echanisms put in place to regulate the 
interventions which the organisation spearheaded would be sufficient to 
assuage concerns over predation, selectivity, and the mixed motivation which 
so often leads to an inappropriate choice of military means. These 
mechanisms could also establish a framework, albeit a necessarily flexible 
one, for defining the nature and scale of the HR abuses which might be seen 
as justification for HI. Buchanan em phasises that the consensus on which the 
organisation would draw in codifying and implementing these standards is 
already in place within the dialogue of international society. A fter all, a limited 
version of the concept of R2P has been endorsed, to some degree, by a 
substantial proportion of the states which make up the UN.
ii. Rejecting State Majoritarianism
Even if this were not the case, however, Buchanan is inclined to argue that 
the application of universally recognised normative principles is entirely more 
morally persuasive than the requirement o f state majoritarianism and the 
defence of NS with which it is associated. He argues that an institution which 
would regulate and monitor acts of HI need not rely for its legitimacy or its 
effectiveness on an exhaustive consensus among states. Instead, the quality 
of a given administration, and the state for which it is responsible, would 
impact directly on its entitlement to enter and affect political negotiation. For 
Buchanan, the ability to act as a mem ber ‘in good standing’ of international 
society is a privilege which ought to be contingent upon good governance; a 
standard which many UN mem ber states do not currently reflect.
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This mistrust of the state consent model in PIL is key to an appreciation of 
Buchanan’s views on international justice and would appear to be at odds with 
the suggestion that his theory is constructivist in nature. Although 
conventional constructivists are concerned with the tacit and implicit 
consensus generated among a broad range of global political actors, the role 
of the state remains one of the most vital elements of norm formation and 
crystallisation. Consequently, unless a norm of justice has secured some 
degree of support across an array of political communities it is difficult to 
claim, using only constructivist tools of analysis, that its terms have become 
settled or embedded. At present, the dynam ics o f the UN system and of PIL 
are largely based upon the pursuit of this consensus. Furthermore, the 
drafting of resolutions, signing of treaties, and establishm ent of conventions 
still number among the most effective means by which to demonstrate the 
existence, and guarantee the preservation, o f such fragile normative 
convergence. As such, the assertion that the imperative to abandon state 
consent can be extrapolated from a logical reading of the current status of HR 
in international society is a radical one. If Buchanan wishes to make the case 
that these claims are consistent with the constructivist confines of institutional 
moral reasoning, he must demonstrate that his rejection of state 
majoritarianism can be defended w ithout recourse to cosmopolitan first 
principles.
In attempting to do this, Buchanan provides several justifications for a 
conception of becoming which is not reliant on consensus among states. The
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first has its roots in the globalisation thesis and the notion that states 
themselves are no longer the sole decision-makers in IR. The claim is that:
Once we acknowledge that international law now encompasses subjects and 
actors other than states, and that this change represents progress, it is no 
longer clear that equality of states itself... is an overriding desideratum.309
In other words, it is fitting in this changing international environment that the 
influence of states should be counteracted by consideration for individuals 
and groups, both above and below the national level. Buchanan argues that 
there has been a notable decline in the significance of state actors and that, if 
this decline persists, which he believes that it will, the focus on equality 
among states will become increasingly incidental to the realities of 
international politics. In fact, he goes so far as to claim that even if states are 
the cornerstone of IR, a hierarchy ought still to exist, which is capable of 
separating those who take seriously the responsibilities associated with NS, 
from those who routinely abuse the power with which it is connected.310 For 
Buchanan, the failure to draw such a distinction is the most fundamental flaw 
of the state consent model of PIL. He claims that
309 Buchanan, Justice, p.317
310 Elsewhere, Buchanan goes further, even arguing that the recognition of statehood itself 
should depend upon standards of legitimacy. In essence, the central tenet of ‘recognitional 
legitimacy’ is the assertion that territories which lack internal and external legitimacy have no 
claim to the advantages associated with statehood (including participation in international 
organisations), even if they fulfil the terms of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights 
and Duties of States. This ‘constitutive’ conception of recognition, as a practice which imparts 
power and authority to its recipients, leads Buchanan to suggest that in recognising errant 
states and governments, international society risks behaving as an ‘accomplice to injustice’. A 
preferable mechanism for incentivising moral behaviour and institutionalising the protection of 
human rights is to deny recognition to emerging entities which do not fulfil the criteria of 
‘minimal justice’ and to place consistently abusive and irresponsible territories on a kind of 
diplomatic ‘probation’ until such time as they notably improve their human rights records. This 
is a further indication of Buchanan’s belief that illiberal regimes should not be treated as the 
legal and moral equals of functioning democracies and should be restricted in their ability to 
impact upon policy or international institutions.
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[l]n a system  in w h ich  m any s ta tes  sys tem a tica lly  v io la te  ind iv idua ls ’ hum an 
rights, state m a jo rita rian ism  in fa c t m ay be the  s ing le  g rea tes t im pedim ent 
both to the e ffective  ins titu tiona l e xp ress ion  o f equa l cons ide ra tion  o f persons 
and to the protection o f hum an rig h ts .311
Therefore, only those states boasting forms of governance which reflect the 
normative standards at the heart o f international society should be equipped 
with the power to influence the manner in which that society evolves.
To recapitulate, Buchanan presents a series of bold claims all o f which are, at 
least partly, designed to provide a defence for the circumvention of the UNSC. 
In the first instance he argues that any reasonable conception of morality is 
one which embraces the fundamental moral equality o f persons. It is his claim 
that the vast majority o f international society already acknowledges this 
assumption as the foundation of PIL and the guiding principle o f the UN 
system. As such, the failure of that system consistently to preserve and 
protect the moral equality of persons underm ines its legitimacy and gives rise 
to arguments for extensive institutional reform. Significantly, these calls for 
reform need not necessarily be endorsed by the broadest possible range of 
global political actors. For Buchanan, the most effective way to give 
institutional expression to HR may som etimes be to compromise states’ 
rights. This notion, fundamentally opposed to the communitarian insistence 
that it is membership of a political com m unity which gives meaning to rights 
claims, provides the basis for Buchanan’s approach to agency.
311 Ibid, p.318
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iii. Agency
(a) Beyond the UNSC
In Buchanan’s view, nowhere is the tension between states’ rights and HR 
more pronounced than in the institutional failings of the UNSC, which is 
inegalitarian in its distribution of the “morally arb itrary”312 veto and yet, 
emphasises that among the P5 all state actors must be afforded equal 
treatment. This contradiction affords enormous influence to two states whose 
governments are profoundly unrepresentative and which, due in no small part 
to their poor record on HR and the treatm ent o f m inorities, are in breach of 
Buchanan’s criteria for ‘internal legitim acy’. Since, he argues that the internal 
illegitimacy of Russia and China bears a direct relationship to a lack of 
‘external legitimacy’ Buchanan is prepared to assert that such influence must 
be curbed. This cannot be achieved through reform o f the UNSC since, 
“[c]learly... no amendment to the Charter has a chance of being adopted if 
any of the permanent members is firm ly opposed to it, as seems to be the 
case at this time” .313 The resultant suggestion that the most effective way to 
avoid deadlock and restrict the power of Russia and China (especially with 
regard to matters pertaining to the regulation of the use of force) is to vest 
more power in the democratic regimes which constitute the remainder of the 
P5, is one which Buchanan explicitly endorses. Once again, his viewpoint is a 
radical one which suggests that consensus over the values which give 
meaning to HR is sufficiently w idespread and deep-rooted to provide
312 Ibid, p. 164
313 Yehuda. Z. Blum, ‘Proposals for Security Council Reform’, The American Journal o f 
International Law, 99(3), July 2005, pp.632-649, pp.648
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justification for the political and diplom atic exclusion of two of the great 
powers.
Nevertheless, Buchanan’s understanding of becoming depends upon a 
reading of legitimacy which he believes is strong and normatively demanding 
enough to provide the basis for such claims. His conception of legitimacy 
leads him to argue the UNSC is unworthy of the deference demonstrated to it 
in PIL. In the context of HI, this is particularly noteworthy given that, at 
present, for HI to abide by the terms of PIL, and indeed of the R2P, it must 
secure the authorisation of this body. Therefore, if Buchanan can successfully 
make the case that Annan’s claim that the UN possesses a “unique 
legitimacy”314 is not persuasive, he may be able to construct an argument for 
the circumvention of the UNSC in response to humanitarian disaster. In 
attempting to do so, he contends that legitimacy is a two-pronged notion, 
which can be either sociological or normative. In the sociological sense, 
legitimacy refers to the acceptance that a given institution is fit to fulfil its 
mandate, and, in the normative sense, legitimacy is evidenced by the degree 
to which an institution is representative of the shared moral principles 
underpinning international politics. Or, as Buchanan him self phrases it:
To say that an institu tion  is leg itim a te  in the  no rm a tive  sense  is to assert that 
it has the righ t to ru le— w here  ru ling  inc ludes p rom u lga tin g  ru les and 
a ttem pting to secure  com p liance  w ith  them  by a ttach ing  costs to 
noncom pliance and /o r benefits  to com p liance . An ins titu tion  is leg itim ate  in 
the socio log ica l sense w hen it is w ide ly  b e lie ve d  to have the righ t to ru le .315
314 Keohane, ‘Contingent Legitimacy’, pp.3
315Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Governance 
Institutions’, Ethics & International Affairs, 20(4), December 2006, pp.405-437, pp.405
315 Sutch ‘Governing’
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Buchanan’s analysis of the UNSC leads to the conclusion that “its structural 
failures... have cost it normative legitimacy; and... everybody knows it thus 
robbing it of its sociological legitim acy”.316 If this is indeed the case, it calls 
into question whether adherence to Charter provisions which prevent 
unilateral HI can be considered morally edifying. Or, in other words, absent 
the requisite normative legitimacy to paper over the cracks generated by 
inefficacy, it is unclear why the UNSC ought to maintain its rarefied status. As 
Hurrell considers,
W hy should we set sto re  by in te rna tiona l in s titu tions  such as the United 
Nations w hen those  ins titu tions  are c lea rly  incapab le  o f acting  dec is ive ly  and 
fo rce fu lly  aga inst cha llenges both to  the secu rity  o f ind iv idua l s ta tes and to 
the broader security  in te res ts  o f in te rna tiona l soc ie ty  as a w h o le ? 317
Instead, Buchanan argues, that theorists and practitioners of IR should 
embrace the potential for becoming represented by a system which extends 
the power and influence of liberal democracies. A fter all,
If there is a m inority  o f s ta tes tha t are both m ore  ze a lous  in p ro tec ting  hum an 
rights and also so pow erfu l tha t they  can exe rt a d isp ro p o rtio n a te  in fluence  in 
the world, then increasing  the scope o f s ta te  m a jo rita rian ism  m ay ac tua lly  be 
a setback fo r hum an righ ts .318
At this juncture, the lim itations which Buchanan places on his own theorising 
bear repeating. It is his claim that all aspects o f his theory, including the 
circumvention of the UNSC, are defensible simply by means o f the principle of 
institutional moral reasoning. That is to say, that his prescriptions for reform
316 Ibid
317 Andrew Hurrell, ‘Legitimacy and the Use of Force: Can the Circle be Squared?’, Review of 
International Studies, 31, 2005, pp.15-32, pp.17?1ft Buchanan, Justice, p.318-319
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are simply a means to institutionalise the values which are already broadly 
agreed upon across international society. In this respect, he argues that the 
normative consensus over the content o f HR is sufficient to justify 
modifications to both PIL and the state system which it seeks to regulate. 
Buchanan frames this argument in terms of his conception of “ illegal legal 
reform” .319
(b) Illegal Legal Reform
Buchanan does not deny that abandoning the requirem ent of state consent is
at odds with the current constraints o f PIL. However, neither does he consider
the credibility of his viewpoint to be contingent upon its legality. Again, his
argument is beguilingly simple: HI is morally justified in extreme cases and
this consideration trumps any concerns over its legal status. If PIL does not
permit HI, then it is the law which must be altered not the commitment to
defending HR. However, such modifications must be approached and
implemented in a very specific manner. This is because Buchanan asserts
that any challenge to PIL must be mounted in a self-consciously precedential
and morally consistent fashion. The law should not be broken on an ad hoc
basis, since this invites abuse and self-interested manipulation. Instead those
wishing to reform international society so that it m ight more effectively
represent the moral values which should be at its core must engage in a
campaign of ‘illegal, legal reform ’, whereby acts o f HI which are forbidden by
current legal standards, (or crucially, the institutions which might bring these
acts to fruition), are justified as an attempt to challenge and improve upon the
319 Allen Buchanan, ‘Reforming the International Law of Intervention’, J.L.Holzgrefe and 
Robert O. Keohane (eds), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 132
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legal status quo. This process is not confined to breaking the terms of an 
existing rule but also to doing so in such a way as to increase the likelihood 
that an alternative, more morally defensible, standard will emerge in its place. 
At its heart this could be perceived as a cosm opolitan constructivist principle, 
premised on an acknowledgement o f the ability o f emerging political norms to 
displace or challenge outmoded legal norms and, in Buchanan’s view, when 
combined with the strengths of institutional moral reasoning, it is the key to 
becoming in international society. Equally, however, if implemented 
irresponsibly, illegal acts have the potential to undercut moral progress in the 
society of states320 and it is in on this basis that Buchanan brings to bear 
restrictions on the ‘illegal’ institutional developm ents which he deems so 
integral to “the development of a new morally progressive rule o f international 
law according to which humanitarian intervention w ithout Security Council 
authorisation is sometimes perm issible”.321
320 Significantly, in evaluating NATO’s intervention into Kosovo, Buchanan is critical of the 
failure of the organisation to signpost more clearly: its intentions, the nature of its mandate, 
and its belief that its actions were legitimated by the democratic credentials of its constituent 
members. In his opinion, the failure to do so ensured that the action could boast no valuable 
precedent-setting potential, since the acceptance that humanitarian intervention spearheaded 
by a regional defence organisation, which had not based its actions on its democratic 
accountability, could have engineered a situation in which the new norm provided justification 
for the following scenario:“[s]uppose that China and Pakistan formed a regional security 
alliance and then appealed to the new norm of customary law whose creation NATO’s 
intervention was supposed to initiate to justify intervening in Kashmir to stop Hindus from 
violating Muslim rights in the part of the region controlled by lndia”320(Holzgrefe and Keohane, 
2007,p.166).
As such, the Kosovo intervention has been treated, almost universally, both by the 
participants in it and the detractors of it, as anomalous, with only very limited relevance to 
future acts of, or approaches to, humanitarian intervention. Of course, Buchanan overlooks 
the fact that this may well have been a deliberate device on the part of the intervening forces, 
who, themselves, may not wish to be committed to act in all instances which may prove 
reminiscent of the Kosovo intervention. Precedent-setting which results in the 
institutionalisation of a new norm may compel those who establish the new rule to abide by it, 
even when their national interest dictates otherwise. The members of NATO would not have 
been blind to this possibility.
321 Buchanan, Justice, p.318-319
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(c) Arguing for a ‘League of D em ocracies’
Buchanan’s institutional solution to the quandaries which surround both 
agency in HI and international justice more generally is the establishment of a 
League of Democracies. In fram ing a defence for such an organisation he 
rejects two key pluralist premises. The first is the notion that insufficient 
consensus surrounding the content o f HR ensures that the pursuit of order, 
rather than the dissemination of justice, must be the principal function of 
international society. In asserting that, “t]he expanding global culture of 
human rights, which is imperfectly institutionalised in international law, gives 
reason to hope that a shared core conception of justice may emerge, if it does 
not already exist” ,322 Buchanan suggests that pluralists underestimate the 
extent to which a relatively broad range of HR standards have been embraced 
across the majority of political communities. Equally, in arguing against the 
principle of state majoritarianism, Buchanan is effectively claim ing that those 
states which continue to oppose, or defy, these ‘em bedded’ humanitarian 
norms, should not be in a position to unduly influence the international political 
process. In the context of HI, these dual assertions lead Buchanan to argue 
for the establishment of a rule-governed coalition of dem ocratic states which 
could regulate the use of force in international society. He envisages that this 
League of Democracies might represent an institutional com plim ent to the 
UN; conceiving of it as an organisation which could take action in cases of 
UNSC deadlock. In other words, the League of Dem ocracies would be 
designed not to “supplant”323 but to “supplem ent”324 the UNSC. Neither would
Ibid, p.309
323 John McCain, ‘An Enduring Peace built on Freedom: Securing America’s Future’, Foreign
Affairs, (November/December 2007),
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the organisation be subject to the procedural and practical shortcomings 
which have hampered its institutional predecessor. Unlike the UNSC, the 
League of Democracies would not reflect the balance of power as it existed in 
1945; neither would it extend to any of its members the right of veto, a 
restriction which would help to avoid the paralysis for which the UN system is 
so notorious.
Perhaps surprisingly, Buchanan’s argum ent is not as radical as it may first 
appear, at least in the sense that suggestions of this nature have secured a 
large degree of cross-party support in the US. During the 2008 Presidential 
election campaign both Barack Obama and John McCain indicated that they 
would take under advisement any foreign policy fram ework with a League of 
Democracies at its crux. In fact, as journalist Jonathan Rauch commented 
“Rarely...have liberal idealism and neoconservative realism converged so 
completely” .325 This reflects the belief that thorough-going reform to the UNSC 
is as necessary as it is unlikely and that, consequently, continuing to defer to 
it, especially in the face of humanitarian disaster, is no longer defensible. In 
fact, the influence of Buchanan’s theorising became apparent when the 
Princeton Project issued the report Forging a World o f L iberty Under Law, in 
which his proposal was reiterated:
While pushing for reform of the United Nations and other major global 
institutions, the United States should work with its friends and allies to 
develop a global ‘Concert of Democracies’. The Concert would institutionalise
httD://www.foreiqnaffairs.orQ/20071101 faessav86602/iohn-mccain/an-endurinq-peace-built- 
on-freedom.html. [21/07/08], pp.4
Keohane, ‘Contingent Legitimacy’, pp.20
325 (Cited) Charles A. Kupchan, ‘Minor League, Major Problems’, Foreign Affairs [online], 
(November-December 2008), http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20081001 faessay87607- 
p40/charles-a-kupchan/minor-leaque-maior-problems.html
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and ratify the ‘dem ocra tic  pea ce ’. If the  U nited N a tions  canno t be reform ed, 
the C oncert w ould p rov ide  an a lte rna tive  fo rum  fo r libera l dem ocrac ies  to 
authorise  co llective  action , inc lud ing  the use o f fo rce , by a supe rm a jo rity  vote. 
Its m em bersh ip  w ou ld  be se lective , but se lf-se lec ted . M em bers  w ou ld  have to 
pledge not to use or plan to use fo rce  a g a in s t one  ano the r; com m it to ho ld ing 
m ultiparty, free -and -fa ir e lec tions at re gu la r in te rva ls ; gua ran te e  civil and 
political rights fo r the ir c itizens en fo rceab le  by an in depe nden t jud ic ia ry ; and 
accept the respons ib ility  to p ro te c t.326
(d) Membership of the League of Dem ocracies
Advocates of the League of Democracies, including Buchanan himself, are 
quick to point out that the criteria for m em bership would not be limited to a 
western conception of democratic values. Instead,
t]he ch ie f criterion fo r adm iss ion  to the  in te rven tion  reg im e w ou ld  be having a 
decent record on hum an righ ts and hav ing  a g o ve rn m e n t tha t m eets the 
rather m inim al crite ria  fo r d e m o cra cy .327
Elsewhere, Buchanan defines these criteria as those present in states “with 
constitutional, representative governments, com petition for elected positions 
through reasonably fair elections, and entrenched basic civil and political 
rights”.328 This is a conscious attem pt to ensure an eclectic membership, 
sufficiently broad in scope to counter charges of ethnocentrism . In effect, the 
concern that the League of Democracies would prove to be insufficiently 
inclusive, is countered by the assertion that its establishm ent should not “[b]e 
understood as necessarily amounting to a proposal fo r the globalisation of
326 G. John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Final Report of the Princeton Project on 
National Security’, 12th September 2006, pp.1-91,The Princeton Papers, pp.7
327 Buchanan, Justice, p.452
328 Allen Buchanan and Robert O’ Keohane, The Preventive Use of Force: A Cosmopolitan 
Institutional Proposal’, [Reprinted from] Ethics & International Affairs, 18(1), 2004, pp1-22, 
pp.18
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Western-style liberal democracy, but rather representative democracy able to 
provide for a diversity of global cultures” .329
For those detractors who might remain concerned that this looser definition of 
democracy will not be enough to ensure that the coalition does not represent 
a retrograde step in terms of inclusion (for example, those post-colonial 
commentators concerned over the insidious reintroduction of the standard of 
“a certain degree of civilisation”330 which for so long defined the Western 
approach to PIL) Buchanan argues that “the most valuable sort of 
inclusiveness”331 has been achieved not through the state majoritarianism 
which characterises the UN but through non-state actors such as non­
governmental organisations, many o f which operate, principally, with the 
support and protection of rights-respecting states. This is linked to his 
suggestion that for as long as so many states fail to represent the interests of 
their citizens, state majoritarianism boasts no moral value in and of itself. 
Therefore, whilst the proposed League of Dem ocracies would certainly 
exclude “non-democratic states... it does not follow that it would be a threat to 
the sort of inclusiveness that is to be va lued” .332 As Justin Morris affirms, the 
exclusion of non-democratic states is simply a reflection of the fact that:
[tjhe p rinc ip les and ob jec tives  now  ensh rined  w ith in  the United Nations 
cannot be sacrificed on the a lta r o f fo rm a l rep resen ta tion  by sta tes which 
them selves fail to live up to them . R ep resen ta tion  m ust be a substantive , 
dem ocra tic  reality, not m ere ly  a sove re ign  fo rm a lity  and, in  extrem is, th is  m ay
329 Justin Morris, ‘UN Security Council Reform: A Counsel for the 21st Century’, Security 
Dialogue, 31(3), pp.265-277, pp.268
330 James Crawford, The Creation o f States in International Law, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1979), p.72
Buchanan, Justice, p.454
332 Ibid
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require the m arg ina lisa tion  o f certa in  s ta tes  and a recogn ition  o f the need to 
sacrifice in tersta te  consensu s  in fa vo u r o f h ighe r po litica l g o a ls .333
Thus, it may be incorrect to assume that the form ation of a League of 
Democracies “would mark a return to a pernicious exclusivity in international 
law”.334
(e) Governing the League of Dem ocracies: ex ante and ex post 
Accountability Mechanisms
If Buchanan’s defence of the m embership criteria for any proposed League of 
Democracies is designed to assuage concerns over unjustifiable exclusivity, 
the accountability mechanisms which he builds into the fram ework of the 
coalition take aim at a number of other concerns surrounding the discourse of 
HI, absent UNSC authorisation. In a recent article, he outlines both ex ante 
and ex post strategies for constraining the actions of the League of 
Democracies. In his conception, the ex ante accountability requirem ent would 
demand that all reasonable measures short o f force be considered before HI 
could be authorised. Moreover, those arguing in favour o f HI would also be 
expected to acknowledge that their actions would have “precedential value for 
future decisions”;335 an indication of Buchanan’s constructiv ist insistence on 
the need for a rule-governed fram ework to im plem ent his systematic 
conception of HR. According to Buchanan the impact o f this consideration on 
the decision-making processes of potential interveners ought to be far- 
reaching, since even the most powerful states would be reluctant to risk the 
emergence of norms or the institutionalisation of practices which might be
333 Morris, UNSC Reform, pp.275
Buchanan, Justice, p.454
335 Ibid
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used against them in the future, or may at some point compel them to act in 
defiance of their national interest.336
Ex post accountability would complem ent these requirements by demanding 
that, after the conclusion of hostilities, the intervening agent would have to 
submit a detailed report to an impartial commission appointed by the League 
of Democracies, or even by the UNSC. The purpose of this exercise would be 
to evaluate the intervention in terms of two questions:
■ W as the in form ation ga ined ex p o s t abou t the  risk -im pos ing  ac tions  o f the 
target consistent w ith the  s ta tem en ts  m ade by the  s ta tes  p ropos ing  action  ex 
ante?
■ W ere the m ilita ry actions o f the  a ttack ing  s ta tes  co n s is te n t w ith  the ir 
assurances ex ante  tha t the ir ac tions  w ou ld  be p ropo rtion a l to  the  ob jec tives  
being a tta ined?337
Taken together, this requires the interveners to dem onstrate that their actions 
fulfilled the JW criteria of necessity and proportionality and that HI was 
conducted in line with the principle o f non-com batant immunity. Furthermore, 
intervening forces would have to prove that their overwhelm ing motivation to 
breach the territorial integrity of a target state was one of humanitarian 
concern, as against an attempt to secure econom ic or strategic advantage, or 
to undermine the authority of one of more rivals in the target region. Thus, it is 
hoped that the effective institutionalisation o f JW  principles, allied to the 
implementation of cosmopolitan accountability mechanisms, would ensure
336 Ibid
337 Buchanan and Keohane, ‘Preventive’, pp. 13
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that HI would be subject to an exacting standard of legitimacy, which would 
include a certain degree of purity of motivation.
Assessing the extent to which the stated intentions of intervention can be 
reconciled with events on the ground would necessitate comprehensive 
provision for “the sharing o f information"338 to properly incentivise intervening 
states not to abuse their position. Equally, those states engaged in 
unnecessary or self-serving acts of HI would have to see their actions roundly 
punished. Buchanan contends that:
[w jithou t sanctions, rules fo r the regu la tion  o f th e ... use o f fo rce  would a lm ost 
certa in ly be ineffective. U n less the re  are sanctions  fo r v io la tions  o f the 
requirem ent to share in form ation, som e sta tes w ill m isrep resen t the  facts, 
exaggerating the probab ility  o f the harm  tha t they  propose to prevent. Unless 
there are sanctions aga inst those  w ho use excess ive  force, s ta tes are likely to 
d iscount the harm  the ir fo rce fu l ac tions w ill in flic t on others. W ithout 
sanctions, the institu tion  w ill be ine ffe c tive .339
The sanctions themselves would be defined and issued by the impartial 
commission assigned with judging the validity of the intervention. If this body 
were to find in favour of the intervening states, they would be deemed to have 
“performed a public service for the w orld”340 by responding promptly and 
responsibly to a grave threat to humanity. As such, the financial and logistical 
burden of rebuilding the target state would fall to those who had acted as 
“free-riders”341 by refusing to participate in a morally justified act of military 
incursion. However, in the event that HI was deemed to have been without
338 Buchanan and Keohane, Preventive’, pp.12 (emphasis in original)
339 Ibid
340 Ibid
341 Ibid, pp.14
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merit, those who had championed it would be held to account. Specifically, 
“[t]hey would be required... to provide full financial support for operations that 
restore the country’s infrastructure and enable it to govern itself e ffectively” .342
The fact that the sanctions regime would apply to states which attempt to 
block an intervention, which is subsequently vindicated, acts as a disincentive 
for political practices which are equivalent to the capricious use of the veto 
within the current framework of the UNSC. Equally, the insistence that 
erroneous HI result in punishment for the attacking forces guards against the 
indiscriminate targeting of non-combatants and ensures that, in the case of 
unjustified HI “the intervening parties would not be allowed to control the 
political situation in the conquered country, or to determ ine the allocation of 
aid or the awarding of contracts to firms offering services for the 
reconstruction effort”.343
On the face of it, then, Buchanan’s framework for the League o f Dem ocracies 
appears to provide a solution to the broad and diverse range o f problems 
associated with HI. Not only does it offer a means by which to underm ine the 
ability of tyrannical or unrepresentative states to overturn the will o f the rest of 
international society but it is also responsive to concerns over: predation; 
abuse; the disproportionate use of force; exploitation or neglect in term s of 
reconstruction; and inaction among states which do not believe HI, however 
morally compelling, to be in their national interest. Equally, the ex ante and ex 
post accountability mechanisms which would govern the proposed League of
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Democracies reflect Buchanan’s understanding of the manner in which norms 
become embedded in international society, inasmuch as they emphasise the 
potentially precedential nature of decision-m aking in international politics. 
Although, in the first instance, some degree of coercion and management 
would be necessary to ensure that the rule-governed fram ework were 
respected, eventually the normative standards which give meaning to the 
rules may themselves be embraced by global political actors. In other words, 
Buchanan’s argument for a League of Dem ocracies is based on his w ider 
conception of becoming in international society. Finally, his defence for the 
League of Democracies apparently achieves all o f this through adherence to 
one simple constructivist principle; institutional moral reasoning. For 
Buchanan, the establishment of the League of Dem ocracies is entirely 
consistent with the values which underpin PIL and the normative purposes of 
international society, and he maintains that suffic iently extensive consensus 
exists in support o f these principles to justify breaching PIL in the name of 
their implementation.
Nil. The Limitations of B uchanan’s Position
i. The Practical Limitations of a ‘League of D em ocracies’: Charles A. 
Kupchan’s Critique
In reality, the League of Dem ocracies is far from the panacea which it may 
initially appear to represent. First among a range of lim itations impacting upon 
the proposal is its inherently divisive nature, which, according to Charles A.
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Kupchan, institutionalises cooperation where it a lready exists and precludes it 
where it is most needed. In his own words
Such a club is not needed to secure cooperation among liberal democracies - 
they are already regular partners - and it would draw new lines between 
democracies and non-democracies.344
Kupchan contends that not only would this likely result in the “re-emergence 
of great power antagonism”345 as states such as China and Russia react 
angrily to their diplomatic and political exclusion, but the creation of an 
exclusively democratic organisation would also draw attention to the inefficacy 
of these supposedly legitimate and representative regimes and highlight their 
own tendencies toward indecision and disagreement. In fact, in the absence 
of the convenient scapegoat of “Chinese or Russian intransigence”346, to act 
as a veil for western inaction the “league would expose the lim its o f the West's 
power and appeal, revealing the constraints on solidarity among democracies, 
eroding the legitimacy of the West, and arresting the global spread of 
democracy”.347
This issue might prove particularly problem atic if, as he suggested in his initial 
proposal for a League of Democracies, Buchanan intends to exclude the US 
from the organisation.
344 Charles A. Kupchan, ‘Minor League, Major Problems: The Case Against a League of 
Democracies’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2008,
http://www.foreiqnaffairs.orq/20081001faessav87607-p40/charles-a-kupchan/minor-league2
maior-problems. html
Robert Kagan, The Return o f H istory and the End o f Dreams, (London, Atlantic Books, 
2008), p.97
Kupchan, ‘Minor League’
347 Ibid
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There is much to be said for minimising the US role or even excluding it from 
participating, both from the standpoint of constraining the world’s one 
superpower and in terms of the perceived legitimacy of the coalition. Given 
that the United States is widely regarded -  and not without reason -  as an 
international scoff-law, the issue of perceived legitimacy ought to be taken 
seriously.348
From a practical perspective, this is undoubtedly a limitation of Buchanan’s 
proposal since it seems highly unlikely that the US would countenance the 
establishment of a global institution in which it would play no part and equally 
implausible that, w ithout the financial contribution o f three of the P5, a fledging 
organisation of this nature would be able to commit to interventionary projects 
of the sort he envisages.
Perhaps this accounts for the fact that, having originally suggested that 
“[tjhose who wish to produce a more just international legal order must be 
willing to do so not only w ithout the support o f the United States, but also in 
the face of its active opposition” ,349 Buchanan has subsequently reconsidered 
his views on US participation in a League of Democracies and in his recent 
articles has accepted the inevitability o f some degree of US involvement. 
Given the extent of residual anti-American sentiment which persists following, 
among other things, the 2003 invasion o f Iraq, this acquiescence has hardly 
strengthened his position. In fact, relaxing his initial restriction ushers in 
further complications since the US, like so many other powerful democracies, 
is embroiled in a number of complex and co-dependent relationships with a 
broad range of political communities. For example,
348 Buchanan, Justice, p.452
349 Ibid
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[a]s long as the United S ta tes has troops  in Iraq and an econom y dependen t 
on oil from  the Persian Gulf, it w ill m a in ta in  s trong  tie s  w ith  Bahra in, Q atar, 
and the United A rab  E m ira tes - som e  o f the  m ost illibe ra l coun tries  on the 
p lanet.350
Considerations such as these call into question the effectiveness of a League 
of Democracies. However, Kupchan’s critique goes further, contradicting 
Buchanan’s belief that a League of Democracies would boast more legitimacy 
than a majoritarian alternative. Re-establishing the relationship between 
multilateralism and representation, he poses the question:
If dem ocrac ies are leg itim ate  because  they  re p re se n t the  w ill o f the ir citizens, 
could a g lobal body tha t spoke  fo r less than  ha lf the  w o rld 's  popu la tion  and 
represented less than one-th ird  o f the  w o rld 's  na tions  e ve r be cons idered  
leg itim ate? Should C h ina 's  1.3 b illion c itizens  be d o u b ly  d isen franch ised  - no 
voice abroad as well as no dem ocracy  a t h o m e ? 351
This also relates to the communitarian assertion, echoed through certain
elements of the feminist critique, that it is m isguided to believe that a liberal
conception of politics and morality is sufficiently universal to represent the
interests of those in non-democratic societies, any more effectively than their
own local, illiberal regime. Although there may be som e circumstances in
which a government is so profoundly abusive or negligent that its failures bear
out this assumption, this blind faith in liberalism requires further investigation.
The final of Kupchan’s reservations is both a practical and a theoretical issue. 
Noting, and roundly criticising, the tone of d isproportionate liberal enthusiasm 
at the heart o f the campaign for a league which m ight bring about increased 
activism and a renewed determ ination to dissem inate democratic values,
350 Kupchan, ‘Minor League’
351 Ibid
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Kupchan warns against perceiving international politics as a realm in which 
certain of these values have already secured w idespread acceptance.
Such optim ism  is p red ica ted on the  b e lie f tha t the  w orld  is now  at a w ay 
station on the road to dem ocracy ; th a t the  W e s t p rov ides the so le  v iab le  
m odel o f deve lopm ent fo r na tions a round  the  w orld ; th a t C h ina, R ussia, and 
the ir k indred sp irits are the last ho ldou ts  but are soon  to  jo in  the  m arch o f 
h istory; and tha t the league is m ean t to  he lp  them  co m p le te  the ir transition . 
But the world is fa r from  arriv ing  at such a h is to rica l endpo in t; it is heading 
tow ard continued d ivers ity , not g re a te r h o m o g e n e ity .352
Declarations concerning the inevitable trium ph of liberal ideals and the end of 
history,353 assumptions already belied in the period fo llow ing the end of the 
Cold War, are not necessarily anymore persuasive at this juncture than they 
proved to be in the early 1990s and if, as Kupchan argues, they can be 
discredited, so can the basis for a League of Dem ocracies as the arbiter and 
manager of the use of force among and between states.
ii. The Theoretical Limitations of the League of Democracies: 
Institutional Moral Reasoning and Liberal Cosm opolitanism
It is this latter criticism which is the most damning to Buchanan’s case not 
only for the League of Democracies but also for the principle of institutional 
moral reasoning. For Buchanan, the normative legitim acy of the League of 
Democracies derives from the fact that it represents a com m itm ent to HR; the 
same commitment which informs the “moral foundation”354 of the UN 
framework. The sociological legitimacy o f the coalition is the consequence of
352 Kupchan, ‘Minor League’
353 See Francis Fukuyama, The End o f H istory and the Last Man, (New York, The Free Press, 
1992)
354 Sutch ‘Governing’
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its ability to fulfil the associated HR-based mandate in a more effective 
manner than the UN. If the agenda of a League o f Dem ocracies would indeed 
tally with the stated purposes of the UN then its establishm ent would be in 
keeping with the principle of institutional moral reasoning; the deliberate and 
precedential establishment of institutions, aptly reflecting the values which 
give meaning to international society. In this conception, becoming would 
simply be a matter of increasing the ‘fit’ between values and institutions.
However, Buchanan’s argument is irrevocably underm ined if, as his critics 
claim, he has fundamentally m isunderstood the relationship between HR and 
states’ rights. After all,
[o]ne o f the princ ipa l reasons tha t re fo rm s a im ed  a t in s titu tiona lis ing  the 
in ternational p ro tection  o f hum an righ ts  have  been so lim ited  is because 
m any sta tes are re luc tan t to a cknow led ge  th a t hum an  righ ts  no rm s shou ld  be 
considered g rounds fo r ove r-rid ing  those  norm s a lre a d y  em bedde d  in pub lic  
in ternational law  tha t p ro tec t sove re ign  se lf-d e te rm in a tio n  th rough  the 
princip le o f non -in te rve n tion .355
This is indicative of the fact that the moral prim acy o f ind iv idua l HR is not as 
firmly established or as universally accepted as Buchanan w ishes to suggest. 
In fact, there are many cultures, not all o f which are irredeem ably totalitarian 
or abusive, wherein states’ rights are considered to be of instrumental 
importance in the protection of HR. Furthermore, as Jackson contends and as 
many theorists within the English School have ultim ately come to accept, the 
transition from ‘socie tas’ to ‘un ivers itas ’ is one which has taken place, 
predominately, in the minds o f scholars and despite the influence of 
globalisation, the state remains (both in practical and moral terms) the
355 Ibid
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organisational and procedural hub of IR;356 not to mention the most effective 
mechanism for the implementation of HR standards. As Friedrich Kratochwil 
argues:
[T ]he role o f the  sta te as gua ra n to r o f righ ts  is m ore  im p o rta n t than ever 
before. It is not the sta te p e r se  tha t has lost its ra tiona le , ra th e r its func tions  
have been d ram atica lly  changed by the  d e ve lo p m e n ts  th a t w e  lum p toge the r 
under the head ing o f g lo b a lisa tio n ... [F u rth e rm o re ]... the  norm  o f se lf- 
de te rm ina tion  has served as a pow erfu l too l fo r g ro u p s  w h ich  seek to  assert 
the ir independence in o rde r to p rese rve  th e ir  iden tity . T o  th a t e x ten t w e had 
better rem em ber tha t the  state as a po litica l c o m m u n ity  is a lso  a m em bersh ip  
organ isa tion  and the issue o f be long ing  a d d re sse s  m ore  than  som e irra tiona l 
needs.357
As of yet, there is little or no indication that the relationship between NS and 
humanitarianism, or the associated debate between interventionists and non­
interventionists, has been resolved in favour of a liberal conception of HR. 
Hence, Hedley Bull’s conclusion that any suggestion that international society 
is progressing toward a world society, in which individuals take precedence 
over states is, at best, “premature” .358 As such, the ‘moral foundation ’ of the 
UN is premised as much on a com m itm ent to NS and territoria l integrity, as it 
is to HR.
So it is that in rejecting any sense in which the political independence of 
individual state entities boasts its own moral value, Buchanan underm ines his 
own claim that institutional moral reasoning seeks only to systematise the 
existing moral principles which give meaning to the UN fram ework. Absent
356 See Jackson, Global Covenant
357 ‘Politics, Norms and Peaceful Change’ Review of International Studies, 24(5) 1998, 
pp. 195-216, pp.214-215
8 Sutch ‘Governing’
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such an argument, his theory collapses into a fam iliar form of 
cosmopolitanism; an advocacy project which calls for a deliberate, 
coordinated, expansion of the normative agenda designed to increase both 
the scope and depth of a liberal conception of HR in international society. Far 
from seeking more effectively to institutionalise existing consensus this 
amounts to an increased and increasing comm itm ent to a broad range of HR 
and an assumption of the inherent superiority of liberal theory and practice. In 
essence, once the incoherence of institutional moral reasoning is exposed, 
Buchanan is forced to reassess his original claims. He must then
make the separate a rgum ent tha t all bas ic  accoun ts  o f hum an rights are as 
robust or dem anding as his K antian  cosm opo litan  w h ich  is a) dem onstrab ly 
false and b) brings the natura l du ty  o f ju s tice  a rgum en t in to  a centra l position 
in his thesis -  which is w hat he w an ts  to  a vo id .359
In failing to make his case w ithout relying on cosmopolitan first principles, 
Buchanan also fails to honour the terms of his own demands for feasibility and 
accessibility, and ultimately undermines the claim that his theory is palatable 
to advocates of any viable ethical perspective. This failure represents a 
significant blow to Buchanan’s theory and limits the role which it might usefully 
play in the establishment o f universalisable standards of international justice. 
After all,
[i]t is not enough s im ply to lay ou t a v iew  o r a v is ion  o f w here  we th ink the 
world ought to be heading, how eve r soph is tica ted  and w e ll-a rgued it m ay be 
and however a ttractive  it is to  us and those  like us. R ather, the  task is to th ink 
very hard about the cond itions unde r w h ich  m oral p rinc ip les and moral ideas
359 Ibid
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can be m eaningfu lly and pe rsuas ive ly  de fended , jus tified , and critic ised within
global society as a w ho le .360
It is possible that a comprehensive engagem ent with the foundations of ethics 
in which Buchanan submits his advocacy o f the moral equality o f persons to 
comprehensive critique (including a form of gender-analysis which submits 
supposedly ‘universal’ liberal standards to critical scrutiny) might allow him to 
bridge some of the gaps in his theorising. However, in the absence of this 
theoretical foundation, it would appear that his radical agenda for reform is 
likely either to be rejected outright by powerful state actors, or to be 
implemented in opposition to these actors; thereby creating conflictual 
conditions which may prove more damaging than the status quo.
V. Conclusion
Buchanan’s understanding of becoming and international justice depends for 
its success on the ability of the HR discourse to displace the defence of NS, 
self-determination, and non-intervention on which the UN is based. However, 
even a superficial engagement with the legal and political status of HR 
demonstrates that they are yet to do so. For example the evolution of the 
R2P, characterised by many liberals as proof of the emergence of the 
conditional sovereignty norm, appears considerably weaker and less 
normatively demanding in its institutionalised form than many cosmopolitans 
are inclined to suggest. This project asserts that the R2P is the element of 
international legal doctrine which is most explicitly concerned with the 
relationship between HR and states’ rights. The current incarnation of this 
doctrine is ultimately based on the omission o f some of the most radical
360 Hurrell, Global Order, p. 12
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elements of the ICISS and the distillation of its findings into an agreement 
which continues to defend NS and state majoritarianism in almost all cases, 
and to reject unilateral alternatives to UNSC authorisation. With this in mind, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to defend Buchanan’s position that the morally 
prior status of HR is already enshrined in PIL. Rather, this assertion begins to 
take on the hallmarks of fam iliar universalist claims concerning the moral 
superiority of liberalism. Such a viewpoint is likely to elicit suspicion and 
derision from a number of political communities beyond the West and a range 
of IR theorists beyond the liberal tradition.
To argue, as Buchanan attempts to, that the natural duty of justice is reflected 
in the moral foundation of the UN is analogous to the suggestion that when 
the framers of the US constitution established the legal principles which would 
govern an independent America they intended for the expression “all men are 
created equal” to apply as much to black men and to women as to the white 
male elite to which they belonged. This is historically untenable and easily 
falsifiable and, as such, to base any appeal to equality on this suggestion is 
far from persuasive. What is more compelling is the assertion that a right, 
once conceived in narrow terms, has slowly, imperfectly, and inconsistently 
come to incorporate a much broader raft of individuals than its authors may 
have imagined. This is due to the passage of time, the sacrifices of 
individuals, the tireless campaigns o f activists and interest groups, and the 
gradual settling of the norms associated with gender and racial equality. 
Precisely because these developments have taken place at a systemic level 
and have faced barriers built into a system designed to further the interests of 
white males, those championing the rights of women and minorities would
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argue that their task is far from complete but they have, nevertheless, served 
to transform the system from within.
Equally, it is simply inaccurate to argue that the framers of the UN Charter 
always intended for the interests o f individuals to take priority over those of 
states. If anything they “assumed that there was no necessary conflict 
between principles of sovereignty and non-intervention and respect for 
universal human rights” .361 They were concerned, principally, with securing 
order and peace between states and avoiding the outbreak of any further 
conflict in Europe or beyond. Of course they took account of HR and 
committed themselves to the ‘never-again’ pledge to respond to genocidal 
violence but they seemed to believe that avoiding war by respecting NS was 
the most effective way in which to afford these protections. To affirm that this 
account of HR bears anything more than a passing resemblance to the full 
blown Kantian cosmopolitan fram ework of individual rights is inconceivable. 
Just as interpretations o f the US Constitution have consciously widened its 
scope, so various readings of the UN Charter and the development of HR 
norms have placed increased emphasis on the rights of those within state 
boundaries, and those failed by the apparatus of their own state. Perhaps, 
eventually, these incremental normative developments will create sustainable 
conditions for change. In fact, the belief in this possibility is the cornerstone of 
the constructivist conception of becoming. In the meantime, the normative 
balance at work in international society is precarious and any attempt 
artificially to weight it in favour of individual rights or the moral superiority of
361 Nicholas J. Wheeler and Timothy Dunne, Human Rights in Global Politics, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.1
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liberal democracy, carries with it significant risks both to international order 
and to the discourse of HR as it is currently framed. It is for this reason that 
Buchanan’s rejection of casuistical analysis, in favour of a determination to 
enshrine inflexible moral principles in a rule-governed institutional structure, is 
not sustainable. Normative shifts occur by increments and on a case-by-case 
basis and attempts to manipulate this process are likely to prove both 
dangerous and ineffective.
Despite Buchanan’s inherent m istrust o f state majoritarianism, the fact 
remains that “[wjithout the support from states as a whole, an ‘emerging norm’ 
can hardly ‘emerge’ and credibly be binding upon them ”.362 As such, any legal 
or moral development which threatens the predominance of the state consent 
model of PIL is rejected by huge swathes of international society. Moreover, 
accusations of ethnocentrism continue to plague those who argue that 
anything more comprehensive than the rights of life and liberty, narrowly 
determined, might be considered to garner consensus across political 
communities. In many cases, references to HR standards which appear in 
legal documents do so only as non-binding opinions from liberally-minded 
judges and the stateless remain virtually unrepresented in PIL. None of this 
suggests either that the UN was conceived as a system which would promote 
HR over states’ rights, or that it is rapidly developing into one.
In sum, as inadequate as the compromise and power politics of the UN may
be, this institution is still generally ‘perceived’ as more legitimate than a
League of Democracies which excludes more states than it embraces.
362 Carlo Focarelli, The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and Humanitarian Intervention: Too 
Many Ambiguities for a Working Doctrine’, Journal o f Conflict and Security Law, 13(2), 2008, 
pp.191-123, pp.193
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Despite the sophistication of some of his arguments and the inherent value of 
his attempts to synthesise legal, ethical, and political considerations, 
Buchanan’s proposal ultimately collapses into a cosmopolitan claim 
concerning the moral superiority of liberalism. By extension, his attempt to 
hybridise constructivism and cosmopolitanism  is ultimately an unsuccessful 
one.
To those who do not subscribe to liberal cosmopolitan principles Buchanan’s 
theory may appear to be little more than a rationalisation for extending the 
influence of powerful democracies. Associating HI with such a proposal is, 
therefore, potentially damaging to its credibility and provides further evidence 
for its critics of the neo-imperialist overtones o f institutionalising the R2P. 
Although no one can deny that the last sixty years have witnessed far- 
reaching change to the international system or that “ [t]here is a progressivist 
story to be told about the evolution o f international law” ,363 the particular 
manner in which Buchanan retells this story fails to take sufficient account of 
the continued and morally defensible influence of state consent in any 
account of becoming. Attempts to overturn this influence in the name of fragile 
and contested HR norms are likely to “do more harm than good and thus 
threaten those traits of a still imperfect system that it seems valid to maintain 
in the ultimate interest of the individual” .364
However, the contribution of Buchanan to this thesis ought not to be under­
estimated. After all, the standards of institutional and political feasibility which
363 David Armstrong, ‘Law Justice and the Idea of a World Society’, International Affairs,
75(3), July 1999, pp.547-561, pp.548
364 Peter Hilpold, ‘Humanitarian Intervention: Is there a Need for a Legal Reappraisal?’, 
European Journal o f International Law, 12(3), 2001, pp.437-467, pp467
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he establishes may well have proved illusive in his own arguments but they 
nonetheless serve as an invaluable addition to the analytical framework of this 
project by demonstrating the kinds of considerations which may need to limit 
the expansive category of becoming, if it is to function as a conceptual tool in 
an assessment of the current state system. This suggestion provides the 
basis for an investigation into Nicholas W heeler’s solidarist constructivist 
appreciation of becoming and international justice and its moral and 
procedural implications.
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Chapter Four: Nicholas Wheeler, Solidarist Constructivism and 
Humanitarian Intervention
I. Introduction
This chapter will appraise the developing theoretical lens adopted by Nicholas 
Wheeler. It seeks to situate his changing views on HI in the context of his 
broader understanding of international justice and to demonstrate the ways in 
which he interprets the ontology of becoming, in light of his solidarist 
constructivist approach to IR. In contrast to Michael Walzer whose approach 
to HI (as the forthcoming chapter will reveal) has grown more ambitious in 
recent years, Wheeler’s position is arguably more restrictive than a cursory 
engagement with his early work might suggest. This is because he embraces 
a procedural account of the limitations of international justice which attempts 
to balance a conviction that moral obligations cannot be contained by 
geographical boundaries, with an appreciation of the restrictions put in place 
by PIL.
Wheeler’s analysis of HI has proven to be extremely influential with his Saving 
Strangers providing a moral, political, and historical overview of the 
progression of this complex discourse and a detailed account of the 
development of the norms surrounding it. In this volume, Wheeler attempts to 
arrive at a means by which to assess whether a proposed act of HI is 
justifiable. In so doing, he stipulates four criteria, all of which have their basis 
in the JW tradition, and all of which must be met in order for military incursion 
to be endowed with the status of humanitarian. His claim runs as follows:
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First, there m ust be a ju s t cause, second ly , the  use o f fo rce m ust be a last 
resort; th ird ly, it m ust m ee t the requ irem en t o f p roportiona lity ; and finally, 
there m ust be a high p robab ility  tha t the  use o f fo rce  w ill ach ieve a positive 
hum anitarian ou tcom e .365
Although factors such as: purity of motives; a justification for intervention 
framed in humanitarian terms; and UNSC authorisation, are considered to 
afford increased moral weight to any military operation, they do not constitute 
what Wheeler refers to as “threshold requirem ents”366 and are therefore not 
considered to be non-negotiable imperatives. The assertion is that on those 
occasions which satisfy all four o f the core criteria, HI is not only justified as a 
response to systematic violations of HR but is also necessitated from the 
perspective of the enlightened self-interest o f states. In W heeler’s own words
[P jutting out the in ferno o f genoc ide  is in both the  nationa l and the global 
interest because fa ilu re  to do so risks c rea ting  a con tag ion  tha t w ill underm ine 
the value o f c ivilised so c ie ty .367
This indicates that the issue of HI resonates across all debates surrounding 
the nature and extent o f an international duty of justice. It also reflects 
Wheeler’s view that the failure to enforce a minimal raft o f basic, yet universal, 
HR is immoral and destabilising since it represents an unwillingness to defend 
humanity and preserve the standards within which all ‘c ivilised’ societies can 
reasonably be expected to operate. It is possible to contend that these 
standards are themselves enshrined in: the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights (1948), which “established a standard of civilised conduct which
365 Wheeler, Saving, p.13
366 Ibid, p.52
367 Ibid, p.303
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applies to all governments in the treatm ent o f their citizens” ;368 as well as the 
Genocide Convention (1950); the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1966); and the Covenant on Social, Econom ic and Cultural Rights (1966). 
However, W heeler’s understanding of international morality goes beyond 
these legalistic commitments and is in fact intrinsically connected to his views 
on what constitutes humanity. It is the (sometimes uneasy) relationship 
between his conception of the person and his deference to PIL which renders 
Wheeler’s approach to international justice so engaging, and gives rise to his 
unique perception of becoming in IR. This chapter contends that W heeler’s 
analysis has the potential to system atise some of the more ambitious 
prescriptions for reform in international society. However, it also explores the 
suggestion that the task of balancing solidarism and constructivism is 
conceptually illusive. The extensive com m onalities between the two 
approaches provide a compelling theoretical basis for attempting to 
amalgamate them. After all, Andrew Hurrell’s characterisation of the core 
elements of the solidarist project is virtually interchangeable with the principal 
tenets of a constructivist approach to international society. According to this 
overview
four d im ensions are e spec ia lly  im portan t: the  m ove to  institu tions and 
expansion o f g lobal ru le -m ak ing ; changes  in the  m aking , deve lopm ent, and 
justifica tion  o f in te rna tiona l law; the increas ing  e m phas is  p laced on the 
enforcem ent o f in te rna tiona l norm s and ru les; and a changed  understand ing
o g g
o f the state and o f sta te  sove re ign ty .
368 Wheeler and Dunne, Human Rights, p.1
369 Hurrell, Global Order, p.58
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However, despite the substantial overlap between this framework and the 
constructivist agenda, attempts form ally to hybridise the two positions 
continue to prove challenging. These difficulties result from the fact that when 
subjected to detailed analysis, the solidarist perspective often collapses either 
into a more pluralist outlook, or into a straightforward advocacy project of the 
type favoured by cosmopolitans. This thesis asserts that a consistent 
application of the constraints of feasibility dictated by the ontology of 
becoming might more effectively equip solidarist constructivism  with the 
means to manage this quandary.
II. The Theoretical Basis for Hum anitarian Intervention  
i. The Developing Norm of Hum anitarian Intervention
In defining: the occasions which might justify HI; the form which such actions 
ought to take; and the appropriate agent or agents, W heeler attempts to 
produce a hybridised theoretical methodology. This represents an attempt to 
combine a constructivist epistemology, which rejects the presupposition that 
territorial integrity is sacrosanct and national boundaries natural and 
immutable, with a solidarist conviction that the obligation incumbent upon 
state leaders to act in defence of their own citizens ought to incorporate 
intervention on behalf of “suffering hum anity”370 at large. W heeler’s account of 
the development of the norm of HI dem onstrates the manner in which it has 
risen to increasing prominence over the course of the last twenty years. 
Throughout Saving Strangers, he argues that, since the 1990s, international
370 Wheeler, Agency, p. 10
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society has been profoundly affected by an emerging norm of 
humanitarianism which is beginning to compel the UN and its constituent 
member states to prioritise HR and states’ rights equally. The 
institutionalisation of this norm is evidenced by the increasing acceptance of 
the concept of conditional sovereignty, and the drafting of the ICISS report, 
both of which indicate that the notion of individuals as subjects as well as 
objects of PIL is key to prescriptions for progress in international politics.
For constructivists, in general, the humanitarian obligations which derive from 
the suggestion that HR pose a challenge to the dominance of NS are the 
consequence of negotiation and socialisation. They need not necessarily 
reflect an a priori commitment to the moral equality o f persons which, by 
definition, predates the international com m unity’s reconceptualisation of NS. 
Instead, it is possible to argue that, before this ideational shift began to impact 
upon the ways in which states perceived their own national interest and the 
behaviour of their contemporaries, the ‘right to intervene’ had little or no 
normative purchase. Behaviours which appeared indicative of such a right, 
(including: the Indian invasion of Pakistan, in defence o f the East Bengali 
population; the Vietnamese action in Cambodia, which brought an end to Pol 
Pot’s reign of terror and led to the shutting down of the Killing Fields; and the 
overthrow of Idi Amin in Uganda, as a consequence o f a Tanzanian military 
campaign) were implausibly characterised as actions of self-defence, if for no 
other reason than the fact that during the 1970s the discourse of HI simply did 
not exist; or at least had not been embraced within international society. The 
expansion of the remit of the UNSC following the end of the Cold War and the
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reassessment of threat-perception which accompanied it, began slowly to 
introduce (or to reintroduce depending upon whether one accepts that HI had 
previously been advocated by Natural Law theorists such as Hugo Grotius) 
the concept that NS ought not to represent a “license to kill” .371 In the years 
since the first Gulf War, when enforcem ent actions under Chapter VII of the 
Charter were first cited as a justification for the invasion o f sovereign territory, 
the concept of HI (at least in its multilateral form) has developed slowly and 
imperfectly and has been incorporated into the shared understandings which 
govern international politics.
Wheeler counters claims that the em ergence of this discourse must inevitably 
usher in concerns over predation and abuse by asserting that the very 
normative framework which provides its force can be used to regulate its 
application. Language, in particular, is key to restraining unjustifiable 
intervention, hence W heeler’s endorsem ent o f Quentin Skinner’s contention 
that “the range of legitimating reasons that any actor can invoke is lim ited”372 
since the agent “cannot hope to stretch the application of the existing 
principles indefinitely” .373 That is to say, that “any course of action is inhibited 
from occurring if it cannot be legitim ated”374 and state leaders risk “being 
exposed as hypocrites” if their actions are not “plausibly compatible with the... 
values” they profess.375 This constructivist appreciation of the ways in which 
the language of justification can ultim ately develop a ‘life o f its own’,
371 Baylis and Smith (eds), Globalisation o f World Politics, p.471
372 Ibid, p.471
373 Quentin Skinner, ‘Analysis of Political Thought and Action’, James Tully (ed), Meaning and 
Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1988), p.117
374 Ibid
375 Welsh (ed), From Right to Responsibility, p.32
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demonstrates that the relationship between language and normative 
development is integral to the processes of becoming in IR. In the arena of HI, 
this effectively ensures that the language employed by intervening agents is 
vital since, if a state claims that its actions are based on humanitarian 
imperatives and yet its subsequent behaviour belies this assertion, such a 
state will be subject to public opprobrium  and social disapproval, which will 
compromise its standing within international society. As Skinner himself 
asserted, once any political actor embraces the linguistic constraints of a 
humanitarian endeavour the range of options available to them is narrowed.
Even if the agent is not in fa c t m o tiva ted  by any o f the princ ip les he 
professes, he will neve rthe less  be ob liged  to  behave in such a w ay that his 
actions rem ain com patib le  w ith  the  c la im  tha t these  p rinc ip les  genu ine ly  
motivated h im .376
II. The Components of Hum anitarian Intervention
i. Just Cause
These constraints are consolidated by the criteria outlining W heeler’s 
“solidarist framework of humanitarian intervention” ,377 first among which is the 
matter of just cause, defined by W heeler in terms of “supreme humanitarian 
emergency”,378 a mantle which he is reluctant to assign the to anything but the 
most extreme of HR abuses, or the total collapse of state authority. Genocide, 
ethnic cleansing, massacre, enslavement, and mass-deportation are the 
actions which can precipitate the destruction o f whole political communities
376 Tully (ed), Meaning and Context, p. 116
377 Wheeler, Saving, p.52
378 Ibid, p. 13
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and which therefore, according to W heeler’s conception of an international 
duty of justice, generate a moral obligation which compels international 
society to respond in an attempt to halt or avert humanitarian crisis. In 
Wheeler’s view this obligation finds expression in international legal doctrine 
and in the conviction that certain crim es represent an affront to the 
international moral conscience. The solidarist belief, incorporated into 
constructivist theorising as the norms of hum anitarianism  have begun to take 
hold across international society (or in the terms of this project as standards of 
international justice have been constructed through processes of becoming) 
asserts that whilst territorial integrity is a vital principle o f IR, it is morally bereft 
to treat borders as impermeable entities, when doing so is likely to cost 
hundreds or thousands of human lives. In line with the findings of the R2P, 
and in terms already fam iliar from the conditional sovereignty discourse, 
Wheeler argues that respect for NS depends upon the w illingness and ability 
of a state to guarantee the HR o f its citizens, and that the failure to safeguard 
such fundamental entitlements em powers (and in certain circumstances 
should arguably force) international society to intervene.
This position is criticised by Nico Krisch on the basis that the definition 
provided by Wheeler for those crim es which justify  HI is too inexact to 
underpin moral standards which can be consistently applied. The suggestion 
is that “Wheeler can give no objective definition, but says that some claims 
will be more persuasive than others” .379 As a consequence, the simple 
insistence that HI cannot take place in the absence o f supreme humanitarian
379 Nico Krisch, ‘Legality, Morality and the Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention after 
Kosovo’, European Journal o f International Law, 13(1), 2002, pp.331
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emergency “relegates the problem o f definition to the consideration of each 
case”.380 This appraisal of W heeler’s position overlooks the fact that he is 
deliberately seeking to establish standards which are sufficiently flexible to 
allow for case-by-case assessment; a fram ework which naturally lends itself 
to constructivist theorising. After all, if as constructivists would argue, legal, 
political, and ethical norms become embedded through convergent and 
consistent practice, casuistical analysis is a much more appropriate and 
effective tool for investigating this process than the system atic view of human 
rights presented by Buchanan. A lthough W heeler’s criteria are designed as a 
means to improve the efficacy of HI and reduce the risks of abuse, they are 
not intended to provide the basis of a specific ‘ru le-governed’ institution, and 
draw their strength from the fact that they can be interpreted with some 
degree of flexibility.
This scope for interpretation is o f particular value in a consideration of the 
relationship between the requirements of just cause and ‘last resort’, since it 
allows Wheeler to argue that im m inent humanitarian emergency provides 
sufficient grounds for HI, even before any potential crisis has developed to the 
fullest extent. Although, in some respects, this caveat appears counter­
intuitive when combined with the expectation that force may only be approved 
after all other diplomatic and non-violent attempts at resolution have been 
exhausted, Wheeler asserts that once large-scale loss of life appears 
inevitable, the continued pursuit of non-interventionary policies is rendered 
inappropriate. Accordingly, he claims that
380 Ibid
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[i]t is too dem and ing  to requ ire  p o litic ia n s  to  exh a u s t all peacefu l rem edies; 
rather w hat is requ ired is tha t they  a re  co n fid e n t tha t they  have exp lo red  all 
avenues that are like ly  to p rove  success fu l in s topp ing  the  v io le n ce .381
If this requirement is fulfilled, protracted negotiations and a stubborn 
adherence to non-violence cannot be allowed to provide a backdrop to crimes 
against humanity. This dem onstrates the way in which JW  principles may 
have to be perceived differently in response to changing international threats; 
a suggestion which finds favour in the work of Buchanan in particular.382
Despite the apparent manoeuvrability of his criteria, W heeler asserts that the 
value of the category of supreme hum anitarian em ergency lies within its very 
specificity. The threshold for HI which he establishes is extrem ely exacting 
because it reflects a conscious attem pt to identify a category of crime which is 
so severe as to justify the loss of life in which HI will inevitably result. For 
Wheeler, the most important consideration which must deter HI in anything 
but the most extreme of cases is “the premise that force is always going to 
lead to people being harmed” . Therefore,
[y]ou have to be ab le  to  ju s tify  the  harm  th a t’s go ing  to  be im posed by your 
actions aga inst the harm  th a t y o u ’re go ing  to  be p reven ting ... th a t m eans the
383bar has to be very high be fo re  you go to  war.
In essence, Wheeler is committed to the notion o f non-com batant immunity 
and, as such, he is disinclined to license any act o f intervention which, in a
Wheeler, Saving, p.35
382 See Allen Buchanan, ‘Institutionalising the Just War’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 34(1), 
2006, pp.2-38
383 Interview with Nicholas Wheeler, conducted at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. 
19/07/06
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cost-benefit analysis, is liable to adversely affect as many people as it 
rescues. The exacting specifications o f suprem e humanitarian emergency 
must therefore, he suggests, be reserved for instances “where a very 
significant number of people are either dead, or at risk o f death, and where 
force is seen to have the possibility o f providing... a positive humanitarian
0 0 4
outcome
Wheeler believes that, in cases such as this, egregious and sustained 
violations of the rights of life and liberty provide grounds for HI. However, he 
also explores the suggestion that the category of jus t cause may serve not 
only as a means to assess the valid ity o f an act of intervention which has 
already taken place, or which is imminent, but m ight also be employed to 
critique inaction in the face of hum anitarian disaster. This is enormously 
significant since, for Wheeler, the fa ilure to respond to the system atic abuse 
of HR represents as much of a threat to international justice, as does the 
licensing of inappropriate or irresponsible HI.
There can be little doubt that, in the absence of sufficient political will, even 
the most unambiguous exam ples of massacre and ethnic cleansing have 
been known to elicit inaction and apathy from international society. One 
compelling and ongoing example is the fa ilure o f the international community 
to respond more com prehensively to the crisis in Darfur.385 Having issued a
384 Ibid
385 The International Criminal Court issued a warrant for the arrest of Sudanese President 
Omar Hassan al-Bashir on 5th March 2009. However, at the time of writing, the humanitarian 
crisis in Darfur is ongoing, the warrant seems unlikely to be actioned in the near future, 
humanitarian intervention has yet to take place. Aid agencies estimate that, to date, up to 300
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solemn promise of ‘never-again’, fo llow ing the slaughter of up to 800 000 
civilians during the Rwandan genocide, it seems intuitively clear to many 
commentators that a coalition of W estern and African States, or the UN, ought 
to have come rapidly to the assistance o f the people o f Darfur. One of the 
reasons for inaction, in W heeler’s view, relates closely to the aftermath of the 
Rwandan crisis. Throughout the course of the massacre, representatives of 
international society and, in particular, the US Government, pointedly refused 
to describe the mass-killings as a genocide. Instead, the administration 
maintained, in a manner consistent with the post-colonial fem inist critique of 
selectivity, that violence was the consequence o f clan warfare and deeply 
rooted social tensions which the W est was powerless to address. In refraining 
from the use of the very specific term ‘genocide ’, the US hoped to evade the 
obligation to intervene which they feared would impact upon them, as 
signatories to the Genocide Convention. In contrast, in d iscussions regarding 
the crisis in Darfur, Colin Powell, in his capacity as Secretary of State, 
explicitly acknowledged that the violence had escalated to the status of
3 8 Ggenocide and yet the society of states, once again, failed to intervene. This
reluctance, and manifest lack of political will, represents an unwillingness on
the part of international society to honour the terms of the R2P; in which the
parties pledged to come to the aid o f those whose own governments had
failed in their duty of guardianship and, e ither through their own actions or
their inability to control the behaviour o f other agents, exposed their citizens to
the ravages of ethnic cleansing, massacre, m ass-deportation, or other crimes
against humanity. Furthermore, according to constructivist understandings of
000 people have been killed in the conflict and 2.7 million have been displaced, 
(http://news.bbc.co.Uk/1/hi/world/africa/3496731 .stm, [27/08/09])
35rlbid "
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the constitutive relevance of language and its impact on state practice and 
legitimacy, to employ the use of this term and yet refuse to take the necessary 
action to curtail such atrocities, “fundam entally devalued and undermined the 
currency of the naming power of calling som ething a genocide” .387
Wheeler’s concern that the normative and linguistic force of certain categories 
of crime be maintained and his awareness that, in term s of becoming, inaction 
can have the same precedent-setting potential as intervention, account in part 
for the narrow terms in which he defines suprem e humanitarian emergency. 
The term is designed: to provide the tools to assess whether or not a given 
act of HI is in keeping with the w ider dem ands of international justice; to 
subject those who would intervene in the absence of a jus t cause to public 
scrutiny and social disapproval; and to bring pressure to bear when 
international society refuses to take action when doing so could save the lives 
of thousands of innocent civilians. In W hee ler’s terms, defining the category of 
just cause as the existence o f suprem e humanitarian em ergency allows us to 
argue that the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the US-led ‘coalition o f the w illing ’ did 
not meet the threshold for such action, whereas, for example, the Vietnamese 
invasion of Cambodia in 1977, and the consequent shutting down of the killing 
fields, was justifiable in hum anitarian terms.
The criteria which W heeler uses to establish this distinction are fundamental 
to his wider approach to international justice. He appears to maintain that if 
becoming is (as constructivists would be inclined to suggest) largely
387 Ibid
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contingent upon consensus-building, we may have to frame our conception of 
the international duty of justice in negative terms. “We can ’t necessarily agree 
on what the ‘good life’ looks like” but by retaining the linguistic force of 
supreme humanitarian em ergency “we m ight be able to agree on some notion 
of what the ‘bad life’ looks like”388 and, thereby, maintain a consensus over 
the kinds of HR infringements which are subject to an international duty of 
justice and, therefore, necessitate HI. W hilst e lem ents of this argum ent are 
very persuasive, viewing W heeler’s analytical fram ew ork from the perspective 
of a gender-sensitive ontology o f becom ing brings to light certain 
inadequacies. Feminist constructivists m ight be inclined to argue that, having 
established that the use of force is an inappropriate response to anything but 
the most grievous of HR abuses, W heeler ought to strengthen his argument 
by considering the value of m easures short o f force designed to address the 
inequalities and injustice which so often underpin the outbreak of political 
violence. Once again a more nuanced understanding of human suffering than 
that typical of mainstream theories reveals the interrelated nature of social 
and economic deprivation and physical insecurity.
(a) Morality, Legitimacy, and Becom ing
Wheeler’s determination to maintain the ‘naming power’ o f supreme 
humanitarian emergency effective ly ensures a very narrow definition of just 
cause. What remains at issue is the m anner in which he defends his claim 
that certain rights have becom e so intrinsic to standards of international 
justice that their infringem ent may justify  HI. Perhaps surprisingly the terms in
388 Ibid
214
Being and Becoming: Humanitarian Intervention and the Constructed Duty o f Justice Claire Malcolm
which he does so draw out many sim ilarities between his solidarist 
constructivism and a more cosmopolitan approach to international justice. 
Initially, Wheeler asserted that the criteria which he advocated could be 
employed to assess the leg itim acy  of HI. However, he has subsequently 
suggested that the clarity of his early work was com prom ised through the 
conflation of legitimacy and morality. In reality, the legitim acy o f HI, at least 
according to constructivist understandings, effectively refers to the extent to 
which it reflects the emerging and settled norms of international society, or 
secures the endorsement of a variety o f global political actors. This is 
because
legitimacy is som eth ing  w h ich  is a lw a ys  soc ia l: you try  to  ra ise  c la im s and you 
try to leg itim ate those  c la im s to  d iffe re n t co n s titu e n c ie s , and if you succeed 
then that is leg itim acy .389
In contrast, Wheeler now contends that his stipulated criteria are an attempt to 
establish “a normative standard for judging intervention, which may or may 
not be agreed by others” but which he considers to be “m orally right whether 
or not it is validated”390 by other agents. This represents a significant 
departure from the constructiv ist assertion that morality arises as a 
consequence of the consensus generated through interaction, negotiation, 
and the development of shared m eanings and understandings. W heeler is 
instead claiming, in noticeably cosm opolitan terms, that certain moral 
standards do possess an intrinsic value based on “our essential humanity,
389
390
Ibid
Ibid
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which resonates to the presence o f the same thing in other human beings” .391 
As such, all individuals, regardless of the cultures from which they herald, or 
the states in which they are citizens, are the bearers of certain rights, which 
must be respected and enforced by the apparatus of the state. In this respect, 
Wheeler’s epistemology embraces some aspects o f morality as universal and 
morally prior to agreement among global political actors.
This position threatens his work with a measure of incoherence or, at the very
least, calls into question the extent to which it can be characterised as
constructivist in nature. A fter all for constructivists, legitim acy and morality
are, effectively, one and the same. It is the very fact that certain normative
standards achieve tacit or explicit recognition and acceptance across a broad
range of political communities which infuses them with their moral status. It
would appear that W heeler w ishes to argue that certain m inimal humanitarian
values are morally persuasive with or w ithout the stamp of ‘social legitim acy’.
This has implications for his w ider theory since if one can make the case that
certain rights exist a prio ri and that international society is compelled to
defend them, the processes o f social interaction and construction become
little more than a footnote to a form  o f covering-law  universalism , which
prioritises certain entitlements, w hether or not they are informed by
meaningful cross-cultural consensus. The challenge for W heeler then is to
demonstrate how his constructiv ist conception o f norm formation and
becoming can be reconciled with his solidarist refusal to view HR as socially
or historically contingent. It is the contention o f this chapter that, despite the
391 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1989) p. 189
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enormously instructive nature of elem ents o f his theorising, he is not always 
able to achieve this.
One might expect W heeler’s w illingness to adopt a moral position, which has 
the potential to conflict with a constructiv ist account o f becoming, to lend itself 
to a relatively radical approach to the issues of HI and international justice. If 
his views are not constrained by the requirem ent o f achieving and 
demonstrating consensus and he believes that, at times, the moral urgency of 
certain rights trumps their social legitim acy, his prescriptions for change in 
international politics ought, logically, to be less constrained than, for example, 
communitarian constructivist theorising. However, in a fashion which may 
appear contradictory, W heeler’s justice  claims are in fact confined by his 
fidelity to PIL. In terms already fam ilia r from  an analysis o f Buchanan, he 
attempts to impose a standard of feasib ility  on his work, such that the reforms 
he recommends might be applicable to the current realities of inter-state 
relations. As such, W heeler seeks to outline those incremental, yet significant, 
changes which could be absorbed into international society as it presently  
functions. In this respect, although W hee le r’s moral theorising has grown less 
ambitious over time his appreciation of the legal m echanism s which govern 
change at the international level m ight serve to connect the constructivist 
agenda for becoming, w ith the practicalities o f international legal doctrine. 
Nowhere are the grounds fo r this potential synthesis clearer than in an 
analysis of the issue of agency.
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ii. Agency
Wheeler’s account of agency is complex and som ewhat inconsistent. In fact, 
his theorising in this area has passed through three distinct phases: a defence 
of unilateralism; a retreat from this position in light o f the impact of the Bush 
doctrine of pre-emptive self defence and the fram ing of the ICISS; and finally 
a tentative acceptance that, in view of the lim itations of the R2P, a blind 
rejection of unilateral alternatives may not be sustainable. The evolution of 
Wheeler’s perspective represents a response to the changing imperatives of 
international politics and demonstrates that the processes of becoming impact 
as much on theorists of international society as on that society itself.
Intriguingly, were an analysis o f W heeler’s contribution to the debate to be 
limited to his early work, it would be possible to argue that his views on 
agency represent an endorsem ent o f unilateralism ; a suggestion evidenced 
by the claim in his 2002 volume that “while we should always try and obtain 
Security Council authorisation this legal requirem ent can be overridden in 
cases of supreme humanitarian em ergency” .392 Fam iliar criticisms of: the 
oligarchic structure of the UNSC; its “morally arb itrary”393 distribution of veto 
powers and their frequent abuse; as well as a cognisance of the generally 
inefficient and time-consuming nature of multilateral decision-m aking, were all 
taken into account by W heeler who, initially allowed for the requirement of 
UNSC authorisation to be omitted from his list o f threshold criteria for HI; 
featuring instead as a means by which to increase, rather than determine, the 
validity of any such action.
392 Wheeler, Saving, p.41
393 Buchanan, Justice, p. 164
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Subsequent to the publication o f Saving Strangers, however, W heeler re­
evaluated his contention that HI could be championed at the expense of PIL 
and embraced instead a notably more conservative commitment to the 
preservation of UNSC authority. At this stage, it was his hope that an 
incremental campaign o f procedural reform might increase the efficiency and 
efficacy of the UN. In other words, proper authority might be seated with this 
flawed institution, even as the organisation continued to develop. Among his 
justifications for this shift in emphasis, was his belief that the UNSC had 
evolved into a much more capable institution than it was during the Cold War. 
As such, increased activism within the organisation had shifted the 
parameters of the HI debate. A fter all,
[tjhere are no cases in the 1990s where the Council has blocked action, when
there’s been an overwhelming case for something to happen.394
Through the theoretical conduit o f the ontology o f becoming, he argued that 
the increased promise of the UNSC was due in large part to the emergence of 
the concept of “good international citizenship” ,395 as an anchor to an ethical 
foreign policy and a reflection of a reconceptualised understanding of 
international justice. First coined by Gareth Evans, the Australian Foreign 
Minister from 1988 to 1996, and the co-chair o f the ICISS, this expression 
denotes a departure from the “traditional realist approach to foreign policy 
because it rejects the assumption that the national interest always pulls in the
394 Wheeler Interview
395 Nicholas J. Wheeler and Timothy Dunne, ‘Good International Citizenship: A Third Way for 
British Foreign Policy’, International Affairs, 74(4), October 1998, pp.847-870, pp.848
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opposite direction to the promotion of human rights”396 and establishes a 
causal link between “domestic state repression” and “a negative impact on 
wider regional security”.397 This ensures that “ it is not acceptable to define 
such situations as being covered by Article 2(7)”398 and therefore, as being 
beyond the auspices of HI. This notion has gained increasing credence within 
international society and has been reflected in the decision of the UNSC to 
license HI under Chapter VII, on the basis, at least in part399, that the 
widespread violation of HR in a given region threatens the stability and 
security of surrounding territories.
In some cases, the refugee crises and spread of d isease which can result 
from supreme humanitarian emergency appear to vindicate this assumption; 
in others, this logic has been em ployed to mobilise HI, w ithout the 
implementation of unwanted reform within the UN. As such, W heeler argued 
that the block on HI no longer predom inately originated from the unwillingness 
of the UNSC to provide authorisation in specific cases. Rather, the politics o f 
rescue continued to be hampered by a pervasive lack of political will among 
the protagonists. According to this argument, it is the absence o f “a solidarist 
commitment that could lead governm ent and citizens to v iew  global firefighting 
in the same way as citizens view the provision o f a fire service in domestic
396 Ibid
397 Ibid
398 Ibid
399 The inflection ‘in part’ is significant because as Karel Wellens asserts: no situations have 
arisen where such violations of human rights provided the exclusive underpinning of a 
pronouncement or determination of a threat [to the peace]” (The  UN Security Council and 
New Threats to the Peace: Back to the Future’, Journal o f Conflict and Security Law, 8(1), 
2003, pp.15-70, pp.44)
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society”,400 rather than deadlock within the UN, which is most likely to arrest 
HI even before it begins.
At this stage, W heeler’s faith in the need to maintain the credibility and 
exclusive jurisdiction of the UNSC owed much to the tone of Bush’s foreign 
policy, which rendered Skinner’s em phasis on the relationship between 
language and state practice increasingly d ifficult to defend. Instead it was 
tempting to claim, as realists have always been inclined to, that the ability and 
willingness of states to ensure that their behaviour remains consistent with 
international norms is a luxury and is therefore de-prioritised when adhering to 
it appears likely to compromise national security. Hence, the 2001 attacks on 
the World Trade Centre; the subsequent unilateralism  dem onstrated by the 
US; and the failure of international society to force the Bush Adm inistration “to 
apply human rights norms to its own actions in the ‘w ar on terror’”401 
seemingly confirmed the prophetic fears o f many com m entators that 
‘homeland security’ and international justice are incommensurable 
agendas.402
The inability of international society to restrain the conduct o f the US, a state 
which, under Bush, appeared at times to be im pervious to moral censure, 
seemed to belie W heeler’s original assertion that “ [ojnce established, norms 
will serve to constrain even the most powerful states in the international
400 Wheeler, Saving, p.304
401 Julie Mertus, ‘Review of Saving Strangers: Intervention in International Society, American 
Journal of International Law, 97(1), pp.224-227, 2003, pp.226
402 Wheeler was by no means the only commentator concerned with this conflict. Writing in 
2003, Julie Mertus expressed her concerns that “ in the wake of those developments, human 
rights and humanitarian intervention will be jettisoned in favour of US national security (Ibid)
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system”.403 As such, in 2006, he openly admitted that the invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq, both of which were ultimately framed, at least in part, as 
exercises in humanitarianism, threatened to lead to his abandonment o f the 
unilateralist cause. Initially, he had harboured the optim istic expectation that 
since “[hjumanitarian emergencies were occurring in failed states” and “those 
failed states were breeding grounds for terrorism ” 404 the Septem ber 11th 
attacks “would create a convergence of security interests and humanitarian 
impulses” 405 However, he rapidly became aware that the ‘w ar on terror’ had 
not provided the missing “security m otivation”406 to place HI at the top of the 
political agenda. For the W heeler of 2006, the Bush doctrine served to 
undermine, at least to some extent, the credibility which he m ight once have 
extended to the US as a potential ‘rescuer’; a change o f heart which impacted 
upon his approach to unilateralism, and his understanding o f the demands of 
international justice, more generally. He identified what he termed the 
administration’s “antipathy... to international institu tions” ;407 its by-passing of 
the UNSC in the build-up to the Iraq war; as well as a fram ework of IR rooted 
in a “very hard-edged W ilsonianism ”408 predicated on the universal and 
universalisable nature of American values, as inherently damaging to the 
reputation of the world’s only superpower. Conversely, he argued, that a lack 
of commitment and coherence among the European powers in matters of 
collective security ensured that the EU was not well positioned to offer an 
alternative to US dominance, and since only a small num ber o f states beyond
403 Wheeler, Saving, p.7
Wheeler Interview
405 Ibid
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the affluent West were materially able to intervene effectively, Wheeler 
conceded that unilateralism appeared less credible as a response to supreme 
humanitarian emergency than he had been inclined to suggest only four years 
earlier.
Deeply concerned by the potentially destabilising impact o f powerful and self- 
interested states spearheading interventionary campaigns, irrespective of the 
constraints imposed by PIL and international society, Wheeler came to 
consider that the incorporation of UNSC authorisation into his erstwhile 
criteria for HI might infuse the process with increased moral efficacy and 
guard against the dangers of unilateralism. W hilst he did not deny that UNSC 
“inaction in cases where atrocities shock the conscience of humankind... 
undermines the authority of the UN”,409 his proposed solution to this was not 
to allow for the institution to be routinely by-passed. Instead, he called for 
concerted efforts to reinvigorate, and, if necessary, reinvent the UN to ready it 
for such tasks. For Wheeler, the inclusion in the ICISS of discussions 
regarding the proper recourse in instances of UNSC deadlock precipitated an 
engagement with tenable alternatives to unilateralism. Accordingly, he 
proposed a series of mechanisms designed to streamline decision-making 
within the UN, thereby increasing the likelihood that UNSC authorisation might 
either be obtained or, if necessary, legitim ately  by-passed. More generally, he 
appeared to argue that becoming could be engendered and sustained within 
the current UN framework.
409 Nicholas J. Wheeler, ‘Humanitarian Intervention after Kosovo: Emergent Norm, Moral 
Duty, or the coming of Anarchy, International Affairs, 77(1), 2001, pp. 113-128, pp. 119
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(a) Constructive Abstention
The first of Wheeler’s proposals for reform was based on his conviction that 
the use of the P5 veto, should be contingent upon a certain level of fairness 
and moral responsibility; the notion of “constructive abstention”410. Wheeler 
maintained that
it is not acceptab le fo r pe rm anen t m em bers  to  exe rc ise  the ve to  in situations 
where states request C ouncil au tho risa tion  and w here  there  is s ign ificant 
international support fo r in te rven tion  to p reven t o r stop gross v io la tions of 
human rights.411
However, the fact remains that the P5 are extremely unlikely to approve any 
measure which would limit their own influence and even Wheeler 
acknowledges that “the problem arises... that often people will genuinely 
believe that they’re not being capricious” .412 It is possible to argue, for 
example, that the Russian willingness to veto NATO’s actions in Kosovo, a 
threat which resulted in the failure to table a resolution and a subsequent 
unilateral bombing campaign, represented “a genuine difference over how 
government members exercise their responsibilities in international 
society”;413 a contentious debate over the proper interpretation of Article 2(4); 
and conflicting interpretations of the demands of international justice, rather 
than a blindly capricious act. A fundamental disagreement of this nature 
cannot simply be resolved by means of institutional reform.
41U ICISS, 6.21
411 Wheeler, Saving, p.297
412 Wheeler Interview
413 Ibid
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(b) “Uniting For Peace”
Furthermore, the only circumstances under which the veto cannot currently be 
exercised is in the context o f the “Uniting for Peace” protocol established in 
1950 as a means by which the General Assem bly (GA) could take action in 
the event that political stalemate were to prevent agreem ent within the UNSC. 
Envisaged as a means to increase co-operation during the Cold War, this 
procedure, which has remained inactive since its inception, would begin with 
the drafting of a Procedural Resolution within the UNSC in support of the use 
of force. If nine votes could be secured, the m atter would then pass to the GA. 
Although, the role of the GA would only ever be recommendatory, and 
therefore military action would not be guaranteed by the passing of any such 
resolution, Wheeler argues that “requiring a two-thirds majority in the GA in 
cases where the UNSC has found a threat to ‘international peace and 
security’ but is unable to act due to the use of the veto, “constitutes a high 
standard of legitimacy, and would m inim ise the risk that states would abuse a 
right of humanitarian intervention” .414 However, the ethical quandaries which 
result from the interconnected nature of moral and legal considerations may 
prove intractable if this process results in a failure to secure a 2/3 majority 
within the GA. In effect, such a scenario recreates the deadlock of the UNSC 
and reintroduces the question of whether unilateral HI ought to take place in 
the face of a refusal by the UN to provide its authorisation.
414 Wheeler, Saving, p.297
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(c) United Nations Armed Force
The recurring problem of political deadlock also has the potential to 
undermine Wheeler’s third proposed alternative to unilateralism; the 
suggestion that a UN Armed Force (UNAF) would be better positioned to 
respond to widespread violations of HR than would the armies o f individual 
states, regional organisations, or coalitions. At its inception, the UN was 
envisaged as an organisation which ought, unlike its unsuccessful 
predecessor, the League of Nations, to be endowed with a m ilitary wing which 
could be mobilised in those instances wherein global peace and security 
came under threat. However, the cooling of relations between East and West 
led to the onset of the Cold W ar which derailed any such notion and, 
although, the Military Staff Committee which was convened to “advise and 
assist the UNSC in the ‘employment and command of forces placed at its 
disposal’... has met every two weeks since February 1946” ,415 by 1948 it had 
already declared that it would be incapable of fulfilling its mandate and the 
aforementioned meetings are now said to last no more than a few m inutes.416 
In this respect, the bipolarity which hijacked the UN has left a legacy which, to 
this day, renders the organisation dependent on the military capabilities and 
contributions of its constituent members.
Wheeler has suggested that in the arena of HI the establishment of a UNAF 
provides a potential solution to some of the issues precluding consensus over 
the use of force. In the first instance, a “UN army with its own officers, capable
415 Simon Chesterman, ‘Legality vs. Legitimacy: Humanitarian Intervention, The Security 
Council and the Rule of Law’, Security Dialogue, 33(3), 2002, pp.293-307, pp.298
416 Ibid
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of acting independently in the right fie lds”417 gives fresh impetus to the notion 
that successful HI can be conducted multilaterally. Secondly, the remit of the 
UNAF and, specifically, the kinds of crises with which it would be equipped to 
contend, could be established in advance (albeit with a necessary degree of 
flexibility and scope for case-by-case analysis) and this could serve to 
guarantee a rapid response and increase the likelihood of securing a positive 
humanitarian outcome. Thirdly, a UNAF, assigned specific responsibility for 
matters of HI, could receive specialised training, tailored to the demands of 
both warfare and peacekeeping and framed in terms which would breed the 
requisite cultural sensitivity and political awareness to facilitate a just and 
lasting settlement, once hostilities cease. Not only would this be likely to 
reduce the possibility of a premature withdrawal of troops but it would also 
ensure that an emancipatory mandate was meaningfully executed; with the 
local population, ultimately, liberated from oppression, rather than further 
violated by ‘invaders’ with little or no sense of the cultural specificity of the 
region.418 Equally, since HI would not necessitate the deployment of national 
armies, the tendency of voting publics to dictate the scale and duration of 
military incursion would be counteracted, since governments and civilian 
populations alike would no longer perceive that dispatching service personnel 
amounted to the decision to risk the lives of their own nationals in the name of 
humanitarian causes.
417 Walzer, Arguing, p.80
418 A famous example of the comprehensive failure to win the trust of a local population is 
cited by Wheeler in Saving Strangers and relates to the disastrous Somali intervention. He 
states that “one of the worst insults in Somali society is to show your shoe to someone, and it 
did not foster good relations when Somalis could see the boots of US soldiers facing down on 
them as US helicopters flew their low-level search and destroy missions over Mogadishu” 
(p.206). It is possible to argue that a UNAF, properly prepared for humanitarian missions, 
would be less likely to fall victim to such costly errors.
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However, there exist a number of obstacles to the establishment of this 
proposed UNAF. The first is the simple fact that, at this time, there appears to 
be little indication that powerful players within the UN would license the 
creation of such an army. This is indicative of W heeler’s concern that 
insufficient commitment to human solidarity renders agreement over ‘global’ 
crises entirely more difficult to secure than responses to ‘local’ challenges. 
Secondly, even if this problem could be overridden, the deployment of the 
UNAF “would depend on decisions of a Security Council likely to be as 
divided and uncertain as it is today, still subject to a great-power veto and 
severe budgetary constraints”;419 or, in W heeler’s terms, restricted in its 
efficiency and its moral authority by its inability to react consistently; what he 
labels the “vexed question of selectivity” .420 Finally, supreme humanitarian 
emergency may be an exacting category but its outbreak is not as rare as its 
severity might imply. In fact, even the resources of a UNAF are likely to be 
exhausted when instability and violence take hold in more than one region, 
concurrently. As Wheeler points out, had the UN fire brigade existed in the 
mid-1990s, it “could not have been sent to save Rwandans, because it would
4 2 1already have been committed to fire-fighting in Somalia or Bosnia”. Thus, 
strategic and economic considerations would govern the deployment of a 
UNAF in much the same way as they dictate the actions of national armies. 
Finally, from the perspective of gender analysis, the constitution of any 
proposed UNAF would have to be conceived in terms which did not simply 
replicate the institutional failings and embedded gendered hierarchies so 
typical of military organisation. At the very least, both its membership and its
419 Walzer, Arguing, p.79
420 Wheeler, Saving, p.304
421 Ibid
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remit would have to take into account the issues surrounding gender 
inequality and seek to balance such an appreciation with the requirement of 
cultural sensitivity; a difficult if not impossible task.
Ultimately, the establishment o f a UNAF is subject to the same constraints 
and limitations as any other proposal for UN reform. There is significant 
agreement among both theorists and practitioners of IR that the structure and 
nature of the organisation is in need of revision. In fact, it was Annan who, 
whilst serving as Secretary General, claimed that in order for the UN to retain 
its credibility it must “undergo the most sweeping overhaul in its 60 year 
history”;422 a statement which lead to the establishment of the ‘High Level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Changes’ which published its findings in 
2005. However, the consensus generated by the panel was limited and 
addressed itself almost exclusively to the expansion of the membership of the 
UNSC, rather than the abolition of the veto, or any other fundamental changes 
to the operational procedures governing the use of force.423 The enormous 
difficulties associated with securing agreement over reform of the UN speak to 
the limitations of Wheeler’s procedural approach to HI and international justice 
since, in part, his theory relies upon the ability of the UN to demonstrate that it 
is a capable institution, adaptable, and responsive to the demands of 
humanitarianism. However, as an engagement with both feminist and 
cosmopolitan constructivists has indicated, it could be argued that the reform 
of the organisation, which was, after all, “created by the Great Powers for the
422 (Cited) Thomas G. Weiss, ‘An Unchanged Security Council: The Sky Ain’t Falling’, 
Security Dialogue, 36(3), 2005, pp.367-369, pp.367
423 For full details on the findings of the HLP see Thomas G. Weiss and Karen E. Young, 
‘Compromise and Credibility: Security Council Reform?, Security Dialogue, 2005, 36(2), 
pp.131-155
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Great Powers”424(and h a s  th e re fo re  served to perpetuate unequal power 
relations) is precluded by th e  leg itim acy and democratic deficits which result 
from  its o ligarchic s tru c tu re . If th is is the case, W heeler’s faith in 
multilateralism is n e ce ssa rily  underm ined.
(d) Agency and the R 2P
To some extent, fac ing  th is  quanda ry  brings W heeler’s argument full-circle, 
s ince his faith in the a b ility  o f the U N  to adapt to new threats and pressures 
appears to have been m isp laced . M uch of his determ ination to investigate and 
prom ote institutional m e chan ism s which might alleviate the problems of 
UNSC stalemate w as ba sed  on h is belief that the drafting of the ICISS 
represented a h igh ly s ig n ifica n t s tep  toward international consensus over HI. 
Both the acceptance o f c rite ria  to govern  HI and the cautious indication that 
deadlock in the U N SC  cou ld  leg itim ate  alternative UN-based initiatives, 
seem ed to confirm  his b e lie f tha t a respect for multilateralism need not 
necessarily equate to an e n d o rse m e n t o f inaction. However, both of these key 
e lem ents of the IC ISS  w ere  “ los t in the transition from ‘document to 
doc trine ’” ,425 with ne ithe r se t o f recom m endations ultimately incorporated into 
the W orld Sum m it O u tco m e  D ocum ent. As W heeler puts it
P aragraph 139 o f th e  O u tc o m e  D ocum en t requ ires tha t any collective action 
in suppo rt o f R 2P  m u s t be ‘in a c co rd a n ce  w ith  the C harter, including Chapter 
V II’. T h is  has led  s o m e  co m m e n ta to rs  to  a rgue tha t the  2005 O utcom e
424 Morris, ‘UN Security Council Reform’, pp.268
425 McClean, The Responsibility to Protect’, pp. 131
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Document closes the door on unilateral and regional action without prior 
Security Council authorisation.426
For those who contend “that the language in the Outcome Document cannot 
be the last word on military intervention to end genocide and mass killing” ,427 
this blanket ban on unilateralism strips the R2P of its ability to constrain state- 
sponsored HR abuses. W hist HI without authorisation may be institutionally 
flawed, non-intervention in the face of UNSC deadlock appears to Wheeler to 
be morally indefensible. It is on this basis that he is once again prepared to 
concede that a focus on multilateralism may be negotiable.
(e) The Quandary of Solidarism
It is easy to sympathise with W heeler’s changing views on agency. If 
anything, they demonstrate his appreciation of precisely how complex and 
elusive agreement on this issue is. However, at present it is reasonable to 
suggest that his position is somewhat incoherent. The concerns over 
unilateralism which he articulated in the wake of the Afghanistan and Iraq 
invasions remain pertinent but his faith in the R2P appears to have been 
undermined by the failure of international society to institutionalise some of its 
more radical components. The significance of all this in terms of Wheeler’s 
conception of becoming and the international duty of justice is the fact that it 
serves to highlight a tension in his work between his belief that justice 
demands the defence o f HR and his profound concerns over the 
circumvention, in the name of these very rights, of the UNSC. For the most
426 Nicholas J. Wheeler, ‘Operationalising the Responsibility to Protect: The Continuing 
Debate over where Authority should be Located for the Use of Force’, NUPI Report 3, 2008, 
pp.5-27, pp.9-10
427 Ibid
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part, Wheeler maintains that justice is most effectively served through the 
preservation of the exclusive right of the UNSC to sanction the use of force. 
This is because the disorder which is likely to result from the by-passing of the 
UN is too high a price to pay for the mobilisation of HI. However, he also 
wishes to maintain that the reality that thousands of lives may be lost as HR 
are sacrificed at the altar o f the national interest is at odds with the demands 
of justice as he understands them.
Wheeler’s oscillating convictions speak to a broader issue concerning the 
relationship between solidarism, becoming, and the limits of international 
justice. As Hurrell has argued, it is when they begin to explore “ the space 
beyond existing legal consensus” ,428 that those who are committed to the 
scope of “normative expansion”429 implied by the solidarist project are 
frequently confronted by the lim itations of its appeal and applicability among 
global political actors. Even in accepting the existence of an international 
society and, in the case of some solidarists, aspiring toward a global society 
commentators are forced to accept how far removed their conception can 
sometimes be from the current realities of international politics.
[tjhe asp ira tions o f th is  no rm ative ly  am bitious international society remain 
deeply con tam ina ted  by the p re ferences and interests o f powerfu l s ta tes... 
where so lidaris t coope ra tion  is w eak or breaks down, the o lder im peratives of 
p luralist in te rna tiona l soc ie ty  continue to flourish ... even when genuinely 
consensual, the  p rom otion  o f so lidaris t values both depends on, and 
reinforces, the pow er and priv ileges o f the dom inant state or group o f states. 
We are the re fo re  not dea ling  w ith a vanished or vanishing W estphalian world, 
as much trans fo rm a tion is t w riting  suggests, but rather w ith a world in which
428 Ibid, p. 155
429 Hurrell, Global Order, p. 144
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so lidaris t and cosm opo litan  conceptions o f governance coexist, often rather 
unhappily, w ith  m any aspects  o f the old p luralist o rd e r430
When faced with this quandary, solidarists tend to shift their focus in one of 
two directions; either toward increased radicalism or increased conservatism. 
In the case of Hurrell (and sim ilarly in the work of Richard Falk)431 the tone of 
analysis takes on the hallmarks of an advocacy project, moving rapidly and 
somewhat unsteadily from an appraisal of ‘what is’ to a set of radical 
prescriptions for ‘what should be’, which arguably takes insufficient account of 
what ‘conceivably could be’. For example, the suggestion that “[AJIthough 
central to a liberal solidarist vision of international society, the expansion and 
consolidation of human rights press hard against the statist limits of that 
conception”432 indicates a desire to push the boundaries of a solidarist 
normative agenda into a cosmopolitan conception of world society. Given the 
controversy which continues to rage over even the most limited interpretations 
of certain rights claims and the tangible legal restrictions which still impact 
upon humanitarianism, the proper debate is not whether we have moved, or 
are moving, from a solidarist framework for international politics into a 
cosmopolitan one. In fact there remains substantial doubt as to whether the 
solidarist agenda has served, or may ever serve, to displace the pluralist 
conception. Even those who are inclined toward solidarist argumentation must 
still address the possibility that in “seeking to achieve more, solidarists set 
themselves an impossible task and risk undermining the limited degree of
430 Ibid, p.9
431 See Richard A. Falk, Achieving Human Rights, (New York, Routledge, 2009)
432 Hurrell, Global Order, p. 148
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consensus and order that has been achieved within the society of states” 433 
This critique is equally applicable to the emancipatory framework of feminist 
analysis and seems to support Carpenter’s assertion that the most effective 
means by which to ‘m ainstream ’ notions of gender bias is to separate them 
from the feminist focus on improving the lives of women.
Unlike some of his contemporaries, especially those from within the broad 
category of feminist analysis, W heeler accepts certain limitations on the scope 
of his theorising. It is for this reason that his work might be said to conform 
more effectively to the understanding of the constructivist ontology of 
becoming which informs this thesis. Despite his conviction concerning the 
moral priority of certain rights claims, W heeler’s commitment to constructivism 
nevertheless underpins his belief that a lack of consensus among global 
political actors has very real implications for the institutionalisation of HR and 
HI. In the aftermath of the R2P, and by way of a response to this apparent 
contradiction, W heeler appeared to retreat from solidarism into a more 
conservative outlook, more in-keeping with his views on the moral and 
practical values of norm dynamics. Nevertheless, he also expressed renewed 
hope that the mechanisms of the UN might yet implement the incremental 
“internationalisation of the human conscience”434 necessary for a more overtly 
solidarist approach to international society to be rendered tenable. He argued 
that the tangible acceptance of the findings of the ICISS would take some 
time to resonate throughout international society; a process which he believed 
may prove to be analogous with the development of the concept of “common
433 Ibid, p.78
434 ICISS, VII
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security” 435 He hoped that, the consequent, albeit gradual, ‘de-legitimation’ of 
the veto (which would discourage its capricious use), and the development of 
a prompt and more morally responsive approach to humanitarian disaster, 
might prove to be sufficient to the task of shoring up the practice of 
multilateralism.
(f) The Role of ‘M itigation’
However, in his most recent contributions to the debate, Wheeler has been 
unable to disguise his disappointment that many of the most innovative 
instruments established through the ICISS were not more effectively 
institutionalised. It is perhaps for this reason, that, as yet, he does not appear 
to be prepared entirely to abandon the notion that alternatives exist to explicit 
UNSC endorsement. It would appear that W heeler remains committed to the 
moral conviction that “there ought to be a possibility for willing states to help 
those oppressed by their governments even if the UN fails to take action”.436 
Accordingly, in his 2008 article on the subject of agency, Wheeler attempts to 
produce a comprehensive survey of all the means by which HI might be 
authorised. This allows him to revisit and reorder his changing approach to 
the matter of proper authority and leads to the establishment of what may be 
his most persuasive argum ent to date. He begins with largely uncontroversial 
cases in which HI is welcomed by a government or serving head of state;
before addressing the range of measures, increasingly coercive in nature,
435 This was based on the recognition, encapsulated in the 1982 Palme Commission Report, 
that the superpowers could only guarantee their own security, and that of the states which 
surrounded them, through co-existence. As Wheeler states “In the beginning, those ideas 
were very much marginalised... but by the end of the decade both superpowers were talking, 
and to some extent, acting, the language of common security” (Wheeler Interview).
436 Stefan Kircher, T he  Human Rights Dimensions of International Peace and Security and 
Humanitarian Intervention after 9/11’, Social Science Research Network, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm7abstract id=445124, [13/05/09], pp.30
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which might secure such an invitation in instances where it is not immediately 
forthcoming. In cases wherein HR abuses have become intolerable and a 
serving government is complicit in the massacres (or, having collapsed, is in 
no position to issue an invitation to interveners) diplomatic and economic 
sanctions or incentives are liable to prove fruitless. It is in such circumstances 
that UNSC endorsement is most needed and, often, impossible to secure. 
Once again, Wheeler considers the virtues of “Uniting for Peace” but admits 
that the concept is neither a popular nor an efficient one and ultimately, he 
introduces a suggestion which, in view of his recent opposition to 
unilateralism, is more than a little surprising. Reviewing the international 
response to NATO’s intervention into Kosovo, he argues that
[tjhe Security C ounc il’s hand ling  o f the  Kosovo case m ight... o ffe r the best 
precedent fo r how  the  in te rna tiona l com m unity  should cope w ith future cases 
of th is kind. The lesson o f Kosovo, and especia lly  the abject defeat o f the 
Russian draft reso lu tion  condem n ing  the bom bing, is tha t Council m em bers 
are not ready to  lega lly  sanction  arm ed intervention fo r hum anitarian 
purposes tha t lacks express  C ouncil authorisation. But ne ither will they 
always condem n it. A  m a jo rity  o f Council m em bers were persuaded that 
NATO ’s breach o f the  s tric t p rocedura l rules o f the UN C harter should be 
excused and in th is  sense  it opera ted  an international equiva lent to m itigation 
in dom estic law .437
This statement is enormously engaging from the perspective of the 
relationship between becoming and the constructed duty of justice. In the first 
instance, Wheeler asks us to reflect on the outcome of one of the best known 
cases of unauthorised HI, reminding us that far from eliciting widespread 
opposition, the NATO bombing of Kosovo was characterised by many global
437 Ibid, pp.7
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political actors, albeit tentatively, as justifiable in moral and pragmatic terms. 
Even Annan ultimately labelled the campaign “illegal but legitimate”.438 
Secondly, although there may be many reasons to claim, as Noam Chomsky 
does, that this is at best a “dubious policy”439 it does point to the disjuncture 
between those legal standards to which states are publically committed and 
the flexibility with which they might interpret these restrictions in the correct 
circumstances. For Wheeler, these institutional and legal ‘grey areas’ offer the 
most fruitful route to progress. This is because there is scope for them to be 
seized upon and developed w ithout demanding an abandonment of the 
current legal framework. A lm ost by definition, however, this process must be 
casuistical rather than systematic since it must be concerned with developing 
the application of legal standards rather than with creating entirely new 
justice-based mechanisms or institutions.
This leads to the third of his observations; the intriguing implications of 
mitigation in PIL. In essence, mitigation might provide a means by which to 
‘bend’ a particular rule o f PIL w ithout breaking it. Acknowledging that the 
NATO intervention may, on this specific occasion, have been necessitated by 
the institutional flaws of the UNSC does not erode the belief that multilateral 
HI is the prevailing legal and moral norm. This tallies with Michael W alzer’s 
argument (explored in more detail in the forthcoming chapter) that violating a 
rule does not mean that it ceases to exist. Rather, the very fact that we feel 
compelled to suspend it acts as proof of its existence. Mitigation is
438 See The Report of the ‘Independent International Committee on Kosovo’, 
(http://www.reliefweb.int/librarv/documents/thekosovoreport.htm). [12/03/08]
See Transcript of ‘Illegal but Legitimate: A Dubious Policy’, Lecture by Noam Chomsky, 
Auditorium Henry Ford Building, Free University of Berlin, March 23, 2005, 
http://www.americanvoicesabroad.net/30Mar05-Chomsky-Lecture-FU-Berlin.htm [15/05/09]
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consciously designed not to claim precedential value. In fact, this is the 
source of some criticism for those who argue that ‘rule governed’ policy must 
shape consistent responses to humanitarian disaster. For Buchanan, one of 
the most significant flaws of the Kosovo campaign is the fact that it was not 
orchestrated in a fashion which might have provided the basis for a new 
precedent. However, W heeler’s argument suggests that it is the self­
consciously exceptional nature of mitigation which renders the notion 
palatable to international society. The interpretation of the ontology of 
becoming at the heart of this thesis offers a balance between these two 
positions. Wheeler is correct to suggest that the argument against precedent 
serves to secure support for mitigation. However, because the development of 
normative standards is both a legal and a moral process, it seems likely that 
repeated flouting of the same principle might eventually provide the basis for 
the crystallisation of this so-called ‘exception’. Becoming is not a linear or 
predictable process but, at the very least, W heeler’s argument for mitigation 
might serve to systematise the defence of unilateralism; ensuring that it is only 
applied in the rarest o f cases and that it falls within a broad interpretation of 
current legal doctrine. The challenge for Wheeler, and indeed for any other 
theorists seeking to balance their agenda for becoming with the restrictions of 
a consensual international politics, is how to implement effective change 
without undermining the conditions for global stability. Although imperfect, 
Wheeler’s understanding of mitigation may yet offer the means to reconcile 
these conflicting agendas and, crucially for this project, may do so in a fashion 
which can be absorbed into a constructivist conception of norm formation.
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iii. Motivation
Wheeler’s developing views on agency form the basis of an appreciation of 
the relationship between moral development and legal parameters, which is of 
enormous value to the debates surrounding international justice. Equally, his 
changing approach to the issue of motivation demonstrates the ways in which 
the processes of becoming in IR have forced him to adapt his theory to take 
account of evolving political imperatives. In his early work, Wheeler states 
repeatedly that mixed motives are an inevitable by-product of power politics 
and that they need not compromise the value of HI, provided that they do not 
“fundamentally undermine a humanitarian outcome or lead to a selection of 
means”440 that results in such a contradiction. In essence, Wheeler contends 
that if there is an agent willing to act in the face of humanitarian crisis then 
almost any motivation which is incidental to the alleviation of human suffering 
is permissible. In defence of this position, he cites the Vietnamese action in 
Cambodia, which was conducted with little or no regard for humanitarian 
impulse but, nonetheless, resulted in the undeniably positive humanitarian 
outcome of the shutting down of the killing fields. Similarly, motivation is of 
fundamental importance from the perspective of wider justice claims. The 
dissemination of liberal dem ocratic values for instance, boasts the undeniable 
advantage, from the perspective of the West, of facilitating the establishment 
of patterns of trade and diplomacy with formally undemocratic territories. 
However, if the by-products of this process, for the citizens of the target state, 
include: improved representation, political participation, and an increased 
commitment to the preservation of HR, it might be possible to argue that this
440 Wheeler Interview
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coincidence of motives is tolerable and, in fact, the only realistic way in which 
those currently denied democratic freedoms are likely to gain access to just 
institutions. So it is that, although Wheeler does not suggest that HI carried 
out in the absence of genuine humanitarian motives ought to elicit praise from 
international society, he does argue that “because they save lives, such 
interventions should be legitimated and not condemned or sanctioned” .441
More recently, he has begun to re-evaluate this conviction. Wheeler concedes 
that it is certainly possible to identify acts of HI which were conducted with no 
regard for humanitarianism but which resulted in a positive humanitarian 
outcome. For instance, the cessation of the slaughter in Cambodia was the 
direct consequence of a perceived security interest. After all,
Vietnam  w as prepared to  risk its so ld ie rs ’ lives and expend scarce resources 
only because it perce ived  a fundam en ta l th rea t to its security  from  China in 
the North and DK in the S ou th .442
However, for every instance in which a coincidence of security and 
humanitarian motives led to the alleviation of human suffering, there are a 
great many more cases wherein an ill-advised choice of military means 
formed the basis of an intervention which further compromised the security 
and well-being of those whose plight warranted rescue. Wheeler is particularly 
critical of ‘Operation Turquoise’, which saw French troops enter Rwanda in 
what was widely perceived as a self-interested attempt to constrain the 
influence of Anglophones in what the French considered to be “their part of
Wheeler, Saving, p.39
442 Ibid, p. 106
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Africa”.443 In response to the failure of French troops to demonstrate the 
requisite impartiality and commitment to just settlement, Wheeler argues that:
[G jovernm ents tha t lay c la im  to the hum anitarian mantle have a responsibility 
to live up to these  cla im s... the  accusation is that the non-hum anitarian 
m otives behind the French in tervention  led to means being em ployed that 
conflicted w ith  its hum an ita rian  purposes 444
The issue of motivation is intrinsically connected with notions of non- 
combatant immunity and the reluctance of Western democracies to incur the 
political costs of risking the lives of soldiers. It is often the latter of these two 
conflicting imperatives which trumps the former and this has frequently led to 
a selection of military means which are incompatible with lasting peace. 
Among Western states the desire to engage only in “no-risk interventions”445 
has led to an increased reliance on airpower as a response to supreme 
humanitarian emergency. Often, as a consequence, an unnecessarily large 
number of civilians are killed as aerial bombardment is expanded to 
incorporate the shelling of bridges or factories and, in line with feminist 
concerns regarding the denial of the political agency of civilians in target 
states, the principle of non-combatant immunity is gradually undermined and 
replaced by the ominous phrase ‘collateral damage’. As a defender of non- 
combatant immunity, W heeler is troubled by this tendency, which has come to 
consolidate his belief that in the absence of humanitarian motives, HI is 
unlikely to be successful. Put simply, those Western leaders responsible for 
interventions which have relied on inappropriate means have cost many lives
443 Wheeler, Saving, p.232
444 Ibid
445 Mills and Brunner (eds), New Killing Fields, p.29
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by refusing to “learn the lesson that you cannot stop paramilitary murder and 
ethnic cleansing from the air” .446 For Wheeler, forcing states to make their 
case for HI in humanitarian terms, and then, if necessary, exposing them to 
the consequences of reneging upon such a claim, ought to render it more 
difficult for self-interest to govern the selection of military means. If HI is 
justified as a defence of the rights of life and liberty, it is a contravention of the 
norms which support it to consciously increase the risks of civilian casualties.
iv. Just Settlement
Wheeler also argues that motivation directly impacts upon the possibility of 
achieving a just settlement in the aftermath of hostilities. He suggests that the 
mismatch between rhetoric, motives, and means accounts, in large part, for 
the failure to arrive at a sustainable settlement which guarantees an increased 
security and quality of life for the local population. This is profoundly 
significant because, it is possible to argue that in terms of becoming, 
establishing a durable and equitable post-conflict resolution may be the most 
important element of HI. A fter all, the dissemination and protection of 
standards of international justice may be furthered by the building of just 
institutions in areas formerly ravaged by civil and political unrest and the 
establishment of the means to assist those responsible for the vastly 
increased amount of carework in which military incursion inevitably results.
The suggestion that a half-hearted attempt at settlement nullifies the defence 
of HI is evidenced, W heeler claims, by two recent examples. The first is the 
premature withdrawal from Somalia prompted by the death of eighteen US
446 Wheeler, Saving, p.282
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marines. The reaction of the US public ensured that the same ‘CNN effect’ 
which had inclined the Clinton administration toward HI, brought an almost 
immediate end to the campaign, long before civic order had been restored. As 
a consequence of this failure to pursue a lasting settlement, within months of 
the conflict “the UN’s first experim ent in rebuilding failed states lay in ruins” .447 
This points to the limits of ‘solidarist sentim ent’ as a basis for becoming by 
illustrating that, in general, the publics of intervening states still value the lives 
of their citizens more highly than those of strangers. As such, despite radical 
cosmopolitan claims to the contrary, borders do maintain a moral and political 
significance which impacts upon the options available to intervening 
governments, particularly democracies.
This lack of public and political com m itm ent to long-term settlement is also 
evident in the second of W heeler’s examples. He asserts that the efficacy and 
moral credibility of the US-led incursion into Afghanistan have been 
undermined by a lack of humanitarian impulse. Not only did the fact that the 
motivation for invasion was prim arily strategic result in a choice of military 
means which was inappropriate to the task of securing so-called “Enduring 
Freedom” but this mismatch also ensured that almost as soon as the conflict 
began, the focus shifted toward the search for an exit strategy. “What was 
missing from the Afghan operation, com pletely” W heeler claims “was any real 
recognition of the importance of... the settlem ent” 448 He contends that as 
supporters of the R2P, the US and its allies ought to have taken more 
seriously the section of the ICISS which focuses on the ‘responsibility to
r ibid
448 Wheeler Interview
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rebuild’. Having failed to discharge this duty, those responsible for the 
invasion are now paying the price economically, militarily, and, to a certain 
extent, diplomatically. As such, he bemoans the lack of commitment from the 
Bush government:
[t]he Am ericans w ere ju s t not p repared  to put a big foo tp rin t on the ground in 
term s of troops, they w e re n ’t p repared to suppo rt the  ISAF (In ternational 
Security A ssistance Force), they w e re n ’t p repared  to expand, they w eren ’t 
happy to take a leadersh ip  ro le .449
The Obama Administration has vowed that Afghanistan will be treated as a 
higher political and strategic priority and, so far, this does appear to be the 
case. However, the pursuit of settlement in one war-torn region has 
necessitated a reduced commitment to resolution in another, with the US 
presence in Iraq substantially reduced. This is both a practical and a political 
balancing act which is dictated as much by a scarcity of resources as by the 
limits of the US public’s tolerance for m ilitary casualties. As such, a degree of 
reticence remains in place and it has yet to be established whether, under 
new leadership, the US will “demonstrate sufficient moral commitment to 
protecting Afghan strangers”450 and whether they will embrace an 
understanding that “protecting Afghan strangers [is] the best way to prevent
451Afghanistan becoming a failed state again” .
Even if this proves to be the case, the nature of the Afghan operation to date 
(and the abject failure of the intervention in Somalia) form the basis of a
449 Ibid
450 .
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retraction, by Wheeler, of his earlier acceptance of mixed motives; his claim 
now being that the coincidence of motives and outcomes represented by the 
Vietnamese example is, effectively, an exception to the rule. In posing the 
question, “if the motivation is not primarily humanitarian, are you going to get 
the commitment to rebuilding, and are you going to get people tailoring their 
military means to humanitarian ends in an appropriate way?” ,452 Wheeler 
concludes that, the new complexion of IR in a post-September 11th world 
demonstrates that the argument that mixed motives can result in positive 
humanitarian outcomes “isn’t going to work in practice... that if non­
humanitarian motives are the driver”453 the com m itm ent to just settlement will 
not hold, particularly in the face of the loss of service personnel. Once again, 
a measure of incoherence threatens to overshadow W heeler’s arguments 
since, whilst, it is difficult to envisage how the military means chosen by 
intervening forces can be restrained in the absence of humanitarian motives, 
or the commitment to just settlem ent guaranteed, it is equally pertinent to 
suggest, as he does, that, “w ithout mixed motives, it’s hard to see where 
governments”454 are likely to engage in HI at all.
This is a further example of the m anner in which the demands of international 
justice often appear to conflict with one another and, as such, it reflects the 
need to consider both from a pragmatic and a moral perspective the limits 
which must be placed on an international duty o f justice and reaffirms the 
necessity of casuistical analysis capable of assessing the specific imperatives 
governing the recourse to force. In this context, international justice demands
452 Ibid
453 . . . .
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a response to egregious violations of HR, but the realities of international 
politics ensure that some flexibility in the interpretation of motivation is vital if 
such a response is ever likely to be elicited.
It would appear that, for Wheeler, an international duty of justice takes more 
than one form. Political actors construct expectations through the language 
they employ to define their intentions and the hope is that this discourse will, 
to some extent, frame and restrict the options available to them. Hence his 
initial conviction that when mixed motives do precipitate HI, the need to 
behave only in a manner which can be publicly legitimated, and which tallies 
with stated justifications, may tame the worst excesses of self-interest on the 
part of the intervening state. Such is the nature of W heeler’s constructivism. 
However, he also appears to argue that this process is contingent to some 
extent upon a preponderance of solidarist sentiment within international 
society and a form of enforcem ent which can be levied against any state 
engaged in brutal HR violations, or morally unjustifiable and irresponsible HI. 
In his view we must ensure that
governm ents that v io la te  hum an righ ts a lw ays  pay a heavy price in
4 5 5diplomatic, politica l, and e co n o m ic  term s.
In essence, the process of public legitimation described by W heeler relies 
upon a shared acceptance that the suffering o f strangers is tantamount to the 
suffering of citizens and should generate the same, or at the very least, a 
similar response. This embodies W heeler’s comm itm ent to solidarism but also 
indicates the manner in which, in over-estimating the extent to which
455 Ibid
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international society has the interests of human solidarity at its heart, he has 
been forced to rescind some of the bold statements, at work in his early 
theorising (concerning the extent to which social interaction can constrain 
even the most powerful states) and to search for practical, as well as moral, 
solutions to the many issues informing HI and international justice.
IV. Conclusion
According to Wheeler’s criteria for HI as they were originally framed, in the 
event of supreme humanitarian emergency, when a successful campaign is a 
realistic expectation, sovereign borders can be breached, if necessary 
unilaterally, even if the primary motivation for such action is not humanitarian. 
More recently, however, in conceding that a vindication of unilateralism is at 
odds with the views expressed by international society, W heeler has 
demonstrated a willingness to modify this position in an attempt to arrive at a 
defence of HI which is more likely to be endorsed by the international 
community. The result is: an expectation that the success of an intervention 
depends on the purity of the motives which precipitated it; an increased level 
of concern over unilateral campaigns; and a reconceptualised theory which is 
noticeably more conservative than his original position. This reframing of his 
viewpoint is due to the fact that W heeler has begun to apply the ontology of 
becoming in a manner which is more restrictive than his early interpretation.
All four branches of constructivism analysed over the course of this thesis are 
committed to the notion that substantial change to the mechanisms of 
international politics is both necessary and achievable. However, the extent of
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that reform and the timeframe for its implementation are conceived differently 
across the tradition. W heeler’s initial insights were closely linked to the liberal 
universalist argument that the task of international politics is to erode national 
boundaries and allow for the developm ent of solidarist sentiment to form the 
basis of an increasingly integrated international society. Recently, his 
perspective has grown somewhat more circum spect and is instead focused 
on the suggestion that existing international legal and political institutions 
must evolve to more accurately reflect the limited range of normative 
standards which can be said to be universal. The incremental nature of this 
development is dictated by the need to respect the broad themes of PIL even 
as the minutia are challenged and re-envisaged. As the forthcoming chapter 
will demonstrate, communitarian constructivist W alzer argues that the 
reiterated realities of international politics provide us with the means to ground 
IR theory in the pursuit of reform; up to and including fundamental changes to 
the state and UN systems. Feminist constructivism  encourages a sceptical 
appraisal of existing institutional m echanisms as little more than a means to 
legitimate and embed inequality and prevent substantive self-reflection on the 
part of the powerful West. Finally, cosmopolitan constructivists advance the 
claim (ostensibly comparable with W alzer’s position) that if the current 
structure of international society cannot embody the ambitious set of HR 
norms which they claim are integral to international morality, then those 
institutions can be replaced on the basis that they lack political legitimacy. 
Wheeler’s solidarist constructivism appears to concur with the cosmopolitan 
position that certain basic HR are morally prior to political society, whilst also 
maintaining that in order for the reforms necessary to provide these rights with
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the requisite ‘teeth’ to be effective, they must be deferential to the constraints 
of PIL. At times, this is a difficult position to sustain, especially when the 
practical realities of an issue such as unilateralism or mixed motives in HI, 
appear to force a choice between morality and legality. However, in defence 
of Wheeler’s position, it is important to reiterate that his theory represents a 
series of prescriptions for international society as it is currently constituted. 
The challenge of drafting a framework for becoming which is applicable to the 
current state system renders the balance which W heeler seeks to strike even 
more illusive. Yet, on those occasions when he does so successfully, he 
offers an insight into the relationship between becoming and the constructed 
duty of justice which is almost uniquely valuable. A lthough W heeler’s theory is 
certainly more conservative than some of the alternative prescriptions for the 
reform of international society which this thesis seeks to explore, he may well 
be correct in his claim that it is “more in tune with the realities and the 
possibilities of where this debate m ight go” .456 In other words, as the least 
expansive conception of becoming with which this thesis engages, Wheeler’s 
approach to international justice is perhaps the most consistent with the 
standard of institutional feasibility which might be said to underpin the 
commitment to the ontology of becoming. This is because in insisting that 
reform must be achievable within the confines of the existing international 
legal order, Wheeler focuses on the construction of a consensus which might 
provide the foundation for future normative development.
456 Wheeler Interview
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This is not to suggest that his approach to HI is w ithout limitations. Perhaps 
the most significant being that much of his theory requires a high degree of 
confidence in the ability o f developing norms to enable changes in the 
conduct of global political actors. However, since, as he often states, whilst 
shifting normative standards enable changes in state practice, they do not 
necessarily determine them,457 W heeler’s arguments appear incomplete, on 
those occasions when his relative fidelity to PIL conflicts with his conviction 
that human beings in peril ought to be rescued. Several factors might account 
for the consequent ‘gaps’ which tend to appear in his theorising. It may be that 
his conception of HI (and of international justice) is in somewhat of a transition 
between the solidarist project which formed the basis o f Saving Strangers and 
the more restrictionist or pluralist position which he appears to have begun to 
incline toward since the formulation o f the R2P encouraged him to align his 
views with those of w ider international society. Accordingly, much like Hedley 
Bull before him, Wheeler may have arrived at the viewpoint that the full 
implications of solidarism are unlikely to find acceptance within the practices 
of the society of states, and as such, even as the norms surrounding 
humanitarianism arguably evolve, those implications remain premature.
Alternatively, it is possible that W heeler believes that a solidarist account of 
becoming and the international duty o f justice depends upon an international 
society framework, based on the primacy o f the UN, and that it is this 
framework which limits the extent to which he is able to look beyond the 
factors currently constraining HI. In this respect, far from abandoning his 
original principles, W heeler may be attempting to defend the role of an
457 Wheeler, Saving, p.299
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institution which is integral to his approach to international society and IR. 
Thus, he appears to believe that there is a great intrinsic value in arriving at a 
level of consensus concerning HI, even if doing so entails compromising 
some of the more radical elements of his original theory.
Wheeler believes that the R2P might yet prove to be “the most significant 
development in the story”458 and is encouraged by the large number of states 
which have, at least in principle, embraced its terms; expectations which he 
hopes will slowly begin to be incorporated both into state practice and 
customary PIL. Such a development, he maintains, would simply not have 
been conceivable if UNSC authorisation and purity of motives had not 
remained in place as part of the criteria for a morally justifiable intervention. 
The matter for debate remains, however, how W heeler’s theory is likely to 
respond in the event that the terms of the R2P do not, in fact, crystallise 
sufficiently to determine the approach which international society takes to HI. 
This is particularly pertinent in view of the fact that the “extreme and 
multifaceted am biguity...”459 of the R2P and the ambivalence of much of the 
international community toward its most innovative elements ensure that the 
prospect of it emerging as a functioning norm of international society is far 
from assured.460
This speaks to a broader concern surrounding W heeler’s contribution to the 
discourse of international justice. W hilst some of the practical solutions which 
he advances to contend with the complexities of HI are enormously engaging,
458 Wheeler Interview
459 Focarelli, Too Many Ambiguities’, pp.191
460 Ibid
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the theoretical premises on which they are based appear somewhat 
inconsistent. Central to his conception of an international duty of justice is his 
attempt to provide an appraisal o f those values which may realistically be 
considered as universalisable, principally the rights of life and liberty. 
However, he does not always appear capable of engaging in this process 
within a consistent theoretical framework. The chief limitation in his approach 
is his tendency to oscillate between constructivism and solidarism, rather than 
to create a coherent hybrid of the two positions. In some instances, he argues 
that international society has constructed  an obligation to defend certain 
minimal entitlements and that it is this process of social construction which 
has infused these rights claims with their validity. However, on those 
occasions wherein the structure o f international society and the inevitable 
mismatch between normative expectation on the one hand, and state 
practice, on the other, act as a barrier to the actions which W heeler considers 
to be morally necessitated, he reverts to the argument that certain basic rights 
are owed to all by dint o f their humanity. This need not represent an 
insurmountable challenge to his theory, were he prepared to argue, (as 
Buchanan attempts to), that the UN system is simply failing to embody the 
values and customs which are shared across international society. On this 
basis, when supreme humanitarian em ergency occurs -  an affront to 
universal humanitarian standards -  and the UN fails to mount an effective 
response to its outbreak, the organisation is failing to execute its 
responsibilities to humanity and thereby forfeits its legitimacy and its exclusive 
jurisdiction. However, W heeler’s reticence, and, in some cases, unwillingness 
to countenance the circumvention of the organisation, or, in simple terms, his
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belief that justice demands the preservation o f multilateralism, brings to bear 
restrictions on the acts of HI which he feels able to endorse.
In essence, Wheeler, adopts a constructivist lens to account for the 
dissemination of certain normative expectations but combines this with an 
almost cosmopolitan appreciation of the manner in which these rights came to 
exist in the first instance. This argum ent is flawed since W heeler cannot 
argue, as constructivists do, that where agreem ent concerning the existence 
of a right does not exist, neither does the obligation to defend it, whilst 
simultaneously contending, as solidarists are inclined to, that a minimal raft of 
HR must be considered timeless and universal. Embracing the implications of 
a constructivist approach to IR may som etimes include an acceptance of the 
need to limit our conception o f an international duty o f justice and the 
possibilities of becoming, to those areas where international agreement can 
truly be said to exist. This tends to result in a marked level of conservatism, 
which, as an analysis of fem inist IR has elucidated, can be a source of 
frustration to both theorists and practitioners of the discipline. As such, it is 
easy to sympathise with W heeler’s attempt to infuse constructivism with a 
form of moral foundationalism. However, it would appear that in attempting to 
bridge the gap between constructivism and solidarism, as a means to address 
issues of international justice, W heeler has honoured the terms of neither 
theoretical endeavour.
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Chapter Five: Michael Walzer, Communitarian Constructivism and 
Humanitarian Intervention
I. Introduction
This chapter represents an engagement with the unique contribution of 
Michael Walzer to the debate surrounding HI and the relationship between the 
ontology of becoming and the constructed duty o f justice. Of the four 
constructivist approaches to international justice with which this project has 
contended, one might expect W alzer’s to be the most conservative, since he 
is best known for his defence of the right o f territorial integrity. However, a 
thorough engagement with W alzer’s body of work reveals a consistent and 
intensifying commitment to the proposition that international society must 
develop to respond more effectively to the limitations of the state system. 
Whilst this assertion is not limited to HI, with W alzer’s project also embracing 
broad issues of redistributive justice and global governance, it is his changing 
perception of the use of force, for humanitarian purposes, which throws into 
sharp relief precisely how much his approach to international justice has 
evolved over the past thirty years.
In building his defence of HI Walzer has demonstrated that a universalist ethic 
and a communitarian commitment to the moral worth of the political 
community are not, as many liberal theorists argue, irreconcilable. Similarly, 
he has provided the means to claim, w ithout recourse to first principles, that 
certain HR standards are sufficiently established across international society
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to provide grounds for the modification of our current understanding of NS and 
of its breaching for humanitarian ends.
This chapter asserts that the tendency o f W alzer’s critics to focus exclusively 
on his initial definition of self-determ ination, to the detrim ent o f his more 
progressive prescriptions for the developm ent o f international society, has 
tended to overshadow his contribution to the international justice debate. In 
fact, his willingness to license HI as a response to the systematic and 
widespread breaching of certain normative standards indicates that W alzer’s 
views on the relationship between sta tes’ rights and HR are sufficiently radical 
to support the claim that he adopts a transform ative onto logy consistent with a 
communitarian constructivist fram ework. His principle o f reiterative 
universalism is the cornerstone of his understanding o f the possibility of 
change in international politics. It allows him to balance his belief that “all in 
all, we cannot be happy with the current state of the w orld”461 with an 
appreciation of the constraints imposed by the consensual nature of the state 
system. Perhaps more intriguingly it also informs his suggestion that it is 
these very constraints which the term s o f reiterative universalism may 
ultimately come to challenge and unpack.
In order to trace the processes of becoming which have altered the tone of 
Walzer’s conception of international justice and which, he hopes, may yet 
come to reshape international society itself, this chapter will begin by outlining 
the most familiar elements of the W alzerian approach to HI. This will entail an
461 Michael Walzer, Arguing about War, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2004), p.179
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overview of his definition of self-determ ination, his appraisal of the Legalist 
Paradigm, and his identification of possible exceptions to it. It is at this 
juncture that most analyses of W alzer’s theory begin and end, generally with 
the dismissive suggestion that he lacks the conceptual tools to frame 
consistent moral claims and that as such his argum ent is little more than a 
form of “deeply conservative normative com m unitarianism ” 462 However, this 
over-worn characterisation does not w ithstand critical scrutiny, especially in 
light of his more recent arguments in favour o f what he terms the “third degree 
of global pluralism”;463 a concept which seeks to disperse political power 
among states, non-governmental organisations, intergovernmental, and 
regional centres. It is in this ambitious context that W alzer’s understanding of 
becoming reaches its logical conclusion and ultim ately offers us “a real 
alternative to the dominant neo-Kantian cosm opolitan tradition and a workable 
ethical framework for thinking about the challenges of contemporary 
international politics and international law” .464 As this chapter will attempt to 
establish, Walzer uses this fram ework to dem onstrate how an international 
duty of justice can be grounded in, and constructed by, principles rendered 
universal through reiteration. However, this chapter will also engage with the 
suggestion that even as W alzer’s prescriptions for change have grown more 
ambitious, his tendency to neglect the im pact o f gender on the construction of 
power relations has left certain elements o f his theorising somewhat under­
developed.
462 Peter Sutch, ‘International Justice and the Reform of Global Governance. A 
Reconsideration of Michael W alzer’s International Political Theory, Review o f International 
Studies, 35, 2009, pp.513-530, pp.516
463 Walzer, Arguing, p. 188
Sutch, International Justice, pp.513
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II. The Theoretical Basis for Humanitarian Intervention 
i. Self-Determination
The evolution of W alzer’s approach to international justice cannot be fully 
comprehended without a detailed analysis of his early work; in particular his 
conception of the nature and origins of justice. For the W alzer of Just and 
Unjust Wars (a volume which was first published in 1977) justice derives from 
the particular political community to which one belongs. The ideal for 
international politics would be for relatively atomistic, individual states to 
practice self-determination and for the territorial integrity o f these units to be 
respected. In other words, in an ideal model of international politics the limits 
of any duty of justice map neatly onto the geographical boundaries which 
define and contain our political community. The state into which we are born, 
or in which we make our home, informs our understanding o f morality, which 
is liable to differ enormously from that of other individuals who have been 
similarly influenced by their own political culture. Therefore, the danger of 
covering-law universalism (the suggestion that a wide range of a priori moral 
principles can secure agreement across numerous and disparate cultures) is 
that it is likely to result either in the homogenisation of cultures along 
ethnocentric lines, or, more probably, in conflict between states. Non­
intervention is the logical corollary of NS, which W alzer considers to be the 
most fundamental operational principle o f international society. After all, as 
the ICISS asserts:
sovereignty is fo r m any s ta tes the ir best — and som etim es seem ing ly  on ly -
line o f defence... sovere ign ty  is m ore than ju s t a functiona l princip le o f
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in ternational re la tions... it is a lso a recogn ition  o f the ir equal worth and dignity, 
a protection o f the ir unique identities, and the ir national freedom, and an 
affirm ation o f the ir right to shape and determ ine  the ir own destiny.465
It is important to note that W alzer’s defence of NS has tended to be 
caricatured by his critics as intrinsically and irredeemably conservative. 
However, even at this early stage of his career it was not his intention to 
suggest that moral progress within international society was inconceivable. 
Rather he has always argued that the processes of becoming, whilst vital to 
interaction within and between states, have their roots at the level of individual 
political communities. HR abuses or drastic inequalities can be, in Buchanan’s 
terms, “subject to assessment from the standpoint of justice”466 but, for 
Walzer, “the fight against those inequalities” must “begin within existing 
political communities” and then “aim at the progressive expansion... of 
existing solidarities” .467 This conviction is both communitarian (in its 
acknowledgement of the moral primacy of the political community) and 
constructivist (in its belief that the moral standards of individual states can 
impact upon the identities and interests which constitute wider international 
society). However it does rely, to some extent, on the assertion that the 
political community or state is the most appropriate avenue for self-realisation; 
a suggestion which many fem inist commentators would claim takes 
inadequate account of the gendered hierarchies which preclude the full scale 
self-realisation of women in the vast majority of political communities.
ICISS, 1.32
466 Buchanan, Justice, p.83
467 Michael Walzer, ‘Response to Veit Bader’, Political Theory, 23(2), 1995, pp.249
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Nevertheless, W alzer’s communitarian conviction that the seeds for reform 
are sown at the national level relates closely to his initial characterisation of 
the relationship between self-determ ination and non-intervention. In the first 
editions of Just and Unjust Wars, the concept of intervening in defence of a 
civilian population is barely addressed and, in subsequent editions, it is 
established as an exception to the JW prohibition on the use of force; 
recourse to which ought only to be permitted under the most extreme of 
circumstances. In further defence of this position, Walzer elucidates at some 
length (in an article written in response to critics of his best known book) the 
reasons that foreign intervention into the domestic affairs of a political 
community is almost always ill-advised; arguing that the practice tends toward 
the disruption of international order and demonstrates insufficient deference to 
the relationship between citizen and state.
The state is constitu ted  by the  un ion o f people and governm ent, and it is the 
state that c la im s aga ins t all o the r s ta tes the tw in rights o f te rritoria l integrity 
and political sovere ign ty . Fore igners are in no position to deny the reality o f 
that union, or, rather, th e y  are in no position to a ttem pt anyth ing more than 
speculative den ia ls . T hey  d o n ’t know  enough about its history, and they have 
no d irect experience , and can form  no concrete judgem ents, o f the conflicts 
and harm onies, and h is to rica l cho ices and cultura l affin ities, the loyalties and 
resentm ents, tha t unde rlie  it. H ence the ir conduct, in the firs t instance at least, 
cannot be de te rm ined  by e ith e r know ledge or judgem ent. It is, o r it ought to 
be, determ ined instead by a m ora lly  necessary presum ption: tha t there exists 
a certain ‘f it ’ be tw een the  com m un ity  and its governm ent and that the state is 
‘leg itim ate ’. It is not a gang o f ru lers acting in its own interests, but a people 
governed in acco rdance  w ith  its own trad itions. This presum ption is sim ply the 
respect tha t fo re ig n e rs  ow e to  an h istoric com m unity  and to its internal life. 
Like o ther p resum ptions  in m ora lity  and law, it can be rebutted and 
d isregarded, and w h a t I have ca lled ‘the rules o f d is regard ’ are as im portant
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as the presum ption  itself. So long as it stands, however, the boundaries of
international soc ie ty  s tand w ith  it.468
In short, the rule of non-intervention is neither fixed nor absolute but the 
circumstances under which it may be overturned must be inordinately narrow 
and specific. In defining the exceptional circumstances which might permit 
intervention, Walzer draws heavily upon John Stuart Mill’s defence of the right 
to self-determination, thereby establishing one of the principle forces behind 
his own communitarian reputation. Once again, the right of any political
community to maintain its territorial integrity and manage its own internal
affairs is defended by W alzer in the vast majority o f instances. He reiterates 
Mill’s assertion that:
[w]e are to trea t s ta tes as se lf-de te rm in ing  com m un ities ... w he the r or not the ir 
internal political a rrangem en ts  are  free, w h e th e r o r not the c itizens choose 
their governm ent and open ly  deba te  the  po lic ies carried ou t in the ir name. For 
self-determ ination and po litica l freedom  are  not equ iva len t te rm s.469
Accordingly, intervention cannot necessarily be employed with a view to 
assisting those who find them selves bereft of, for example, democratic 
freedoms, since it is not desirable for liberation to be imparted by an external 
force. In Walzer’s own words
[a] state is se lf-de te rm in ing  if its c itizens strugg le  and fa il to  estab lish  free 
institutions, but it has been dep rived  o f se lf-de te rm ina tion  if such institu tions 
are established by an in trus ive  ne ighbour. The m em bers o f a political 
com m unity m ust seek th e ir ow n fre e d o m .470
468 Michael Walzer, The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics’, Philosophy 
and Public Affairs, 9(3), Spring 1980, pp.209-229, pp.212
469 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations,
ewYork, Basics Books, 2000), p.87 
Ibid
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Appropriating Mill’s notion of “arduous struggle”471 W alzer argues that those 
seeking to establish popular institutions within their own state must 
demonstrate that they “are willing to brave labour and danger for their own 
liberation”.472 Summarising M ill’s argument, W alzer contends that, in almost 
all cases, its tenets prevent “any substitution of foreign intervention for internal 
struggle”.473
Self-determ ination, then , is the  righ t o f a peop le  ‘to  becom e free by the ir own 
efforts ’ if they can, and non -in te rve n tion  is the  princ ip le  guaran tee ing  that the ir 
success will not be im peded  or th e ir fa ilu re  p revented  by the intrusions o f an 
alien power.474
Again, the suggestion is that becoming begins at the national level. In 
constructivist terms, it may be the case that developing international norms 
will inspire resistance or even revolution among a local population. Equally, 
tyrannical or dictatorial leaders may modify their behaviours as a response to 
diplomatic or political pressures, or in an attempt to improve their own 
standing within international society. However, such developments cannot be 
enforced by ‘outsiders’. Irrespective of the pride which we may take in our 
own political community the dem ands of justice as W alzer presents them in 
his early work, ensure that we have no right to attempt to recreate others in its 
image.
In conjunction with this Millian viewpoint, W alzer goes on to outline the terms 
of the Legalist Paradigm; a further defence of NS and non-intervention. As
47Hbid
472 Ibid
473 Ibid, p.88
474 . . . .
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regards HI, the three most pertinent terms o f the paradigm run as follows: 
Firstly, “there exists an international society o f states” and whilst these states, 
as the subjects of PIL, “are founded for the sake of life and liberty, they cannot 
be challenged in the name of life and liberty by any other states. Hence the 
principle of non-intervention”; Secondly, “this international society has a law 
that establishes the rights of its members -  above all, the rights of territorial 
integrity and political sovereignty” , both of which have traditionally been 
jealously guarded and defended in international society; and thirdly, “any use 
of force or imminent threat o f force by one state against the political 
sovereignty or territorial integrity o f another constitutes aggression and is a 
criminal act” 475
However, having established the terms of the paradigm, W alzer proceeds to 
part company with Mill and his faith in the need for arduous struggle as the 
only means of securing self-determ ination, by defining three exceptions to it. 
He states that “the ban on boundary crossing is not absolute”476 and can be 
overturned in the following circumstances: “When a particular set of 
boundaries clearly contains two or more political communities, one of which is 
already engaged in a large-scale m ilitary struggle for independence” , that is to 
say in instances of secession or national liberation; “When the boundaries 
have already been crossed by the arm ies of a foreign power” , and, 
consequently, what is at stake is in fact an act of counter-intervention; and 
finally, with specific reference to HI, W alzer creates a third exception which 
governs cases where “the violation of human rights within a set of boundaries 
is so terrible that it makes talk o f community or self-determination... seem
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J  cynical and irrelevant, that is, in cases of enslavement or massacre”.477 The 
final exception demonstrates the limits o f self-determination since “when a 
people are being massacred, we don’t require that they pass the test of self- 
help before coming to their aid. It is their very incapacity that brings us in”.478
!
ii. Reiterative Universalism
Walzer’s willingness to impose lim itations on territorial integrity is indicative of 
his belief in the concept of “thin universalism ” 479 Even in the context of the 
cultural diversity which he celebrates, W alzer creates a theoretical space for 
an international duty of justice and acknowledges that a certain category of 
‘crime against humanity’ is sufficiently egregious as to nullify the bond 
I between citizen and state, and provide justification for some degree of foreign
' intervention. This is due to the fact that there exists an area of consensus
which can transcend cultural specificity, and the values which constitute it are 
universalisable. This notion finds expression in 1994’s Thick and Thin: Moral 
Argument at Home and Abroad, which is an attempt by W alzer to reconcile 
i his communitarian comm itm ent to the inherent value of self-determination,
i with his desire to establish a form o f “moral m inimalism”,480 accessible and
comprehensible to all human beings, regardless of social and historical 
conditioning, and to arrive at a balance between “transnational super-values 
and discrete cultural values” .481 As W heeler puts it,
477 Ibid
478 Ibid, p. 106
479 See Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad, (Notre Dame, 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2002)
480 Wheeler, Agency, pp. 11
481 William Thornton, ‘Internationalism after the Cold W ar’, International Journal o f Politics, 
Culture and Society, 14(2), 2000, pp.325
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W alzer seeks to em bed his unde rs tand ing  o f com m on hum anity w ith an
appreciation o f the con tinge ncy  o f hum an sub jec tiv ity  482
The contention is that certain minimal values are expressed and understood 
across a range of cultures and political communities, by means of reiteration. 
As the mobility of modern societies increases, we find ourselves subject to an 
ever expanding number of human encounters. With each of these 
experiences comes the opportunity both to convey information regarding our 
own social practices and to garner insights into those of others. Walzer 
envisages a scenario in which “we must explain and defend ourselves, ground 
our complaints, justify our claims, situate ourselves within the moral world” .483 
In so doing, we will likely discover a range of ways in which our society can be 
differentiated from any other. However, more significantly, we will also note 
that certain of our values will resonate across almost all our human 
encounters. The terms in which these values are expressed are likely to be 
inconsistent such that the concept o f respect, for example “is itself 
differentiated and its names are multiplied: honour, dignity, worth, standing, 
recognition, esteem, and so on”484 will appear as euphemisms for it. These 
“family resemblances” ,485 manifest themselves when the value at stake is 
‘thin’ enough to generate consensus and, in this respect, the relationship 
between reiterative universalism and the assertion that meaning derives from 
social construction and interaction is significant. After all,
482 Wheeler, Agency, pp.11
483 Walzer, Nation, pp.532
484 Ibid, pp.530
485 Ibid, pp.534
264
Being and Becoming: Humanitarian Intervention and the Constructed Duty o f Justice Claire Malcolm
[t]he rights o f life and libe rty  are... based on a com m on ly  held perception (or 
fam ily o f pe rcep tions) o f w ha t it m eans to be a hum an be ing .486
Standing in opposition to cosmopolitanism , defined as “the standard 
philosophical effort to bring all human activities, all social arrangements, all 
political practices, under... a single conception of the right or the good” ,487 
reiterative universalism thus provides an explanation for the manner in which 
morality is formed and re-formed by experience. It also encourages cultural 
pluralism by affirming that “subject to minimal universal constraints there are 
many different and valuable ways of life that have equal rights to flourish in 
their respective locations, and deserve equal respect to our own” 488
These minimal constraints arise through negotiation between political 
communities. The negotiations them selves are conducted by the leaders and 
diplomatic representatives o f individual states. In essence, the consensus 
generated in these interactions defines the content of ‘international morality’ 
and, as such, the scope of any international duty o f justice. The terms in 
which Walzer frames this argum ent reaffirm the decision to categorise him as 
a constructivist.
The idea o f re ite ra tion ... re flec ts  an unders tand ing  tha t m ora lity  is m ade again 
and again; hence the re  canno t be a s ing le  s tab le  covering law. Moral 
creativity is p lura l in its in c idence  and d iffe ren tia ted  in its ou tcom es — and yet, 
it is not w ho lly  d iffe ren tia ted , as if the  agen ts  and sub jec ts  o f all m ora lities had 
no com m on kinship. In fact, they  can recogn ise  them se lves  and one another 
as moral m akers, and from  th is  recogn ition  the re  fo llow s the m in im alist 
universalism  o f re ite ra tion .489
Ibid, pp.530
487 Ibid, pp.533
488 David Boucher, The  Law of Nations and the Doctrine of Terra Nullius , (forthcoming)
489 Walzer, ‘Nation’, pp.533
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Accordingly, Walzer contends that it is relatively easy to achieve consensus 
over that which is universally comprehensible, irrespective of particularist 
influences, since ‘th in ’ values “evoke and provoke intense reaction”490; 
whereas, with thicker moral understandings come “qualification, compromise, 
complexity, and disagreement’” .491 On this basis, a hierarchy of sorts emerges 
in the discourse of HR. The rights, values, and expectations which are 
universal in nature can generally be classified as rights of life and liberty 
which, when compromised through humanitarian crises, generate scope for a 
military response. Therefore, W alzer maintains that in instances where these 
core rights are imperilled (“ in those extraordinary cases where governments 
are committing acts of m ass-m urder” )492 the state authority ought to be denied 
the protection afforded by NS, since its representatives are “guilty of crimes 
against humanity”.493
In sum, whilst the presumption must always operate in favour of non­
intervention, the moral fram ework generated by reiterative universalism would 
appear to dictate that when the actions o f a state, to use an archaic phrase 
much beloved of Walzer, ‘shock the conscience of mankind’ some form of 
moral obligation to protect beleaguered civilian populations results. The 
nature and extent of this obligation is key to the w ider issue of the limitations 
of an international duty o f justice.
Walzer, Thick and Thin, p.6
491 „  . , ^Ibid
492 Walzer, ‘Nation’, pp. 106
493 Ibid
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iii. The Evolution of Reiterative Universalism
Reiterative universalism, then, provides an explanation for the mechanisms 
which govern change in international society and allows us to contend that a 
limited international duty o f justice m ight result from extreme violations of the 
core rights of life and liberty. It provides us with a communitarian constructivist 
framework for identifying those “negative injunctions”494 by which all societies 
can reasonably be expected to abide. In extreme cases, the infringement of 
these standards might even provide grounds for third party intervention. 
However, as Sutch has suggested, the perception of becoming which this 
early reading of reiterative universalism  informs is necessarily restrictive and 
arguably temporary 495 This is because it is W alzer’s contention, at least in his 
initial exploration of the concept, that the international HR standards 
achievable through, and implied by, ‘thin universalism ’, and the “moral 
maximalisms”496 shared by members o f a specific political community remain 
separate entities.
We do m ake... g loba lis t a ssu m p tio n s  but on ly  in the  con tex t o f in ternational 
political crises and w e do no t go on to  inco rpo ra te  these  assum ptions  into the 
moral h ierarchy o f ou r e ve ryd a y  live s .497
This certainly appears to be a reasonable interpretation of W alzer’s position 
during the early part of his career. It also accounts in part for the inconsistent 
and unsatisfactory way in which he has tended to distinguish between those 
rights which might be considered universal and those which are culturally and
494 Walzer, Thick and Thin, p. 10
495 Sutch, ‘International Justice’, pp.520
496 Ibid, pp.527
4Q7 r
Ibid, pp.520
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historically contingent to such a degree that they cannot be expected to 
transcend borders. As Sutch affirms, W alzer’s tentative initial suggestion that 
the definition of universal rights is “som ehow entailed by our sense of what it 
means to be a human being”498 is both weak and incompatible with an 
otherwise largely communitarian approach to international society.499
Intriguingly, however, W alzer’s understanding of reiterative universalism is as 
vulnerable to the processes o f becoming as any other concept or practice 
within IR, and the changing political backdrop against which he has developed 
his ideas has served to reconceptualise the nature and limits of this 
communitarian constructivist principle. In simple terms, the dynamics of 
globalisation have begun to ensure that our ‘human encounters’ are no longer 
infrequent or elite driven. From a fem inist constructivist perspective, this is all- 
important since female political actors would so rarely have been in a position 
to influence and appraise justice claims in W alzer’s original framework of 
reiterative universalism. However, his reworked (though still gendered) 
version of the principle is slightly more inclusive. In the context of HI, for 
example: the enormous influence and access of the global media; the 
proliferation of non-governmental organisations concerned with the protection 
of HR; and the increased mobility o f ordinary individuals, have all served to 
bring the reality of systematic abuse and neglect to the forefront o f our moral 
and political considerations. This, in turn, has increased the diplomatic 
pressure on governments to conform to a more demanding conception of HR 
than the principle of non-intervention could ever have imposed. We no longer
498 Walzer, Just and Unjust, p.54
Sutch, ‘International Justice’, pp.516
268
Being and Becoming: Humanitarian Intervention and the Constructed Duty o f Justice Claire Malcolm
restrict our ‘urgent moral judgem ents’ to ‘times of crisis’. Instead, the 
diplomatic dialogue of international society is constantly contending with the 
language of HR and the matter o f how to respond to their infringement.
The sorts o f crises tha t w e find  in to le rab le  and im pe lled  to  act upon are 
becoming (or have becom e) a fix tu re  in ou r po litica l lives and the political 
constitution o f in te rna tiona l soc ie ty  has adap ted  to the  po in t w here  the basic 
assum ptions o f sovere ign ty , non -in te rve n tion , se lf-de te rm ina tion , and o f the 
anarchical socie ty do not m ake sense  o f o u r m ora l and po litica l com m itm ents. 
In short, we have re ite ra ted  and shared  reasons fo r need ing to  change the 
shape of world po litics ... [t]he te m p o ra ry  casu is tica l and re ite ra tive  process of 
norm construction has itse lf deve lop ed  as the  cons titu tive  con tex t o f world 
politics has change d ... [C o nsequ en tly ], these  th in  m ora l un iversa ls  have 
become, o r are becom ing , fre e s ta n d in g  -  a part o f o u r ‘com m on hum an 
reason’ provid ing au tono m o us  m ora l reasons  th a t transcend  th e ir o rig ins .500
In other words, “[OJnce established in the moral consciousness of 
international society” ,501 moral principles rendered universal through 
reiteration begin to permeate the understanding of morality which we carry 
with us in our daily lives.
[T]hese princ ip les becom e m ore  than the recogn ition  o f som e ‘partial 
com m onality in a to ta lly  se p a ra te  ‘o th e r’; they  becom e a critica l tool. The 
consequence o f th is  is th a t w e com e to  recogn ise  th a t ou r th in, but in tensely 
important, m oral m in im um  no longe r finds adequa te  expression  in 
m em bership o f a sove re ign  n a tion -s ta te  in a loose in te rna tiona l soc ie ty .502
This is distinct from a liberal universalist reading of HR and the state system, 
which is based on the assumption that such rights exist independently of
500 Ibid
501 ,, • .
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consensus and institutionalisation. Nevertheless, it can support comparable 
moral claims as to the need to reform those elements of international society 
which are palpably failing to enforce the evolving moral minimum identified by 
Walzer. So it is that Walzer, so often dism issed as irretrievably conservative in 
his approach to the state system, employs the ontology of becoming to argue 
that this very system may have outlived its usefulness. This is not to suggest 
that he advocates the dismantling of the current fram ework of international 
politics. Rather, he has modified his theory to take account o f the fact that the 
“solid lines on the old cultural map are turned into dotted lines”503 and this has 
laid the foundations for a set o f obligations and an international duty of justice 
which is far more expansive than his early work m ight have suggested. Key to 
Walzer's argument is the assertion that this duty has been constructed  
through the human encounters at the heart o f his principle o f reiterative 
universalism. It is this process which has infused it with its moral authority and 
its international legitimacy and which also ensures that it remains restricted to 
those values which are genuinely palatable to a diverse range of political 
communities. An obvious gender-based critique of this position persists, 
inasmuch as consensus surrounding the injustice of gender inequality 
remains illusive. Nevertheless, W alzer’s evolving conception of reiterative 
universalism and becoming serves to indicate the existence o f norm-based 
mechanisms for change which, whilst not conceived in these terms by Walzer, 
may ultimately lay the foundations for unpacking and problematising gender- 
based inequalities.
503 Michael Walzer, The  Politics of Difference: Statehood and Toleration in a Multicultural 
World’, Ratio Juris, 10(2), 1997, pp.168
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iv. Reiterative Universalism and Becoming
It has so far been established that W alzer’s principle of reiterative 
universalism, as originally defined, is sufficient to the task of justifying HI in 
the most extreme of cases. This is because it demonstrates that a broad 
international consensus exists in defence o f the ‘negative injunctions’ against 
the most severe of HR infringements. Failure to adhere to these minimal 
standards overrides the dictates of self-determ ination and allows for HI.
However, Walzer’s position is rendered increasingly radical in light of the 
recent modifications which he has made to his original theory. According to 
his arguments in favour o f the ‘third degree of global pluralism ’, the normative 
consensus in favour o f HI, or at least in favour o f the concept of conditional 
sovereignty of which it is a component, has the potential to become one of the 
reiterated and shared values at the heart o f international society. If this is 
indeed the case, then the privileged status of the peremptory norms of NS 
and non-intervention may not be assured. As our ‘th in ’ and international moral 
prescriptions are gradually absorbed into our thick and culturally specific 
‘moral maximalisms’, a process made possible by the changing dynamics of 
international politics, the lim its o f our toleration for HR abuses are 
incrementally tightened. Our interpretations of moral principles remain 
culturally differentiated but the set o f values over which consensus can be 
said to exist continues to expand. In constructivist terms, the ‘realities’ of 
international politics are, themselves, formed and reformed such that the 
reiterated ‘social facts’ o f IR begin to change. It is on this basis that W alzer is 
able to suggest that “the constitutive norms of international society that once
271
Being and Becoming: Humanitarian Intervention and the Constructed Duty o f Justice Claire Malcolm
prioritised strict adherence to the principle of self-determ ination... now criticise 
such prioritisation”.504 This evolving perception of NS is not so widely 
embraced as to displace a more traditional reading of the concept. In fact, it is 
the erroneous assumption that ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ already 
represents a settled norm of international society which often undermines the 
value of cosmopolitan theorising. Nevertheless, there is scope for it to weave 
its way into the fabric of international society and, even if fails to do so, its 
current moral status is enough to invigorate debates over the most 
appropriate response to HR abuses. The implications of this argument for the 
development of international justice find expression in an analysis of HI.
II. The Components of Hum anitarian Intervention
i. Just Cause
The appraisal of the relationship between reiterative universalism, becoming, 
and HI must entail an overview of the circumstances which might justify or 
permit the breaching of territorial integrity. The conceptual category of ‘just 
cause’ has its basis in the JW  tradition, which was itself an attempt to regulate 
the recourse to armed conflict and to erode the understanding that the 
declaration of war ought to be considered as a sovereign right. Although, in 
terms of modern PIL, the only legal exceptions to the prohibition on the use of 
force are self-defence and UNSC authorisation, the debate surrounding HI 
has led to the suggestion that this legalistic interpretation is overly narrow and 
allows for the routine violation of HR to go unpunished. The value of Walzer’s
504 Sutch, ‘International Justice’, pp.523
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reiterative universalism in advancing such discussions lies in the assertion 
that minimal universal standards of human conduct, and expectation, can be 
identified and defended; and that all human societies must necessarily reflect 
a combination of particularist and universalist dimensions; “universal because 
it is human, particular because it is a society” .505 Therefore, the suggestion 
that certain experiences are so universally fam iliar that “pretty much anyone 
looking on will see something here that they recognise”506 can be 
reconceptualised to incorporate cases of HR abuses. The result is that all 
observers are able to recognise egregious violations of HR and “[t]he sum of 
these recognitions is what is meant by minimal morality” ,507 or in this case, 
just cause.
In the past, this has represented the full extent o f W alzer’s argument and his 
defence of intervention, of any kind, has been restricted to the most extreme 
cases of tyranny or anarchy. In his early work he employs the thin 
universalism framework to distinguish responses to the regrettable, yet, as he 
sees it, insoluble routine violations o f HR, which characterise much of world 
politics, from the acts which can truly be said to shock humankind; 
specifically, massacre and genocide. This w illingness to demarcate certain 
crimes and label them as acts o f ‘radical oppression’, in contrast to that which 
might be considered as ‘ordinary oppression ’ is arguably one of the most 
controversial elements of W alzer’s early defence of non-intervention and 
certainly the aspect of his theory which is most vehem ently criticised by 
feminists. On his original view, the distinction between thick and thin values
505 Walzer, Thick and Thin, p. 10
5 0 6  iu ;j oIbid, p.6
507 ~Ibid, p.6
273
Being and Becoming: Humanitarian Intervention and the Constructed Duty o f Justice Claire Malcolm
provides an explanation for the fact that some traditions which the West might 
consider to be aberrations (such as female genital mutilation) are embedded 
in the cultures wherein they are practiced and cannot therefore be considered 
to shock the conscience of the totality of humankind, in the same way as 
widespread slaughter and enslavement. As such, they do not conform to the 
criteria which provide grounds for forcible or m ilitary intervention. This 
suggestion has met with hostility from liberal political philosophers. For 
instance, Gerald Doppelt argues that “a state may be extremely tyrannical and 
unfree”,508 yet fail to meet the threshold for intervention as defined by Walzer. 
Doppelt is disturbed that
[0 ]n  W a lze r’s lega lis t pa rad igm , such a sta te , regard less  o f h ow  tyrannica l 
and unfree it m ay be, p o ssesses  the  inde feas ib le  rights o f political 
sovereignty; and in such cases  fo re ign  m ilita ry  in te rve n tio n ... is a lways 
morally w rong .509
This is due to the fact that W alzer’s early commitment to self-determination 
dictates that, in his view, it is neither practical nor moral, to license HI in 
anything other than the most extrem e cases. In short, he does not seek to
[d]escribe a con tinuum  tha t beg ins  w ith  com m on nastiness and ends w ith 
genocide, but ra ther a rad ica l b reak, a chasm , w ith  nastiness on one side and 
genocide on the  o ther. W e shou ld  not a llow  ou rse lves  to  approach  genocide 
by degrees.510
508 ‘Walzer’s Theory of Morality in International Relations’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 8(1), 
Autumn 1978, pp.3-26, pp.8
509 Ibid, pp.8-9
510 Michael Walzer, Arguing for Humanitarian Intervention, Nicolaus Mills and Kira Brunner 
(eds), The New Killing Fields: Massacre and the Politics o f Intervention, (New York, Basic 
Books, 2003), p.20
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Therefore, as he states in The Politics o f Rescue:
Hum anitarian in te rven tions are not ju s tifie d  fo r the  sake o f dem ocracy, or free 
enterprise, or econom ic  jus tice , o r vo lun ta ry  assoc ia tion , or any o ther o f the 
social practices and a rrangem en ts  tha t w e m igh t hope fo r o r even call fo r in 
other peop le ’s coun trie s .511
He claims that instead
[we] are best served... by a s ta rk  and m in im a lis t ve rs ion  o f hum an rights... it is 
life and liberty tha t a re at s take ...S till, w e  could as eas ily  say tha t w hat is 
being enforced, and w h a t shou ld  be en fo rced , is s im p le  dece n cy .512
According to this minimalist understanding o f international morality, only the 
systematic and genocidal violation of HR can produce a level of injustice 
which allows for the breaching o f sovereign borders to take place, in 
accordance with the doctrine of “supreme em ergency” .513 This element of 
‘emergency ethics’ is a com m unitarian argum ent based on the claim that 
political communities, have the right to protect themselves from annihilation, 
sometimes even at the expense o f certain elements of PIL. In order for 
emergency ethics to be applicable, the danger must be extreme, such that 
“our community is threatened... in what we might think of as its 
ongoingness”.514 Only in this context when
[w]e face a loss tha t is g re a te r than  any  w e  can im agine... W e face m oral as 
well as physical ex tinc tion , the  end o f a w ay o f life as w e ll as o f a set o f 
particular lives, the  d isa p p e a ra n ce  o f peop le  like us, [m igh t we] be driven to 
break through the m ora l lim its  th a t peop le  like us no rm a lly  a ttend to and 
respect.515
511 Walzer, Arguing, p.68
512 Ibid, p.76
513 Ibid, p.33
514 Ibid, p.43
515 i L 1 j
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Accordingly, as an engagement with W heeler’s account o f just cause has 
demonstrated, the doctrine of supreme em ergency is intrinsically connected to 
the ‘rules of disregard’ which allow us to move beyond the assumption of ‘fit’ 
between citizen and state, when appeals to self-determ ination are nullified by 
HR abuses.
There are m om ents w hen  the  ru les  can be and pe rhaps have to  be 
overridden. They have to be ove rridden  p rec ise ly  because they  have not 
been suspended. And o ve rrid ing  the  ru les leaves gu ilt behind, as a 
recognition o f the eno rm ity  o f w h a t w e have  done  and a com m itm en t not to 
make our actions into an easy p receden t fo r the  fu tu re .516
In other words, emergency ethics allow us to honour in the breach the rules of 
non-intervention but only as a response to the most ‘conscience shocking’ of 
crimes.
(a) The Limitations of Non-Intervention
An obvious two-pronged critique o f this position relates, firstly, to the open- 
ended terms in which W alzer defines crimes against humanity and, secondly 
to his attempt to separate his conception of physical security from other 
equally pressing considerations. For instance, many people might be inclined 
to argue that mass-starvation or institutionalised discrim ination are 
themselves ‘indecent’ and, certainly, a vast evidential basis suggests that 
marked disparities in wealth and opportunity are as costly in terms of human 
lives as the sporadic outbreak of genocidal violence. In defence o f this 
apparent shortcoming, it is noteworthy that W alzer is explicit in his willingness
516 Ibid, p.34
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to ascertain the existence of just cause on a “case-by-case” basis. Therefore, 
the use of broad categories is arguably a deliberate mechanism to guarantee 
flexibility and increase the possibility that HI may find favour within 
international society. After all, states, and the international organisations to 
which they belong, are unlikely to subscribe to standards which are overly 
exacting, and institutionalising weak or heavily caveated commitments is not 
necessarily valuable unto itself. As to the matter of broadening the definition 
of crimes against humanity beyond the ‘loud emergencies’ of ethnic cleansing, 
mass-deportation, and enslavement to take account of, for example, what 
Henry Shue referred to as the ‘silent genocide’ of starvation, or what gender 
analysis reveals as the entrenched and unequal power relations which 
perpetuate discrimination and persecution, W alzer is addressing himself 
specifically to the use o f force, which, in his view, is an inappropriate response 
to anything but widespread physical violence and one which itself inevitably 
results in loss of life. As such, the litmus test for those actions which may 
justify forcible intervention must be enormously demanding. Perhaps 
surprisingly, many fem inist commentators characterise the resort to force in 
comparable terms.
Nevertheless, even W alzer has now conceded that the demarcation between 
ordinary and radical oppression is inadequate, since the former is so often a 
precursor to the latter. With this in mind, he has now moved beyond the 
concepts of Jus in Bello and Jus ad Bellum  to outline the circumstances which 
might give rise to Jus ad vim ; the just use of “force short of war” .517 Of course
517 Michael Walzer, ‘Regime Change and Just War’, Dissent [online], Summer 2006, 
http://www.dissentmaqazine.ora/article/?article=663. [06/08/09]
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this overturns the presumption that the use of force can only ever be justified 
as a last resort:
[F ]orce-short-o f-w ar obv ious ly  com es before  w a r itself. The argum ent about 
ju s  ad be llum  needs to  be extended, there fo re , to ju s  ad  vim. W e urgently 
need a theory o f ju s t and un jus t uses o f force. Th is shou ldn ’t be an overly 
to lerant or perm issive  theory, but it w ill ce rta in ly  be more perm issive than the 
theory o f ju s t and un just w a r.518
For Walzer, then, ju s  ad vim connects to what the ICISS refers to as the ‘duty 
to prevent’ and necessitates a reconsideration of the category of just cause. 
The threshold for force short o f war is necessarily more permissive than the 
actions which justify full blown w ar but still largely restricted to a regime which 
has “acted aggressively or murderously in the past” and given “reason to think 
that it might do so again” .519 In such cases, external forces can support and 
even anticipate local demands for increased freedoms but they cannot 
consciously initiate regime change.
[tjh is isn ’t an un just an tic ipa tion , s ince the sta tes o rgan is ing the containm ent 
don’t them selves o ve rth row  the old reg im e, and they don ’t estab lish the new 
one, if there is a new  one. T hey  are opera ting  at the edge o f the non­
intervention princip le , but no t in v io la tion  o f it.520
This looser interpretation of non-intervention would seem to suggest that 
Walzer allows for the processes of becoming to be expedited when the will for 
reform is seemingly present among a local population. This may also be
518
519
520
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
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achieved through the use of “politics-short-of-force”;521 in essence offering 
support to those elements of civil society which aim at creating conditions for 
change. Once again, it seems clear that W alzer’s erstwhile communitarian 
commitment to the sanctity o f national borders has been eroded by the 
development of an increasingly morally and politically integrated international 
community. He is now prepared to contend that becoming, defined in this 
case as the possible transition to democratic governance, can be partially 
implemented through measures such as carefully targeted economic 
sanctions, or explicit support o f civil society movements. The focus on ‘politics 
short of force’ highlights the potential for W alzer’s approach to international 
justice to embrace a broader conception of becoming which is more amenable 
to those concerned with ‘routine’ or ‘ordinary’ oppression and inequality. In 
simple terms, the ‘just cause’ for intervention which stops short of war is 
considerably less demanding than the traditional definition of ju s  ad bellum. 
Nonetheless, Walzer remains committed to his belief that the use of force 
itself must be reserved for the most specific and severe of HR violations. Only 
this narrow category of crime falls within the remit of ‘emergency ethics’.
ii. Agency
Another key element of W alzer’s approach to HI which is inconsistent with his 
reputation as a conservative communitarian concerns the matter of agency. 
Again the findings of PIL make the case very clearly; only the UNSC and 
those empowered by it can claim the requisite legal authority to engage in 
acts of HI. The limitations of this assumption are manifold but perhaps the
521 Ibid
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most striking counter-argument relates to the rarity with which sufficient 
consensus can be achieved within the organisation to produce a prompt 
response to humanitarian emergency. The threat or use of the veto by the P5 
and the pursuit of national interest over a commitment to ‘common humanity’ 
plague an institution, which is already compromised by a lack of resources 
and a dearth of political will. It is these deficiencies which, at times of great 
humanitarian crisis, have so frequently made “complicit bystanders”522 of the 
constituent members of the UNSC.
Walzer’s willingness to countenance alternatives to UN authorised HI is, 
therefore, born out of several considerations. Among the most common 
defences of multilateralism is the suggestion that an organisation which takes 
account of the views of a number of states is, by definition, more legitimate 
than the unilateral decisions o f one state. As a detailed exposition of the work 
of Buchanan has sought to explore, this understanding of legitimacy is 
arguably erroneous; with liberals suggesting that the legitimacy of an 
international organisation is directly dependent on that of the individual states 
which constitute it. Even in the absence of this insight, W alzer questions the 
assumption that multilateral decision-making is in some sense inherently 
preferable by claiming that “morality, at least, is not a bar to unilateral 
action”.523 Although, W alzer is keenly aware, that in the current international 
climate, legality does represent just such a bar, he bases his viewpoint on the 
contention that, in instances of large-scale humanitarian emergency, when 
mass-killing is either taking place, or is imminent; the simple reiteration of
522ICISS, 1.22
523 Walzer, Arguing, p.43
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high-minded principles and an unflinching commitment to the doctrine of non­
intervention are rendered indefensible.
Walzer’s initial views on agency are also a direct reflection of the manner in 
which he has tended to categorise HI. Characterising such acts as neither 
right nor obligation, he suggests that the issue of intervention is most 
accurately described as an “imperfect duty” ;524 which effectively refers to a set 
of circumstances in which it is clear that a response is necessitated but it is 
difficult to ascertain who ought to assume responsibility for it. In other words, 
the challenge is to establish “proper authority” .525 In the case of HI, Walzer 
makes reference to situations in which “ [s]omeone should stop the awfulness, 
but it isn’t possible to give that someone a proper name, to point the finger, 
say at a particular country” .526 Under such circumstances, the logic of the 
assumption that it is preferable for intervention to be spearheaded 
multilaterally comes under strain. In W alzer’s view, if the inefficiency and 
political paralysis of such an organisation prevent it from taking action, the 
burden falls to whichever state, or group of states, is empowered to do so;
5 2 7hence his simple maxim “who can... should”.
The notion of imperfect duty is instructive as part of a more general 
appreciation of the nature and limits of an international duty o f justice, since it 
illustrates the manner in which an element of international injustice so rarely 
corresponds with a designated agent, either inclined toward, or capable of,
524 Mills and Brunner (eds), New Killing Fields, p.25
525ICISS, 47
526 Mills and Brunner (eds), New Killing Fields, p.25
527 Walzer, ‘Nation’, pp.107
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mounting an effective response. In short, it is considerably easier to identify 
injustice than it is to identify those who ought to rectify it. In the early 
Walzerian framework, HI is more than a voluntary act of charity but less than 
a full-blown moral obligation and, in some respects, this is true of international 
justice more broadly. The cosmopolitan conviction that meaningful 
international justice depends on the w illingness of state leaders to prioritise 
the interests of those beyond their borders as vociferously as those of their 
citizens528 (an argument which corresponds to justice as duty) is rejected by 
Walzer but so is the suggestion that all moral obligation is contained within 
geographical borders. It is reasonable to suggest that the developments within 
international society which have led W alzer to expand his conception of 
reiterative universalism may also have encouraged him to review his initial 
characterisation of intervention as less than obligatory; such that he has 
acknowledged an increasing number of what might be thought of as 
‘international obligations’. As further enquiry will reveal, perfecting an 
‘imperfect duty’ may even entail substantial reform of the state and UN 
systems. This is because the need to embrace unilateralism is, for Walzer, the 
direct consequence of “the reiterated recognition that the nation state system 
simply cannot deal appropriately with the [humanitarian] crises it faces”.529
This recognition has been engendered, at least in part, by the consistent 
failure of the UN to respond effectively to the outbreak of genocide or ethnic 
cleansing, particularly when it has occurred beyond continental Europe. Not
528 Not all cosmopolitans are committed to this principle. Buchanan and Keohane, for 
example, acknowledge the value of ‘“ Moderate Cosmopolitanism’ which allows one to give a 
limited priority to the interests of one’s own nation and does not require strict impartiality”(See 
The Preventive Use of Force’, pp.4)
529 Sutch, ‘International Justice’, pp.523
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only has the UNSC failed to license HI on its own terms but, in the past, it has 
failed to offer its support to those ‘politically legitimate’ interventions which 
have occurred w ithout its authorisation. As W alzer has consistently 
maintained, many of the best known examples of HI, which have met with 
tacit, or explicit, approval from a range of commentators, such as the 
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, or the Indian incursion into Pakistan, 
would almost certainly have failed to secure a UN mandate. In fact, on each 
occasion, the perpetrators of that which W alzer characterises as a rescue 
were chastised, and often subjected to moral censure and political sanctions. 
For a time it may have appeared that the end of the Cold W ar and the 
expansion of the definition of Chapter VII enforcement powers might serve to 
address these shortcomings. For many commentators this was a time at 
which,
[t]he system centred on the  S ecu rity  C ouncil w as transfo rm ed from  one 
designed to help reso lve  ce rta in  con flic ts  betw een states, when interests 
sufficiently overlapped, to  a system  a lso in tended to prevent extensive 
abuses of state pow er - a t leas t w he re  s ta tes abus ing  pow er w ere w eak -  
over the ir own popu la tion .530
However, despite such (largely short-lived) optimism, it is clear that the 
“propensity for paralysis”531 and indecision still holds the organisation to 
ransom and in the face of humanitarian disaster it remains reactive at best, 
inactive at worst. Hence W alzer’s assertion that
[t]he politics o f the UN is no m ore ed ify ing  than  the po litics o f m any o f its 
members, and, the  dec is ion  to  in te rvene, w h e the r local o r g lobal, w hether it is
530 Mills and Brunner (eds), New Killing Fields, p.25
531 Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Duty to Prevent’, Foreign Affairs [online], 
(January-February 2004), pp. 1-6, http://www.foreianaffairs.org/20040101faessay83113- 
pO/lee-feinstein-anne-marie-slauqhter/a-dutv-to-prevent.html, [07/06/08], pp.5
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made ind iv idua lly  or co llec tive ly  is a lw ays a po litica l decis ion... the collective 
will to act is sure to be as im pure  as the  ind iv idua l w ill to act (and is likely to 
be much s low er).532
With this in mind, the root causes of W alzer’s disillusionment toward the UN 
are easily identifiable, as is the basis of his readiness to dispense with the 
protocols and elements of PIL which limit the opportunities for HI to take 
place, even under the direst o f circumstances. Thus, he maintains that, in the 
absence of effective multilateral enforcem ent action “we will have to look for 
and live with unilateral interventions” .533 Accordingly, W alzer makes no 
apologies for a reliance on unilateralism to further the cause of HI, questioning 
instead the very logic of collective responsibility which originates, to some 
extent, with Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s notion of the ‘General W ill’. This 
principle dictates, in simple terms, that the aggregation of opinion will likely 
produce a compromise which will prevent the vested interests of any one 
force from predominating. W alzer would argue, and to a certain extent 
experience would bear him out, that such protracted negotiations are far more 
likely to produce a ‘lowest common denom inator’ mentality, which would 
ensure that human lives are sacrificed in an ill-fated attempt to achieve 
consensus. Moreover, the politics of the Cold W ar and the ability and 
inclination of the P5 to exercise the veto with impunity have historically 
undermined this pursuit o f comprom ise. As W alzer himself states “stalemate 
and inaction... cannot always be the general will o f international society”.534 
Thus, he concludes:
532 Robert O. Keohane, The Contingent Legitimacy of Multilateralism’, GARNET Working
Paper, No: 09/06, September 2006, http://wi-qarnet.uni- 
muenster.de/fileadmin/documents/workina papers/0906.pdf, [21/07/08], pp.8 
Feinstein and Slaughter, ‘Duty to Prevent’, pp.5
534 Walzer, Just and Unjust, xiii-xiv
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[i]t is a good idea to s treng then  the  UN and to  take  w ha teve r steps are 
possible to estab lish  a g loba l ru le o f law. It is a ve ry  bad idea to pretend that a 
strong UN and a g loba l ru le o f law  a lready  e x is t.535
Walzer seems to suggest that an acceptance of unilateralism may provide a 
‘stop-gap’ for responding to injustice, until such time as the UN system can be 
overhauled and rendered fit for purpose. The justification for this claim is, 
once again, embedded in the terms of reiterative universalism. If, as Walzer 
has sought to establish, this principle has provided us with the moral means to 
define the values of life and liberty as rights which ought to be defended by 
force, it is possible to argue that if the UN fails to engage in such campaigns, 
this duty, imperfect or otherwise, passes to whichever agent is best equipped 
to embrace it. Put simply, the processes of becoming which give meaning to 
the constructed duty of justice compel us to by-pass the UN on those 
occasions when it fails to operate in accordance with an international moral 
minimum.
i. US Hegemony
Of course, Walzer’s endorsem ent o f unilateralism in the field of HI is subject 
to the practical consideration o f which states, or groups of states, might be 
willing and able to take up the mantle of HI in the event o f UNSC stalemate. 
The principal consideration in any such analysis is a pragmatic one. In 
practical terms, only the affluent, W estern states are in possession of the 
resources to intervene with any regularity, or for any notable length of time. 
These states are themselves often subject to the constraints produced by 
their political systems, since, the demands of democracy render the
535 Walzer, Arguing, p.80
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deployment of troops for anything but the most extreme, or self-interested, 
purposes difficult to justify to a voting public. The presumption in favour of 
developed states must also take into consideration the perception of US 
hegemony among the potential targets or supporters of HI. For most 
observers, the consolidation of US power is not necessarily compatible with 
the pursuit of international justice since, as W alzer claims, “[n]o one really 
wants the United States to become the w orld ’s policeman, even of-last- 
resort... Morally and politically, a division of labour is better” .536 This 
preference is due both to the self-interested behaviours of the US itself and to 
what Walzer considers to be a lamentable “knee-jerk Anti-Americanism on the 
European left”,537 which he fears threatens to confuse and undermine the 
issue of HI. As he asserted, in a lecture delivered shortly after NATO’s 
intervention in the Balkans “one thing we learn from Kosovo is that any 
American intervention makes all the world suspicious” .538 W alzer believes that 
if the doctrine of HI is to be successful, this tendency must be addressed. 
Although, he states that in light o f the conduct of the Bush administration in 
particular, “ It is easy to criticise Am erican unilateralism ” ,539 he also claims that 
it is myopic to do so w ithout seeking to provide an alternative to it. In essence, 
whilst the US ought, occasionally, to intervene “very often it is better done by 
someone else”.540 Implicitly this statem ent appears to contradict his earlier 
maxim in acknowledging that, whilst in terms of resources, the US almost
536 Ibid
537 Ibid
538 Ibid, p.79
539 Michael Walzer, The  Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention’, Ethics Across the Curriculum  
Workshop [online], (University of San Diego, 2000),
http://ethics.acusd.edu/videoAA/alzerAA/orkshop/Humanitarian Intervention Lecture.html,
28/04/06
540 Ibid
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always can, from the point o f view of justice and political expediency, there 
may be instances in which it ought not to.
In fact, this is representative of the challenge facing all those who seek to 
establish and enforce standards of international justice more generally. From 
the perspective of W alzer’s com m unitarian constructivism, if these 
expectations are to be embraced they must represent more than a conduit for 
US interests, which might serve to ‘separate the W est from the rest’; they 
must, he argues, be accessible to as broad a range of cultures as possible, a 
balance which is inordinately difficult to strike w ithout minim ising or diluting 
justice claims to the point where they serve no real practical or moral purpose; 
an accusation frequently levelled at W alzer by his cosmopolitan critics.
(b) The Limitations of Unilateralism
The intuitive appeal of W alzer’s justice-based claims is undeniable. The fact 
that his pragmatic endorsement o f unilateralism  appears to provide the means 
to sideline prolonged legal debate and paralysis renders the moral argument 
which he advances very attractive to those seeking to promote the 
circumvention of the UNSC; those for whom  “the current organisation of 
international society causes more problems than it resolves” .541 From this 
perspective, the legitimacy of multilateralism  is contingent, to some extent, 
upon its efficacy. As such, whilst
[C jo llective dec is ions  to  act m ay w e ll exc lude  un ila te ra l a c tio n s ... co llective 
decisions not to  act d o n ’t have the  sam e e ffect. In th is  sense, un ila tera lism  is
541 Haddock and Sutch, Multiculturalism, p.220
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the dom inant response w hen the  com m on consc ience  is shocked. If there is 
no collective response, anyone  can respond. If no one is acting , ac t.542
However, unilateralism is a tem porary and unpredictable solution to 
humanitarian and political crises. W hat is required, in the long term, is much 
more thorough-going reform of the international system. In W alzer’s terms:
[t]he third degree o f p lu ra lism  requ ires  a U nited N a tions w ith  a m ilita ry  fo rce  o f 
its own capable o f hum an ita ria n  in te rve n tio n s  and a s trong vers ion  o f 
peacekeeping -  but still a fo rce  th a t can on ly  be used w ith  the  approva l o f the 
Security Council or a ve ry  la rge  m a jo rity  o f the  G enera l A sse m b ly .543
For many commentators, this remains a distant prospect fraught with and 
frustrated by the continued predom inance o f se lf interest among global 
political actors. In fact, as in fem inist, cosmopolitan, and solidarist analysis, 
there exists an apparent d isjuncture between some of W alzer’s moral 
prescriptions and the legal and political constraints currently restricting the 
processes of becoming in IR. The very stalem ate at which W alzer’s theory 
takes aim has the potential to stifle some of his most innovative ideas. After 
all, international politics remains a consensual system and one in which NS 
and non-intervention are jea lously guarded. There can be little doubt that 
Walzer is correct to suggest that the credib ility o f the UN currently hangs in 
the balance and that there are pragm atic and instrumental reasons for it to 
respond more convincingly to humanitarian crises. A fter all, a successful HI, 
conducted in the absence of UN authorisation, has the potential to undermine 
the UN by drawing attention to its failure to act more decisively; an eventuality
542 Walzer Interview, 2003, T he  United States in the World -  Just Wars and Just Societies. 
An Interview with Michael W alzer’, Imprints: A Journal o f Analytical Socialism  [online], 7, 
^2003), http://eis.bris.ac.uk/~plcdib/imprints/michaelwalzerinterview.htm l, [28/02/06]
3 Walzer, The Politics o f Difference, pp. 175
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which “may have enduringly serious consequences for the stature and 
credibility of the UN its e lf .544 However, as persuasive as W alzer’s views on 
unilateralism are, it is possible to assert that they do not demonstrate a 
realistic appreciation of the fact that HI, in the absence of UN authorisation, 
simply does not find favour within international society, hence the unequivocal 
finding of ICISS that
[i]f international consensus is e ve r to  be reached  abou t w hen, w here, how, 
and by whom m ilita ry in te rven tion  shou ld  happen, it is ve ry  c lea r tha t the 
central role o f the S ecurity  C ounc il w ill have  to  be a t the  heart o f tha t 
consensus.545
This impasse reflects the fact that bridging the gap between the desired 
conditions for international politics and the current realities o f the international 
system is key to defining, applying, and extending the international duty of 
justice. For Walzer “finding political expression for a sustained moral 
minimum”,546 or in the parlance of this project, constructing the duty of justice 
necessitates the application of the ‘rules of d isregard ’. The same rules which 
allow us to assume that most political com m unities are legitimate but take 
action against those which are indisputably not, can allow us to assume that 
multilateralism is the ideal for intervention but license unilateralism  where this 
proves to be the only option. The justification for impinging upon the principle 
of non-intervention is that, in extreme cases o f HR abuses, it no longer tallies 
with the reiterated realities o f international politics. Therefore, far from failing 
the test of feasibility which is so central to communitarian constructivism, 
Walzer demonstrates that reiterative universalism  and the processes of
544 ICISS, 6.40
545 Haddock and Sutch, Multiculturalism, p.220546Sutch, ‘International Justice’, pp.523
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becoming are beginning to force a reconsideration of those actions which are 
conceivable and sustainable in the context o f IR.
Walzer is aware that the reforms which he dem ands can only be implemented 
by increments but this represents one o f the strengths of his argument. The 
gradual ‘rolling out’ of a new fram ework of international politics ensures that 
no one conception of justice can dominate any other and that changes to the 
state and UN systems meet with the approval of a broad range of political 
communities, something which could not be achieved through the application 
of the systematic conception of HR which informs cosmopolitanism. In 
constructivist terms, the norms which justify  and necessitate reform have 
emerged but it has taken many years for them to begin to crystallise through 
reiterative universalism. Until and unless they do unilateralism, like HI itself, 
remains a controversial but necessary exception to an increasingly outdated 
rule.
iii. Motivation
Walzer’s acceptance of the need to embrace, at least for the time being, the 
moral and political necessity o f unilateralism  invites consideration of another 
component of the debate. This is because there exists a presumption, based 
on the predominance of the national interest, that unilateral interventions are 
likely to be governed by motives which are, at best, mixed, and at worst, 
entirely devoid of humanitarian impulse. As such, the matter for debate then 
becomes whether an intervention, conducted in the absence of genuine 
humanitarian motivations, is likely to result in a m ilitary operation conducted in
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accordance with the demands of justice and for the benefit of the local 
population; and equally pertinently, whether this, in turn, is likely to produce a 
settlement which prioritises the security of civilians.
Walzer has consistently argued that it is not only acceptable for mixed 
motives to precipitate HI but that it is also inevitable that the decision to 
intervene will depend upon them. In his view
the victim s o f m assacre  o r e thn ic  c leans ing  are ve ry  lucky if neighbouring 
states, or a coalition o f s ta tes, has m ore than  one reason to rescue them. It 
would be foo lish to  dec la re  the  m u ltip lic ity  m ora lly  d isab ling . If the  intervention 
is expanded beyond its necessa ry  bounds because o f som e u lte rio r m otive 
then it should be critic ised: w ith in  those  bounds, m ixed m otives are a practical 
advantage.547
This appraisal is characteristically pragmatic. However, as an analysis of 
Wheeler’s contribution to the debate has already indicated, it is not 
necessarily plausible to separate considerations of motivation from the 
character of an intervention. A fter all, the driving force behind HI is likely to 
condition the military means chosen to enact it and the conduct of the 
intervening forces both during hostilities and following their cessation. This is 
particularly germane to the issue of just settlement since, as Wheeler has 
argued, self-interested interveners, positioned for economic or strategic gain, 
are unlikely to commit sufficient resources to the rebuilding of damaged 
infrastructure, or the needs of a destabilised civilian population. For 
cosmopolitan critics, in particular, it is the w illingness to assess intervention, 
and justice claims more generally, on a case-by-case basis, rather than
547 Ibid, p.216
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attempt to build a consistent rule-governed practice, which allows for 
illegitimate motives to govern military incursion and strategy. However, in 
W alzer’s view if states are denied the requisite flexibility to pursue their own 
interests (as well as those of humanity more generally), interventions will 
simply cease to take place. This is indicative of a w ider contention that an 
international duty of justice, constructed from a combination of moral 
prescriptions which have secured cross-cultural consensus, must also be 
responsive to the institutional lim itations of the current state system. It is only 
by acknowledging these restrictions that we may eventually come to erode 
them. In short, inflexible rules do little to advance the cause of becoming in 
international society and a casuistical fram ework is the logical corollary of a 
norm-based approach to international justice. Nevertheless, even in the 
context of this case-by-case assessment, W a lzer’s failure to apply a gender- 
lens to his analysis undermines the value of some of his insights. In fact, from 
the perspective of gender analysis W alzer’s argum ent would benefit from an 
acknowledgment of the fact that HI must represent more than the masculinist 
posturing of powerful W estern states. In order for the doctrine of HI to be 
perceived as legitimate by a range of global political actors, it must escape its 
association with neo-imperialism. An explic it acceptance of mixed motives as 
a necessary component of HI appears to be at odds with this agenda.
(a) Selectivity
The debate surrounding mixed motives is intrinsically connected with the 
issue of consistency in the practice o f HI and the discourse of international 
justice more generally. It is undeniable that due to the preponderance of 
national interest as a motivation for intervention, the politics of rescue is
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riddled with selectivity. Access to oil or other natural resources; the 
opportunity to increase one’s advantage relative to a rival; or the promise of 
the lucrative reconstruction contracts which m ight follow in the wake of an act 
of intervention, are all considerations which often conflict with the demands of 
justice and lead to HI being licensed in certain regions, whilst comparable 
crises in less strategically significant territories elicit apathy and inaction. 
Regime change, in particular, highlights this contradiction, with the 2003 
invasion of Iraq conceived, among other things, as a means to secure the 
overthrow of Saddam Hussein while the despotic rule of Robert Mugabe in 
Zimbabwe has persisted with only the most lim ited of meaningful opposition 
from the international community. Sim ilarly, in the arena of HI, the question of 
‘If Kosovo, why not Rwanda?’ continues to cast a long shadow across the 
legitimacy and credibility of the UN; as does the fact that despite near 
universal condemnation of Russia’s shelling of civilians in Chechnya, there is 
simply no practical scope for an intervention which has the potential to result 
in nuclear war between the major powers. W alzer’s response to this issue is 
to accept that different circumstances necessitate different responses, military 
and non-military, and that for reasons of pragmatism, “one ought not to 
provoke fights that one is bound to lose, especia lly not if one is fighting for 
justice”548. With this in mind, W alzer once again argues in favour of casuistical 
judgem ent and maintains that
[c jons is tency  isn ’t an issue here. W e  ca n 't m ee t all occasions; w e rightly
ca lcu la te  the risks in each one. W e  need to  ask  w ha t the costs o f in tervention
548 Henry Shue, The Burdens o f Justice, The Journal of Philosophy 80(10), October 1983, 
pp.600-608, [06/09/08], pp.607
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will be for the peop le  being rescued, fo r the  rescuers, and fo r everyone else.
And then w e can on ly do w hat we can d o .549
For Walzer, the impact of prudential concerns is inevitable and cannot lead us 
to conclude that “having failed to rescue the people of East Timor or the 
people of Tibet, we should have failed to rescue the people of Kosovo out of 
moral consistency” .550 This viewpoint is com patible with a constructivist 
approach to justice which encourages practitioners of IR to consider how 
conceivable a given course of action is, as well as how morally desirable it 
may be. Within this framework, change is implemented incrementally and 
once the economic and strategic advantages afforded a state through, for 
example, demonstrating increased respect for HR are established the hope is 
that this norm will begin to crystallise as an ever expanding number of state 
actors begin to abide by its terms. W hilst these state authorities may initially 
embrace the terms of the norm for exclusively instrumental or self-serving 
reasons, its principles may eventually become sufficiently embedded in the 
political culture so as to socialise leaders and citizens alike into the 
development of new expectations and behaviours. A lthough the impetus for 
change may originate externally, the particular manner in which these reforms 
are institutionalised will depend on local cultural and political proclivities. 
Therefore if an international duty o f justice can successfully strike this 
balance, it might allow for the gradual universalisation of certain standards, 
w ithout the associated accusations o f ethnocentrism  and neo-imperialism.
549
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As appealing as the logic of this argum ent is, it fails to unpack or even to 
problematise the reasons that international society (and in particular Western 
powers) tends to prioritise the suffering of certain groups differently to the pain 
and indignity of others. Since fem inist constructiv ist analysis takes aim at this 
issue and the consequent perpetuation o f unequal and gendered power 
relations, W alzer’s conception of the relationship between suffering and 
selectivity would be more nuanced if he were to take account of this 
theoretical perspective. W hilst he may be correct in his assertion that 
inconsistency is inevitable and not, in and of itself, a strong enough argument 
to preclude HI in all cases, his tendency to acquiesce to the existence of 
selectivity, w ithout questioning its fundamental causes represents an under­
developed dimension of his argument.
iv. Just Settlement
In contrast to this example of ‘under theoris ing ’ an e lem ent of the intervention 
debate, W alzer has written extensively on a issue which is, all too often, 
sidelined in a consideration of the use of force for humanitarian purposes. The 
matter of how and when an act o f intervention ought to be brought to a close 
is of vital significance since the failure to secure a just settlement following a 
military campaign can result in levels o f insurgency and unrest which can 
condemn a civilian population to a fate as uncertain as the humanitarian 
disaster which prompted intervention. Hence, W alzer’s belief that
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you can figh t a jus t war, and figh t it ju s tly , and still m ake a m oral m ess of the 
a fte rm ath ... by fa iling ....to  help the  peop le  you have rescued to rebuild the ir 
live s .551
This represents a further substantial modification of his original theory, which 
was formerly premised on the applicability o f the “ in and out test” .552 This 
refers to the expectation that ‘jus t settlem ent’ is achieved when “the 
intervening force goes in, stops the m assacres or the ethnic cleansing, helps 
set up some sort of regime... and then gets out... they go in, they affect the 
rescue that they said was their goal, and then they leave the rescued people 
to govern them selves” .553 According to this principle, right intention would 
virtually preclude the possibility of a long-term commitment to settlement. 
Interveners who choose to remain in place once violence has ceased are 
likely harbouring a strategic or econom ic agenda and should be encouraged 
to w ithdraw immediately. Recently, however, W alzer appears to have lost faith 
in this proposition.
I’m a little  less su re  o f tha t te s t these  days because it o ften seem s tha t the 
success o f the  in te rven tion  is d e p e n d e n t on the w ill to s tay fo r a w h ile  at least, 
to m ake sure  tha t the  s itua tion  you have ju s t rescued the people from  doe sn ’t
5 5 4recur.
In effect, the application of the ‘in and ou t’ principle is dependent upon a stark 
and simplistic interpretation of intra-state conflict, which characterises one 
ethnic minority or social group as victim iser, and another as victim. However, 
like all other elements o f IR theory and practice, intra-state conflict has
551Michael Walzer, ‘Just and Unjust Occupations’, Dissent [online], (Winter 2004), 
www.dissentmaqazine.orq/article/?article=:400. 22/07/06
552 Walzer ‘Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention’
553 Ibid
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evolved considerably. Even if this simplistic understanding of violence and 
civil breakdown was once of value, it is now clear that adherence to such a 
notion provides no appropriate fram ework for responding to a form of 
humanitarian crisis which is much more common, and considerably more 
ambiguous, than this idealised perception. In W alzer’s words
W hat if the  troub le  is in te rna l, the  inhum an ity  loca lly  and w ide ly  rooted, a 
m a tte r o f po litica l cu ltu re , soc ia l s truc tu res , h is to rica l m em ories, e thn ic  fear, 
resen tm en t, and ha tre d ? 555
As was aptly demonstrated by the botched intervention in Somalia, an inability 
to comprehend the com plexities of local or regional culture and conflict dooms 
any proposed intervention, and in particular, any attempt at reconstruction, to 
dismal, and perilous, failure. It is for this reason that “it sometimes turns out 
that occupying is harder than figh ting” .556
As such, the scope o f W alzer’s interventionary project has grown more 
ambitious not only in terms of the crimes which might warrant HI, and the 
appropriate agents to carry out the campaign, but also with regard to the level 
of commitment necessitated by the pursuit of just settlement. In recent years, 
he has come to believe that a ‘rescue ’ has not been properly executed until 
the conditions which m ight result in a reoccurrence of humanitarian crisis 
have been com prehensively contended with. As such, he rejects the 
suggestion that “there must be an exit strategy before there can be an 
intervention” .557 Believing that this m isplaced focus is tantamount to an
argument against intervention, W alzer asserts that public declarations to draw
555 Mills and Brunner (eds), New Killing Fields, p.30
556 Walzer, Just and Unjust Occupations, pp.4
557 Mills and Brunner (eds), New Killing Fields, p.30
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a campaign to a close within a stipulated timeframe serve only to “give the 
hostile forces a strong incentive to lie low and wait. Better to stay home” he 
claims “than to intervene in a way which is sure to fa il” .558
The conviction that intervention is necessarily a lengthy process allows for the 
possibility of regime change and of the establishment of interim or provisional 
governm ental authorities, perhaps administered from beyond the target state 
or with the support of intervening forces. To demonstrate the legitimacy of 
these policies, W alzer calls upon the example of the humanitarian crisis in 
Rwanda:
Im ag ine  tha t the re  had been, as the re  sure ly  should have been, an A frican  o r 
a E uropean  o r a United N a tions  in te rvention  in R w anda in 1994. The in itia l 
pu rpose  o f the m ilita ry  ac tion  w ou ld  have been to stop the m assacre  o f Tu ts i 
m en and w om en (and th e ir Hutu sym path ise rs), but in o rder to do tha t and to 
p ro tect the surv ivors, it w ou ld  have  been necessary to ove rth row  the Hutu 
P ow er reg im e. And w h o e ve r w as respons ib le  fo r tha t overth row  w ould  a lso  
have taken on som e degree  o f respons ib ility  fo r the creation  o f an a lte rna tive  
governm ent. It w ould have been w ise  to share  that respons ib ility  w ith  loca l 
po litica l fo rces and a lso  w ith  in te rna tiona l agencies, but there  w ou ld  have  
been no ju s t w ay o f shedd ing  it e n tire ly .559
The significance of this is twofold. In the first instance, it points to the fact tha t 
the post-conflict settlement in Rwanda, though noticeably more successful 
than the international response to the genocide itself, remained limited. The 
hundreds of thousands of lives which have been lost since unrest spilled over 
into the Democratic Republic of Congo is testam ent to this. Secondly, it 
indicates W alzer’s changing views on the resolution of an act of HI. In fact, he
558 Ibid
559 Walzer, ‘Regime Change’
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now identifies three specific sorts of intervention which are likely to 
necessitate an extended period of occupation:
The firs t is pe rhaps  best exem p lified  by the C am bod ian  killing fields, which 
w ere  so ex te n s ive  as to leave, a t the  end, no institu tiona l base, and perhaps 
no hum an base, fo r re co n s tru c tio n .560
A rapid w ithdrawal in these circum stances leaves behind a shell of a country, 
ravaged by humanitarian d isaster and facing an indeterminate future. The 
second example pertains to the humanitarian crises in Uganda, Rwanda, and 
Kosovo. In these cases “the extent and depth of the ethnic divisions make it 
likely that the killings will resume as soon as the intervening forces 
w ithdraw” .561 This may be the consequence of a resumption of atrocities by 
the “original killers”562 or, by a com m encem ent of ‘reverse ethnic cleansing’, 
which might see the victim s o f an attempted genocide orchestrating a 
campaign of reprisals. In such instances, W alzer argues,
in and q u ick ly  o u t ’ is a k ind o f bad fa ith , a cho ice o f legal virtue at the 
expense  o f po litica l and  m ora l e ffec tiveness . If one accepts  the risks o f 
in te rven tion  in co u n tr ie s  like  these , one had be tte r accept a lso the risks o f 
occupa tion .
The final set of circum stances which demand large-scale reconstruction exist 
in failed states, such as Som alia, where, at the time of intervention, no 
government infrastructure can be said to exist, and where it is this very lack of 
civic authority which has ultim ately led to the widespread violence that 
provided the impetus fo r HI, in the first instance. When a country has fallen
560
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into the hands of “param ilitary forces and warlords... what is necessary... is to 
create a state, and the creation will have to be virtually ex nihilio” . 
Reconstruction on such a scale is, as W alzer puts it, “not work for the short 
term ”.564
W alzer contends that once an intervention has begun, those who initiated it 
are obligated to pursue a lasting peace for the citizens of the target state. He 
defines two means by which this might be achieved, both of which are 
“standing interventions” ,565 d istinguishable from one another through the 
following definitions:
The firs t is a kind o f tru s te e sh ip , w he re  the in terven ing pow er actua lly  rules 
the coun try  it has ‘re s c u e d ’, ac ting  in trus t fo r the inhabitants, seeking to 
es tab lish  a m ore o r less co n se n su a l p o litics .566
This would arguably be the correct course of action for the reconstruction of a 
failed state such as Somalia.
The second is a k ind o f p ro tec to ra te , w here  the in tervention  brings som e local 
g roup  or coa lition  o f g ro u p s  to  po w e r and is then susta ined only defens ive ly  to 
ensure  tha t the re  is no re tu rn  o f the  de fea ted  reg im e or the old law lessness 
and tha t m ino rity  r igh ts  a re  re sp e c te d .567
In essence, then, HI is justified by processes of becoming but it also 
necessitates them. If an agent makes the decision to intervene in response to 
HR abuses, they accept the responsibility of constructing or defending 
alternative political and legal institutions which might serve to prevent
564 Ibid
565 Walzer, ‘Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention’
566 Walzer, Arguing, p.76
567 Ibid
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renewed outbreaks of violence. However, this position is not without its 
limitations. Post-colonial and fem inist commentators in particular are 
concerned that protectorates and trusteeships are little more than neo­
imperialist wolves in politically palatable sheep’s clothing. For these thinkers, 
enforced regime change denies both the cultural specificity and the political 
agency of the citizens of a target state and is an extension of “the imperial 
arrogance lurking behind the whole idea of nation building” .568 W alzer’s 
communitarian roots ensure that he shares this concern and is anxious to limit 
the authority of intervening foreigners, in as far as possible.
Even when a humanitarian crisis has rightly triggered intervention, we can still 
hope to minimise the coercive imposition of foreign ideas and ideologies. The 
intervening forces have a mandate for political, but not for cultural, 
transformation.569
The obvious overlap between political and cultural considerations has the 
potential to render this argument somewhat unsatisfactory, particularly in light 
of the practical problems associated with reconstruction projects on the scale 
which W alzer appears to advocate. Perhaps the most pressing issues relate 
to the lack of political will among both states and their citizenry. Just 
settlement often necessitates, or amounts to, long-term military engagement 
and is therefore subject to the same constraints which often render such 
extended campaigns so unpopular. The fear is that civilian populations will not 
abide the loss of members o f their own armed forces; a proposition which was 
seemingly confirmed when, following the death of eighteen infantrymen in a 
firefight in Mogadishu, the US famously chose to recall the troops it had
568 Wheeler, Saving, p.207
569 Walzer, ‘Regime Change’
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dispatched to Somalia, leaving the infrastructure of the failed state in tatters. 
In response to this issue, W alzer argues that:
From  the s ta n d p o in t o f jus tice , you canno t invade a fore ign country, w ith all 
the co n se q u e n ce s  tha t has fo r o the r people, w h ile  insisting that your own 
so ld ie rs  can neve r be put at risk .570
He suggests that those who serve in the military have committed themselves 
to defending civilians, even to the detriment of their own lives, and are fully 
cognisant of this risk at the time that they enlist. Therefore, it is legitimate that 
their lives be sacrificed in m ilitary campaigns designed to rescue non- 
combatants. Of course, this does not take account of the ways in which the 
waters of consent are muddied in this context. It is often the poor and 
disenfranchised who jo in the army as the only means to continue their 
education, or for want o f any other financial opportunities. Such individuals 
are often courted by the ir national governments and given only a very limited 
understanding of precisely what their military career is likely to entail. Hence, 
the suggestion that they have w illingly entered into life-threatening situations 
is somewhat of an over-sim plification. This is indicative of the need to adopt a 
holistic approach to justice and becoming which acknowledges the 
interrelated nature of physical and economic security and embraces Vincent’s 
suggestion that an understanding of one necessitates an engagement with 
the other.
Despite the shortcom ings and practical limitations of extended occupations 
W alzer nevertheless maintains that they are a moral corollary of HI. In his
570 Ibid, p.29
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view, the advantages of such a proposal outweigh the negative connotations 
since schemes of this nature offer a means “to open a span of time and to 
authorise a kind of political work between the ‘in’ and the ‘out’ of humanitarian 
intervention” .571 He explicitly addresses the limits of an international duty of 
justice in this context by claim ing that the new regime need not be 
“democratic, or liberal, or pluralist, or even capitalist. It doesn’t have to be 
anything except non-m urderous”572. In insisting upon this degree of 
minimalism, W alzer believes that it is possible to ensure that the scope of 
occupation remains lim ited and that “once the massacres and ethnic 
cleansing are really over and the people in command are committed to 
avoiding their return, the intervention is fin ished” .573 Equally, the refusal to 
impose conceptions of liberal democracy on the target state helps to 
engender the process o f self-determ ination, which he considers to be of such 
moral worth.
IV. Conclusion
W alzer’s understanding o f becom ing in international politics is key to the tone 
and scope of this project. For the most part, justice, for Walzer, is embedded 
in the opportunity o f individual political communities to establish and 
implement their own cultural and political practices. However, the suggestion 
that reiterated and shared moral principles are evolving to such an extent that 
they can begin to im pact upon the realities of inter-state relations serves both 
to explain those reforms which have already taken place and to justify calls for
571 Mills and Brunner (eds), New Killing Fields, p.31
572 Ibid, p.32 (However, he would be inclined to argue that if governmental infrastructure is to 
built ex n/Mo, there are many compelling reasons to attempt to create a democratic 
framework which can then be fashioned and interpreted according to local traditions)
573 Ibid, p.30
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further modifications to the state system. For Walzer, the resultant 
international duty of justice is, in effect, a series of constructed agreements 
and obligations which have generated sufficient consensus to permeate both 
the ‘th in ’ moral arena of international politics and, to a lesser but vital extent, 
the thicker moral understandings of our daily lives. As such, when the 
restrictions imposed by the current international system conflict with the few, 
inordinately valuable, moral prescriptions to which much of international 
society is committed, the system itself becomes vulnerable to demands for 
reform. In the context o f HI, this ensures that in cases where the apparatus of 
the state has grown so repressive or civic authority has disintegrated so 
comprehensively, as to render nonsensical any suggestion of a self­
determining people, the protection afforded by NS ought to be rescinded, 
allowing for HI. As such, whilst territorial integrity remains the abiding norm 
“[hjumanitarian intervention is justified when it is a response (with reasonable 
expectations of success) to acts that ‘shock the conscience of mankind” .574
In such instances, the issue of agency is succinctly addressed through the 
assertion that when the UNSC fails to act promptly, any state, or group of 
states, equipped to take up its mantle is permitted to do so, irrespective of 
whether the principal m otivation for intervention is humanitarian. The 
suggestion is that, under these highly specific circumstances, multilateralism 
may be considered to be at odds with the promotion and safeguarding of HR 
standards and that, this contradiction provides ample justification for the 
circumvention of the UN framework. In fact, in some of his most recent works,
574 Walzer, Just and Unjust, p. 107
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and in tones far more radical than his early interpretations of the imperfect 
duty of HI, W alzer has even begun to claim that the by-passing of the UNSC 
should represent one elem ent of a process designed to create “a strong 
international system, organised and designed to defeat aggression, to stop 
massacres and ethnic cleansing, to control weapons of mass-destruction, and 
to guarantee the physical security o f all the world ’s people” .575 This ‘third 
degree of global p lura lism ’ would see political power diffused and balanced 
across many com peting form s of governance, including organisations both 
above and below the level of the state. W alzer’s willingness to countenance 
institutional reform on this scale results not from the cosmopolitan conviction 
that political institutions must reflect a priori moral rights and duties but from 
the communitarian constructiv ist belief that the international political 
infrastructure has failed to keep pace with developing normative standards. In 
other words
[t]he re ite ra ted  fac ts  o f in te rna tion a l po litics are that the g loba lis t institu tions of 
in te rna tiona l soc ie ty  a re  too  w eak  and tha t re treat into the nation state is not 
the so lu tio n .576
However, as an analysis o f W heeler’s procedural approach has 
demonstrated, moral prescriptions still depend for their dissemination on 
politico-legal structures and these frameworks remain restrictive. It is certainly 
possible to make the case, for example, that long-standing occupations are a 
morally imperative com ponent of successful HI; it is quite a separate prospect 
to suggest that intervening states might be forced to take seriously this
obligation. S im ilarly, no matter how compelling the argument for the
575 Walzer, Arguing, p. 155
576 Sutch, ‘International Justice’, p.523
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circumvention of the UNSC in cases of political deadlock may be, it is still 
subject to the sustained opposition to unilateralism which unites some of the 
most powerful global political actors. W alzer’s approach to these quandaries 
is a largely successful one precisely because it remains firmly anchored in his 
particularist account of morality and the right of individual political 
communities to determ ine their own domestic arrangements in the vast 
majority of instances. A lthough his views are undoubtedly progressive, 
W alzer’s understanding o f the complex and incremental nature of the 
development and crystallisation of political and legal norms ensures that his 
moral theory can be said to conform to the standard of feasibility which this 
thesis interprets as an integral com ponent of the ontology of becoming. Whilst 
Walzer passionately believes that a substantial overhaul of international 
society is both necessitated and justified by the principle of reiterative 
universalism, he also concedes that becoming is a gradual process. As such 
“we need to let it happen in its own time. Forcing the issue corrupts the 
reiterative process” .577 This is a frustrating and in some respects 
unsatisfactory position, especia lly in light of the lack of consensus over the 
injustices associated with gender inequality. However, W alzer’s theory is self­
consciously dynam ic and is constructed with a view to facilitating and 
supporting normative developm ents including, potentially, shifts toward more 
equitable gender relations. In fact, the dynamic nature of reiterative 
universalism accounts fo r the developm ent o f W alzer’s theory over the past 
thirty years. The conservative implications of the early editions of Just and 
Unjust Wars were responsive to the political realities of the Cold War and the,
577 Ibid, pp.525
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then, relatively marginal status of HR norms. His more recent interpretations 
of the possibilities of implementing reforms to the international system reflect 
the degree to which the norms surrounding international justice have begun to 
take root in the dip lom atic dialogue of the society of states. Therefore, 
normative developm ents in international society have impacted both on that 
society itself and on W alzer’s approach to it. It is for this reason that “W alzer’s 
pronouncements have grown more ambitious over the years”,578 whilst still 
retaining a com m itm ent to feasibility.
Perhaps the greatest strength o f his hybridised version of constructivism is its 
ability to “speak of human rights and global justice to actors who still cherish 
sovereignty but are tentative ly engaging in the discourses of humanitarianism 
and justice” .579 The lesson o f W alzer’s communitarian constructivism in an 
analysis of an international duty o f justice is, therefore, double-edged. He 
provides the means to argue that a constructed duty of justice has arisen as a 
consequence of changing expectations within international society, and the 
developing conviction that the pursuit o f justice is a legitimate element of the 
maintenance of international order. However, he also places restrictions of the 
kinds of activities perm itted under the auspices of this international duty of 
justice, arguing that in many cases it is most effectively honoured by 
demonstrating due respect and deference to the cultural diversity at work in 
international politics.
Ibid, p.214
579 Ibid, pp.530
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C on c lu s io n
Drawing together the competing imperatives identified by constructivists in 
their appraisal of becoming in international society is a complex but instructive 
exercise. No one set o f prescriptions for the manner in which PIL and 
international politics could and should evolve emerges from this process, 
since there are aspects o f each branch of the constructivist project which 
often challenge or contradict one another. It is not within the scope of this 
project definitively to identify those normative standards which constitute an 
exhaustive conception of international justice. Nevertheless, in hybridising 
constructivist theorising with a range of other approaches to IR concerned 
with the expansion of the norm ative agenda of international society, this thesis 
has sought to expose to critical scrutiny some of the embedded assumptions 
regarding the relationship between international order and international justice 
and the suggestion that the appeal to justice is the exclusive preserve of the 
liberal universalist. In so doing, it has examined the issue of HI and posited 
the notion that more general them es and precepts concerning becoming 
might be extrapolated from  such an overview. This concluding chapter will 
seek to recapitulate the varying defences and critiques of HI with which the 
project has engaged, before assessing the w ider implications for the pursuit of 
international justice of a theoretical framework which combines casuistical 
analysis with a gender-sensitive, constructivist, ontology of becoming.
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I. The Theoretical Basis for Humanitarian Intervention
Although each of the forms of constructivism with which this thesis has 
engaged adopts a different approach to the role of morality in IR, they are, at 
the very least, united in their belief that this role exists. Although this may 
appear to be som ewhat o f an oversimplification it is, in fact, imperative not to 
under-estimate this com m onality, since it places constructivism at odds with 
the hegemonic realist paradigm, which denies that the behaviour of global 
political actors is responsive to moral principles. All constructivists emphasise 
that “ it is not an unchanging fact that the international realm is a self-help 
system. Rather, the international environment is created and recreated in 
processes of interaction” ,580 which impact upon both the behaviour of states 
and the institutionalisation o f moral standards.
However, key differences exist between the perception of morality among
various constructivist advocates, with communitarian constructivism basing its
moral claims exclusively on incremental normative developments and
consensus across international society. According to this argument,
multilateral HI is a defensible practice, albeit only under the most extreme of
circumstances. This is because the norms which surround it have been
accepted by a num ber o f influential global political actors. The legitimacy of HI
depends upon this cross-cultural agreement and so must the extent to which it
is allowed to take place. All the sub-categories of the debate are defined and
resolved according to moral principles which have taken root through
negotiation and the developm ent o f shared meanings; comprehensible to a
580 Maja Zehfuss, ‘Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liason’, European Journal o f 
International Relations, 7(3), 2001, pp315-348, pp.317
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range of political communities. HI is justified according to a set of HR 
standards which have found favour in a post-Holocaust international society, 
and this emerging HR culture is beginning to shift the focus from ‘sovereignty 
as power’ to ‘sovereignty as responsibility’. The key term here, however, is 
‘beginning’ and com m unitarian constructivists are conservative in their 
estimates of whether or not HR could ever usurp states’ rights. In fact, 
according to com m unitarian principles, such an eventuality would not 
necessarily represent a positive development for international society, since 
membership of a specific political community provides a sense of belonging 
and a cultural and moral fram ework for the individuals who constitute it. 
Impinging upon the relationship between the individual and the political 
community to which they belong is an imposition which is only justified when 
the affiliation between the two has collapsed or been rendered meaningless. 
As such, an international duty of justice, for communitarian constructivists, is 
restricted by the duty to respect territorial boundaries, wherever possible, and 
to maintain order through adherence to the legal framework on which 
international society is based. This almost certainly results in even the most 
liberal of states becoming com plicit in appalling HR abuses and also leads to 
the conclusion, d isturbing for some, that the moral progress which has been 
secured in international politics is precarious and contingent upon the 
continued support o f some of the most morally dubious of global political 
actors. Nonetheless, this conception of both politics and morality as an 
imperfect com prom ise between international order and international justice is 
perceived by com m unitarian constructivists as the most effective means by 
which to preserve our fragile HR culture. After all, according to this perception,
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at least to some extent, “ [t]he formal authority of the international system is 
what gives human rights their normative value” .581
In contrast, for solidarist and cosmopolitan constructivists, the origin of our 
obligation to ‘suffering hum anity’ is an a priori commitment to the moral 
equality of persons. A lthough more likely to concede the instrumental moral 
value of statism than their cosmopolitan contemporaries, solidarists are 
nonetheless equally prepared to seek recourse in first principles when the 
occasion serves. These theorists are unified in their assertion that the role of 
a state is to protect its citizens and that once its behaviours demonstrate its 
unwillingness or inability to do so it forfeits its right to territorial integrity. 
Although, both cosm opolitan and solidarist constructivists argue that this 
principle is enshrined in elem ents of international legal doctrine which 
prioritise HR, they would also be inclined to suggest that even if it were not, 
the obligation to defend those who are persecuted by their own state authority 
would be generated by the abuse of our fellow human beings. As a result, 
according to cosm opolitan (and some solidarist) constructivists, breaching PIL 
in the name of this cause is justified and a necessary element of the moral 
development of these legal principles. An international duty of justice in this 
context may involve overturning the very restrictions identified by 
communitarian constructivists and establishing a competing framework in 
which HR provide the foundation for an alternative approach to PIL.
581 Jim Whitman, ‘Global Governance as the Friendly Face of Unaccountable Power’, Security 
Dialogue, 35, pp.45-57, pp.48, (emphasis added)
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W hether this takes the form of Buchanan’s League of Democracies, or 
necessitates the abolition of the veto within the UNSC, our duty to respond to 
HR violations w herever they may occur appears to engender an extremely 
broad com m itm ent to HI. It also relies upon the assumption that liberal moral 
principles are universally applicable, something which communitarian 
constructivists and most fem inist commentators reject. It is for this reason that 
the cosm opolitan/solidarist constructivist approach to the matter of HI might 
be deemed som ewhat utopian. W hilst the communitarian constructivist 
position almost certainly allows for a range of abuses to continue unchecked, 
a more cosmopolitan outlook threatens to result in disorder, as those states 
which have tentatively com m itted themselves to HR standards retreat into an 
overtly pluralist stance and an uncooperative attitude to international 
institutions, and the HR standards and conventions which have been 
established since the m iddle of the 20th Century are left hanging in the 
balance. It is on this basis that communitarian constructivists defend 
casuistical over system atic analysis; arguing that a case-by-case assessment 
is not only more responsive to an understanding of norm dynamics but also 
maintains the degree of flexib ility necessary to achieve and maintain the 
compromise and consent which are still so vital in the context of international 
society and PIL.
The dimensions o f fem in ist IR which provide the basis for feminist 
constructivism have much to contribute to the complex debate surrounding 
becoming and the international duty of justice. In the first instance, feminist 
constructivism encourages global political actors to frame their conception of
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international justice in light of its relationship to the value of care. In terms of 
HI, this entails moving beyond the theoretical justification of the use of force 
and engaging with the impact of political violence on the lives of the 
individuals within, and beyond, a target state. In other words, feminists 
encourage theorists and practitioners of HI to conceive of humanitarian 
suffering in broader terms than a focus on militarism has tended to allow.
The critical capacity o f fem inist constructivism also seeks to unpack the 
deeply ingrained assum ptions at the heart of cosmopolitan constructivism, 
which have tended to conflate HR with the rights of men. Accordingly, feminist 
constructivists acknow ledge that the dom inant narratives of ‘morality’ are, in 
many respects, an extension of particular masculinist hegemonic discourses 
and ought not to be accepted as, in any way, natural or immutable. Feminist 
constructivism also offers the means to critique communitarian constructivism, 
by problematising the belie f that the state is necessarily the most appropriate 
‘protector’ or d issem inator o f HR standards and drawing attention to the 
unequal ‘inside/outside’ power relations which maintain the privileged position 
of states among other global political actors. Similarly, it calls into question 
whether a focus on elite-level consensus, typical of certain elements of 
communitarian constructiv ist theorising, truly provides an adequate means to 
assess and categorise justice claims given how unequal the distribution of 
such political roles is in both the national and international spheres.
Although critical o f the state-centric overtones of the communitarian 
constructivist project, fem inist constructivism also calls into question the
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liberal belief that HR ought to displace states’ rights, arguing that a gender- 
blind account o f HR is as damaging to women and feminised groups as are 
the more statist elem ents of IR theory. However, despite its vocal criticism of 
the liberal project, fem inist IR in its broad incarnation remains subject to many 
of the same lim itations as cosmopolitan constructivism; namely the matter of 
how the existing state consent model might be modified to take account of the 
challenges presented by progressivist analysis. For many feminist 
commentators, the notion that it might be possible to affect meaningful 
change to the current state system is implausible and leads to a focus on 
criticism, as against prescriptions. As this thesis has sought to demonstrate, 
however, fem inist constructivism  offers the potential for critique to be framed 
in a language which m ight be accessible to the mainstream and for change to 
be executed in an incremental and realistic fashion.
Alternatively, as R. Charli Carpenter has proposed, the merits of the analytical 
category of gender can be appropriated into ‘gender constructivism ’, in terms 
which are distinct from  the fem inist commitment to the emancipation of 
women. In this context, a gender-lens can be used simply to broaden our 
understanding of becoming. A gender-sensitive ontology of becoming, even 
absent fem inist assum ptions, is one which allows not only for a more nuanced 
appreciation of hum anitarian suffering but also for a clearer conception of the 
socially constructed nature of international politics than supposedly ‘gender- 
neutral’ analysis has been able to secure.
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Although substantial disagreement persists among constructivists, as to the 
basis of morality, all of the theoretical subsets of constructivism place an 
emphasis on HR. The views of many of these theorists can be placed on a 
continuum, w ith cosm opolitan constructivists most vociferously committed to a 
set of HR standards which can transcend borders; solidarist constructivists 
prepared to argue that the value of pluralism is constrained by the need to 
honour the rights of life and liberty; and communitarian constructivists 
asserting that whilst, in the majority of cases, political issues ought be 
resolved w ithin political com m unities, in instances where this proves 
impossible, intervention by the w ider international community should be 
permitted. Fem inist constructivism  cannot be categorised quite so simply but 
a number o f com m entators working in this field would concede, albeit with 
extensive caveats relating to non-combatant immunity and preventative 
measures, that some conception o f HR (one which attempts to guarantee a 
focus on gender equality) might, in extreme cases, serve as a justification for 
the recourse to force. So it is that a range of constructivist theorising might be 
said to converge on the conviction that HI is a necessary element of a wider 
international duty of justice.
II. The Com ponents of Hum anitarian Intervention
i. Just Cause
Having established that, at least in principle, all four branches of 
constructivism  can be used to defend HI, in the most extreme o f 
circumstances, it now seems fitting to address precisely what form those 
circumstances m ight take. Again, a review of the viewpoints espoused by
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each group reveals extensive agreement. Feminist, cosmopolitan, solidarist 
and communitarian constructivists all identify the threshold for military action 
as being extremely demanding, with nothing short of actual or impending 
genocide, or other equally alarming crimes against humanity, considered as 
adequate justification for the use of force. This is due to the fact that military 
incursion, even when conducted in a fashion which accords the highest 
priority to non-combatant immunity will inevitably cost human lives. In fact, at 
least from the perspective of communitarian, solidarist and some feminist 
constructivists, the risks attached to m ilitary incursion are so high that they 
can only be approved on a case-by-case basis.
Most branches of constructivism are capable of acknowledging the inter­
related nature of structural inequalities, extreme poverty, and political 
violence. This suggests that not only might HI be most successfully appraised 
in light of issues of redistributive justice but also that measures short of 
military incursion (well-managed econom ic sanctions, political and diplomatic 
pressures, and systemic reform designed to address ingrained hierarchies 
and inequalities) might be justified by a more expansive reading of the 
principle of conditional sovereignty. The com m itm ent to international justice 
implied by this appraisal is much further reaching than anything advocated by 
most communitarian constructivists, but is also considerably less amenable to 
the current restrictions of a consensual international society. Nevertheless, 
most constructivists contend that “ [i]t is important to remember that the 
‘responsibility to protect’ does not begin when armed conflict begins; rather,
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avoiding the outbreak of violence is another form of peace-making or 
keeping”.582
The contribution of feminist constructivists to the matter of just cause goes 
further, however, with the role of narrative and discourse analysis subverting 
some of the assumptions woven into JW  theory. Commentators like Anne 
Orford and Iris Young have successfully demonstrated that the category of 
just cause can be used to manipulate public sentiment, encouraging HI where 
it is not justified and avoiding it where it is necessary but not strategically 
viable. The transition from ‘the right to intervene’ to the ‘responsibility to 
protect’ has, arguably, consolidated this process, with the powerful rhetorical 
impact of notions of ‘protection’ threatening to reawaken imperialist ambitions 
and language. Therefore, the position of fem inist constructivists is 
dichotomous. On the one hand, advocates o f this position would like to 
witness more active (non-violent) intervention into the processes which lead to 
outbreaks of political violence but on the other, they would argue that the 
narratives used to justify intervention are often divisive and counter­
productive.
ii. Agency
Constructivists from the cosmopolitan, solidarist and communitarian traditions 
have all turned their attention to the issue o f agency and all have explored the 
possibility of overturning the exclusive jurisdiction of the UNSC. One 
proposition which emerges from this analysis is that if the UNSC fails to
582 DesAustels and Whisnant (ed), Global Feminist Ethics, p. 196
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discharge its duties, it forfeits its claim to legitimacy and can be circumvented. 
This position is surprisingly broad in its appeal and finds favour across the 
theoretical spectrum. In advocating the circumvention of the UNSC Buchanan, 
Walzer (and to a lesser extent) W heeler are suggesting that adherence to 
normative principles can even provide a basis for breaching the terms of PIL. 
This would appear to suggest that the ‘m iddle ground’ of constructivism has 
served partially to reconcile competing cosmopolitan, solidarist and 
communitarian perspectives. Although their conceptions of the origins of 
individual rights claims may differ, all three commentators appear to defend 
the position that the appeal to HR can (albeit to varying extents) transcend a 
legalistic commitment to the restrictions of the UN system. Once again, 
however, the distinction between casuistical and systematic analysis is 
pertinent in that Walzer and W heeler allow for the ad hoc compromising of 
certain legal standards, either through ‘em ergency ethics’ or mitigation, 
whereas Buchanan insists on the deliberate precedential reconceptualisation 
of those legal restrictions which are at odds with his foundational normative 
commitments.
This leads to a further critique of Buchanan’s position, namely the suggestion 
that insufficient consensus over the superiority o f liberal principles exists to 
support the notion of liberal dem ocracies  assuming a leading role in the 
regulation of the use of force. W hilst calls for the establishment of an 
alternative institution are popular among liberals, in truth “there is very little 
sign of their reflecting any political or legal consensus within international
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society as a whole”.583 This provides a further indication of the fact that the 
most effective prescriptions for becoming may entail case-by-case analysis 
and the ‘bending’ or reinterpreting of certain legal principles, rather than the 
flagrant and deliberately precedential infringem ent of PIL.
From the perspective of feminist constructivism , the crucial and divisive nature 
of the agency issue has been exaggerated. In fact, the suggestion is that in HI 
narratives, the UNSC, regional organisations, and individual states such as 
the US are presented as “largely interchangeable... heroic agents of 
progress, democratic values, peace and security, who shape target states 
through their interventions” .584 The most pressing consideration for feminist 
constructivists is that HI should not depend for its legitimacy on the exclusive 
matter of which agent spearheads it but, rather, on how and why it is
conducted and whether it is based on more than the gendered and racialised
dichotomies which so often underpin international politics.
iii. Motivation, Means, and Settlem ent
The issue of motivation represents a quandary in that whilst, in principle, 
many commentators argue that the strategic or neo-imperialist ambitions of 
the powerful must be restrained, forcing states to act on purely humanitarian 
impulse virtually precludes the possibility of HI. However, despite noteworthy 
differences of opinion concerning the acceptance, or otherwise, of mixed
motivation and its likely impact upon the success of HI, extensive agreement
exists as to the related matter of m ilitary means; specifically, that HI ought not
583 Hurrell, Global Order, p .156
584 Orford, ‘Muscular’, pp.692
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to take the form of aerial bombardment. In the simplest of terms, if the 
conditions on the ground justify HI (e ither from the perspective of covering-law 
or reiterative universalism) then they also provide justification for risking the 
lives of military personnel. Whilst, o f course, the safety of soldiers is an 
enormously important consideration “a fixed policy that their lives are 
expendable while ours are not can’t...b e  justified” .585 Hence, the suggestion, 
framed in somewhat litotic terms by ND W hite that “Bombing in the name of 
humanity may be a cause for concern for the international community” .586 For 
advocates of a constructivist approach to HI, the ju s  in bello standards 
dictated by JW theory represent a firm ly established international norm which 
has at its core the “absolute principle that civilians are not legitimate targets of 
war. This norm is enshrined in all the instruments of international 
humanitarian law, notably the Geneva Conventions (including the two 
additional Protocols signed in 1977), and it is a moral standard against which 
states feel it necessary to justify their actions” .587
A certain degree of purity of motivation and a responsible choice of military 
means are also likely to facilitate the establishm ent of a just settlement. 
Nevertheless, there can be no ‘qu ick-fix ’ in post-conflict resolution. As 
Thomas Weiss has claimed, in colloquial but persuasive terms:
[Tjhose civilians and soldiers who are looking for clear mandates and 
unambiguous exit strategies are demonstrating that they cannot stand the
585 Walzer, Just and Unjust, xiv
586 The Legality of Bombing in the Name of Humanity’, Journal o f Conflict and Security Law, 
5(1), 2000, pp.27-43, pp.43
58 Nicholas Wheeler, ‘Protecting Afghan Civilians from the Hell of War’, Social Science 
Research Council, [online], http://essavs.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/wheeler.htm, [02/02/09]
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heat generated by situational ethics. They should stay out of post-Cold War
humanitarian and peace operations’ kitchens.588
All of the constructivists who have turned their attention to the issue of HI 
appear to concur with this perspective, including Walzer who now believes 
that the ‘in and out’ test has been discredited by real world events. However, 
the challenge of offering support to a target state once widespread violence 
has ceased should not serve to mask cam paigns of enforced democratisation, 
or open the door to neo-colonialism. As this thesis has demonstrated, support 
for the R2P among developing states is currently tentative at best and any 
indication that HI carries with it an undertone of occupation will see even this 
limited endorsement withdrawn. The key appears to lie in conducting 
campaigns with the requisite cultural sensitivity and appreciation of events on 
the ground so that the complexities of warfare can be understood. The notion 
that HI is conducted to rescue ‘good guys’ from ‘bad guys’ and that once 
military engagement draws to a close these ‘good guys’ can be relied upon to 
restore good governance is a grotesque and dangerous over-simplification 
which can raise the political capital o f fringe, dissident, groups and even 
encourage the escalation of genocidal violence both before and after 
intervention.589 An ontology of becoming which takes account of the 
patriarchal implications of an ill-conceived approach to post-conflict resolution 
demonstrates that, if HI is to resolve disorder, rather than engender it, 
intervening states must do more than pay lip service to the tripartite structure
588 ‘Researching Humanitarian Intervention’, pp.425
589 See Jide Nzelibe, ‘Courting Genocide: The Unintended Effects of Humanitarian 
Intervention’, Public Law and Legal Theory Series: Northwestern University School of Law, 
Social Science Research Network, http://srrn.com/abstract=1290654
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of the R2P and ensure that the duty to rebuild is taken as seriously as the 
duty to react.
III. The Ontology of Becoming and the Constructed Duty of Justice
Having recapitulated the responses to the various subcategories of debate 
which inform discussions of HI, it now seems pertinent to attempt to 
extrapolate from these findings, some coherent constructivist principles of 
justice. This process brings to light the analytical virtues of two key concepts 
which have formed the basis of this thesis: the ontology of becoming and the 
constructed duty of justice. In simple terms, the relationship between 
international justice and the fem inist constructivist conception of the ontology 
of becoming represents the cornerstone of this project. The single most 
significant contribution of feminist constructivism  to this debate, and wider 
discussions of international justice, is the ontological shift from being to 
becoming. ‘Mainstreaming’ this notion encourages constructivists to combine 
a descriptive account of the realities of international politics with a 
prescriptive, yet realistic, appraisal of the direction in which international 
society could and should develop. It affords fem inist critique the respect that it 
deserves in that it consciously moves beyond the tendency to ‘add gender 
and stir’ but, equally, it forces those who are resistant to a mainstream 
engagement with gender to justify what are often knee-jerk accusations of 
cooption. The ontology of becoming identifies moral progress where it has 
taken place, without overstating such developments, and because it is openly 
normative, it allows its advocates to argue for a hierarchy of norms which 
privileges basic HR standards. Thus,
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[c]onstructivists might seek to identify the design features that facilitate the 
type of interstate interaction most likely to positively transform identities and 
interests around a preferred international norm.590
This effectively indicates that there is no implicit contradiction in accepting that 
a diversity of viewpoints constitute international society and yet 
simultaneously attempting to generate legitim acy for a particular perspective, 
by publicly raising certain moral claims and attempting to secure agreement 
over their content. In line with comm unitarian constructivist assumptions, this 
process is likely to prove most successful if the moral claim tallies with 
principles which are already common to a multitude of political communities, 
or, in other words, is based on appeals to the most basic of HR. Hence, 
notions of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ , which are designed to limit genocidal 
violence, are generally more palatable to the m em ber states of the UN than 
would be the establishment of a League of Democracies, which might have at 
the heart of its agenda “the aim of moving all other societies toward 
liberalism”.591 Although, this is an uncom fortable proposition for those who 
contend that “[j]ustice requires efforts to project democratic commitments 
beyond national borders” ,592 this is largely because these cosmopolitan 
constructivist philosophers often overestim ate the degree to which democratic 
governance has emerged as an international norm, which favours HR over all 
other considerations.
590 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello and Stepan Wood, ‘International Law and 
International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship’, The 
American Journal o f International Law, 92(3), July 1998, pp.367-397, pp.386
591 Nagel, ‘Global Justice’, pp. 134
592 Andrew Linklater, The Evolving Spheres of International Justice’, International Affairs, 
75(3), July 1999, pp473-482, pp.477
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The ontology of becoming forces us to accept that international justice is 
constituted by “both the rights o f states and the rights of individuals”593 and 
that, as such we are faced “som ewhat inevitably” with “the philosophically 
untidy and politically elastic notion that the scope of our obligations to 
individuals in other societies varies in time and space594” . This is not to 
suggest that “the duties of justice are” exclusively or even “essentially duties 
to our fellow citizens”595 but it is to make clear that any obligations which 
amount to “justify beyond borders”596 are necessarily limited. The guideline, 
drawn from Buchanan, that the prescriptions for international justice are 
conceivable if and only if they can withstand the demands of 
institutionalisation certainly provides one among many instructive yardsticks 
for ensuring the feasibility of proposals for becoming. However, feminist critics 
espouse the suggestion that institutions of global governance ought not to be 
perceived as a panacea. Instead, new or modified institutional mechanisms 
ought to do more than replicate the failings of their predecessors.
Even within an institutional framework, one of the principal challenges for 
justice theorists is balancing the competing rights claims of states and 
individuals and of citizens and ‘strangers’, it appears that the ‘middle ground’ 
between feminism and constructivism effectively provides the ‘middle ground’ 
between international order and international justice, between
593 Stanley Hoffman, Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities o f Ethical 
International Politics, (Syracuse, NY, Syracuse University Press, 1981), p .156-157
594 Ibid
595 Nagel, ‘Global Justice’, pp. 135
596 Geoffrey Best, ‘Justice, International Relations and Human Rights’, International Affairs, 
71(4), October 1995, pp.775-799, pp.780
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cosmopolitanism and com m unitarianism , and between interventionists and 
non-interventionists. This is because its advocates can successfully sketch 
the relationship between power and legitimacy and the incremental 
development of international norms. In so doing, they can concede that:
[T]he maintenance of legitimacy requires that states conform with the 
international community’s conception of justice. This conception changes 
from era to era, and thus there can be no single standard from which to judge 
what is just.597
However, they can also maintain that:
[tjhere is a tendency for a single concept of legitimacy to become generally 
dominant in a particular era. Statist principles, reflecting a legitimation that is 
founded on bases ranging from the balance of power to dynastic 
conservatism, have dominated at times. However, ‘the modern era has also 
seen the establishment of national self-determination as the basis of 
legitimate statehood, and the global extension of the reach of this legitimising 
principle has been one of the most significant developments of recent 
decades.598
Similarly, it is possible to contend that the focus on self-determination as the 
dominant ‘concept of legitimacy’ could, in time, be re-envisaged by the 
development of the discourse of HR. This process is not, as cosmopolitans 
would claim, already embedded across international society, neither is it, as 
realists or some pluralists would argue, a fanciful notion which has absolutely 
no purchase beyond the West. It is, instead, an aspirational and incremental 
set of standards which is becoming increasingly commonplace in the
597 Wellens, United Nations Security Council, pp.44
598 Ibid
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language of inter-state relations and which can be accessed, analysed, and 
arguably consolidated through the ontology of becoming.
In fact, language itself is a core elem ent of the ontology of becoming. This is 
due both to the fact that the influence of fem inist IR encourages the unpacking 
of loaded or bias discourse and to the potential for moral progress implicit in 
the language of diplomacy. After all,
[t]he argument that language constitutes reality is invariably used to show 
how a certain terminology sustains oppressive and unjust structures. But it 
has never been entirely clear why language need necessarily function in such 
a negative fashion; as good governance terminology permeates the 
international discourse, and becomes institutionalised in legal documents, is it 
not possible that it might help to constitute a more just reality?599
IV. Concluding Remarks
Each of the preceding chapters has been structured with a view to 
reassessing and augmenting the debate surrounding international justice and 
HI by investigating the nature and scope of the constructivist ontology of 
becoming. The contribution of the gender-sensitive perspective of feminist 
constructivism is to encourage a broader and more sophisticated 
understanding of humanitarian suffering; one which takes a fuller account of 
the economic disparities and gendered and racialised inequalities which 
permeate international society. It also emphasises the importance of 
deconstructing the ‘heroic narratives’ which often inform the rationale for HI 
and breaking away from assumptions concerning the universality of western
599 Armstrong, ‘Law, Justice’, pp.561
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masculinist conceptions of HR and liberal preconceptions of the neutrality of 
institutions of global governance. Allen Buchanan, though not always 
sufficiently constrained by the standards which he establishes to govern ideal 
theory, nonetheless brings to bear a compelling appraisal of the nature of 
institutional and political feasibility which can be incorporated into the ontology 
of becoming. Nicholas W heeler mounts a persuasive defence of the value of 
criteria-based casuistical analysis and investigates the possibility that PIL 
might be modified to take account o f humanitarian imperatives, without 
precipitating the degree of international d isorder feared by pluralists. Finally, 
Michael W alzer posits the notion that traditional JW  accounts of HI might be 
adapted to incorporate the requirement of Jus ad vim, whilst also contending 
that developments in the extent and depth of normative consensus have the 
potential to lay the foundations for a ‘third degree of global pluralism ’ in which 
the apparent dichotomy between states’ rights and human rights may prove 
increasing reconcilable.
So it is that in matters of international justice, the ontology of becoming, 
shared by a range of constructivist com m entators, emphasises the potential 
for durable reform in international society but anchors this commitment in a 
realistic appraisal of the lim itations of the current state system. In so doing, it 
builds upon Hedley Bull’s suggestion that “ it is better to recognise that we are 
in darkness than to pretend that we can see the light”600 by arguing that that 
instead of ‘pretending’, we can make use o f that little knowledge which we do 
share to ‘imagine’ what this light m ight look like and in which direction it is
600 The Anarchical Society: A Study in World Politics, (London, Macmillan, 1977), p.320
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liable to lead us. There should be no automatic assumption that the 
teleological progress of international society will lead inexorably to a world of 
democratic states but neither should we embrace the defeatist and reductivist 
assumption that progress within the system is impossible. Instead we should 
accept that “while a world society is clearly not taking shape on the back of 
developments of the kind described by... progressivists, neither is the society 
of states unchanged from its nineteenth century form ” .601 In short, inter-state 
relations have begun to evolve as “justice considerations have moved to the 
centre of the discipline”602 and there is every reason to believe that this 
evolution, no matter how inconsistent and frustratingly incremental, can and 
will persist in the future.
Given the vast array of theoretical and practical challenges which inform HI, it 
is little wonder than no one theoretical account has proved able to 
encapsulate or resolve this impenetrable issue. HI and international justice 
more generally, pit the central foundational assumptions of international 
society against one another and beg a series o f seemingly unanswerable 
questions as to how a system of state consent can take seriously the 
demands of individual rights. W hilst it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
provide comprehensive responses to these mystifying enquiries, it is the 
combination of the ontology of becoming and the constructed duty of justice 
which, at the very least, establishes a fram ework for future research and 
critical engagement with competing approaches to international justice.
bU1 Ibid, pp.558
602 Linklater, ‘Evolving Spheres’, pp.747
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E-mail, addressed to Professor Nicholas Wheeler, Aberystwyth University, 
dated 12/05/06:
Dear Professor Wheeler,
My name is Claire Malcolm and I am a Postgraduate Student at Cardiff University’s 
School of European Studies. At present, I am engaged in preparation for my master’s 
thesis, based on a critical engagement with the issue of humanitarian intervention. 
The project takes aim at a comparison between Michael Walzer’s contribution to the 
debate and the central tenets of your own publication, Saving S trangers. With this in 
mind, I would greatly appreciate the opportunity to meet with you in person to discuss 
some of the issues surrounding the development of humanitarian intervention and 
the Responsibility to Protect. I anticipate that the interview I should like to conduct will 
take no more than an hour and, of course, I would be more than happy to provide 
you with a list of questions in advance. In the event that you may be able to make 
yourself available in the coming months, please could you contact me on this e-mail 
address to advise me as to which date(s) might be convenient for you.
Thank you in advance for your assistance in this matter.
